diff --git a/examples/unified-memory/README.md b/examples/unified-memory/README.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bc4cbb1b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/unified-memory/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +# Cross-harness memory conformance example + +Run the existing ECC CLI and local stdio MCP server against one disposable +synthetic vault. The example checks that the same scoped query returns the same +ordered records, scores, excerpts, and provenance for each configured identity. + +From an ECC checkout with its runtime dependencies already available: + +```sh +node examples/unified-memory/conformance.cjs +``` + +No model, network, Graphiti service, package installation, or native harness +application is required. The example uses the existing Ajv dependency. It +creates temporary synthetic project, team, and user records, starts bounded +Node subprocesses, and removes the temporary vaults when finished. Existing +vault locations and ambient credential variables are not passed to children. + +## What runs + +The CLI creates a shared project record, team context, a Codex-targeted record, +a user record, and another project's record. Separate MCP processes configured +as `codex`, `claude`, and `hermes` each perform the same requests. These names +are host configuration in the example, not authenticated sessions in those +applications. + +The 24 checks cover: + +- Ordered CLI/MCP search parity and reproducibility after process restart. +- Stable IDs, scope, source attribution, timestamps, body, and unreviewed trust. +- Targeted read visibility and separate project roots. +- Rejection of client identity overrides, target-filter overrides, trust + promotion, and user access without host opt-in. +- Server-stamped Hermes handoff attribution, preserved memory links, and evidence + verification in both CLI-to-MCP and MCP-to-CLI directions. +- Source-content matching against a separate synthetic source catalog, with + tampered content/digest, missing-source and foreign-context rejection. +- Synthetic private-key marker rejection through CLI and MCP without changing + the recalled dataset. +- Explicit user-scope recall after operator opt-in. +- Failed startup when the host provides no identity. +- Source files and Git HEAD unchanged after execution. + +Success prints a JSON receipt with individual checks, timestamps, Node version, +source hashes, and the example's digest. Failure returns a nonzero exit status +without printing raw subprocess output or memory content. The source hashes +identify the executed files; Git HEAD alone does not prove that a checkout is +clean. Installed dependencies are reused and are not digest-pinned by this +example. This is focused conformance verification, not a full-suite result or +a deployment receipt. The source receipt includes the example verifier digest; + dependency identity and native-harness integration remain separate checks. + +## Contract and auth boundary + +The example reuses `ecc.memory.v1` without adding fields. Project and team are +the default scopes; user recall requires an explicit request and MCP host +opt-in. The host pins `ECC_MEMORY_HARNESS`; clients cannot supply their own +source identity or target filter through tool arguments. All writes remain +`unreviewed` context subordinate to current instructions. + +The fixture body uses `ecc.memory.example-evidence.v1`, an **example-local** +JSON envelope inside the existing Markdown body. No fields are added to +`ecc.memory.v1`. `evidence.cjs` checks a source reference, content digest, +observation time, session ID and checkpoint ID against an independent, +host-owned in-memory catalog. The envelope text must equal the catalog's exact +source bytes. There is no summary/derivation validation in this example. + +The verifier requires an exact workspace and scope match. Context is supplied +by the example host using the selected vault and returned memory scope; it is +not accepted from claims in the envelope. Only bounded `fixture:` identifiers +are supported, with no path/URL lookup, filesystem read, network fallback or +ambient source discovery. Missing evidence fails explicitly. Success returns +`source-content-match`, never a trust promotion. The original observation time +is compared to the catalog, not treated as proof of current factual validity. + +This verifies integrity relative to the host's catalog, not signed authorship, +identity authentication, an immutable journal or statement truth. An operator +who rewrites both catalog and memory can create another matching pair. The +catalog is synthetic, process-local and not a durable archive; references do +not promise continued source availability. The verifier does not execute +memory text or make it authoritative. All vault records remain `unreviewed`. + +Run the pure in-memory negative and boundary checks separately: + +```sh +node examples/unified-memory/evidence.test.cjs +``` + +These checks cover changed text, recomputed/altered digests, altered timestamps, +session/checkpoint substitutions, missing sources, workspace/scope mismatches, +unknown fields/schema, malformed/oversized envelopes and invalid host inputs. +They start no server and require only Node built-ins. The conformance runner +also saves two deliberately altered synthetic envelopes: core storage accepts +unreviewed context, while this example's verifier rejects those recalled bodies. +The verifier is not automatically enabled in core CLI/MCP save or recall paths. + +The private-key rejection fixture is a deliberately incomplete marker containing +no key material. It exercises the existing best-effort secret scanner, not a +complete privacy classifier or permission system. Never substitute private +transcripts, credentials or production records into the public example. + +`targetHarnesses` constrains MCP routing, not same-user filesystem access. The +CLI is an operator interface: direct CLI reads can access a targeted record +without a harness target filter, and the CLI can choose source attribution. +Separate OS accounts or equivalent filesystem isolation are necessary when +local processes are mutually untrusted. + +The example provides no unified OAuth, delegated credential lifecycle, plan +token routing, cross-machine synchronization, Graphiti partition policy, or +Hermes MemoryProvider integration. A future backend adapter must preserve the +existing record contract and enforce its authenticated partition policy +separately from routing metadata. + +See [the memory vault design](../../docs/design/ecc-memory-vault.md) for the +canonical storage and threat contract. diff --git a/examples/unified-memory/conformance.cjs b/examples/unified-memory/conformance.cjs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a8fb424fe --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/unified-memory/conformance.cjs @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +'use strict'; + +// Runs existing ECC code against disposable synthetic vaults. No service or SDK installs. +const assert = require('node:assert/strict'); +const fs = require('node:fs'); +const os = require('node:os'); +const path = require('node:path'); +const crypto = require('node:crypto'); +const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); +const { encodeEvidence, verifyEvidence } = require('./evidence.cjs'); + +const repo = path.resolve(__dirname, '../..'); +const sha256 = bytes => crypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex'); +const cleanEnv = { PATH: process.env.PATH || '/usr/bin:/bin' }; +// Use the already installed Ajv; no package manager or network operation occurs. +let dependencyRoot; +try { + dependencyRoot = path.dirname(path.dirname(require.resolve('ajv/package.json'))); +} catch { + process.stderr.write('ECC memory example requires the existing Ajv runtime dependency.\n'); + process.exit(1); +} +const sourcePaths = [ + 'scripts/memory.js', 'scripts/memory-mcp.mjs', 'scripts/lib/memory-vault.js', + 'scripts/lib/memory-vault-format.js', 'scripts/lib/path-safety.js', + 'scripts/lib/missing-dependency.js', 'schemas/memory.schema.json', 'package.json', + 'examples/unified-memory/evidence.cjs', +]; +function snapshot() { + return Object.fromEntries(sourcePaths.map(file => [file, sha256(fs.readFileSync(path.join(repo, file)))])); +} +function sourceHead() { + const result = spawnSync('git', ['-C', repo, 'rev-parse', 'HEAD'], { + encoding: 'utf8', env: cleanEnv, timeout: 5000, maxBuffer: 1024, + }); + return result.status === 0 && /^[a-f0-9]{40}\s*$/.test(result.stdout) ? result.stdout.trim() : null; +} +const before = snapshot(); +const headBefore = sourceHead(); +const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'ecc-memory-conformance-')); +const checks = []; +const startedAt = new Date().toISOString(); +function envFor(partition = 'alpha', harness = 'codex', allowUser = false) { + const cwd = path.join(root, partition); + fs.mkdirSync(cwd, { recursive: true }); + return { cwd, env: { ...cleanEnv, + NODE_PATH: dependencyRoot, + ECC_MEMORY_PROJECT_ROOT: path.join(cwd, 'vault'), + ECC_MEMORY_USER_ROOT: path.join(root, 'synthetic-user'), + ...(harness ? { ECC_MEMORY_HARNESS: harness } : {}), + ECC_MEMORY_ALLOW_USER_SCOPE: allowUser ? '1' : '0', + } }; +} +function run(script, args, input, options) { + return spawnSync(process.execPath, [path.join(repo, script), ...args], { + ...options, input, encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000, maxBuffer: 2 * 1024 * 1024, + }); +} +function cli(args, input = '', partition = 'alpha') { + const result = run('scripts/memory.js', [...args, '--json'], input, envFor(partition)); + assert.equal(result.status, 0, 'Synthetic CLI operation failed; raw output withheld'); + return JSON.parse(result.stdout); +} +function mcp(harness, calls, partition = 'alpha', allowUser = false) { + const frames = [ + { jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'initialize', params: { + protocolVersion: '2025-11-25', capabilities: {}, + clientInfo: { name: 'ecc-lane-conformance', version: '1.0.0' }, + } }, + { jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'notifications/initialized', params: {} }, + ...calls.map(([name, args], index) => ({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: index + 2, + method: 'tools/call', params: { name, arguments: args } })), + ]; + const result = run('scripts/memory-mcp.mjs', [], + frames.map(frame => JSON.stringify(frame)).join('\n') + '\n', envFor(partition, harness, allowUser)); + assert.equal(result.status, 0, 'Synthetic MCP process failed; raw output withheld'); + const responses = result.stdout.trim().split('\n').map(line => JSON.parse(line)); + assert.equal(responses.length, calls.length + 1, 'Missing or extra MCP response'); + assert.equal(responses[0].result.protocolVersion, '2025-11-25'); + return calls.map((_, index) => { + const response = responses.find(item => item.id === index + 2); + assert.ok(response, 'Missing correlated MCP response'); + return response; + }); +} +function payload(response) { + assert.equal(response.error, undefined, 'Unexpected JSON-RPC error'); + assert.notEqual(response.result.isError, true, 'Unexpected tool rejection'); + return JSON.parse(response.result.content.find(item => item.type === 'text').text); +} +function check(name, fn) { fn(); checks.push({ name, passed: true }); } +function save(title, scope = 'project', target = 'all', partition = 'alpha', body = 'Synthetic orbit evidence.') { + return cli(['save', '--title', title, '--scope', scope, '--source-harness', 'codex', + '--target', target, '--stdin'], body, partition).memory; +} + +try { + const sourceText = 'Synthetic fixture only: orbit project uses scoped memory.'; + // Kept separately from recalled content; memory cannot supply its own source catalog. + const sources = new Map([['fixture:orbit', Object.freeze({ workspace: 'alpha', scope: 'project', text: sourceText, + observedAt: startedAt, sessionId: 'fixture-session', checkpointId: 'fixture-checkpoint' })]]); + const evidenceContext = { workspace: 'alpha', scope: 'project' }; + const body = encodeEvidence('fixture:orbit', sources, evidenceContext); + const shared = save('orbit shared evidence', 'project', 'all', 'alpha', body); + const team = save('orbit team context', 'team'); + const targeted = save('orbit codex context', 'project', 'codex'); + const user = save('orbit user context', 'user'); + const other = save('orbit other project', 'project', 'all', 'beta'); + + for (const harness of ['codex', 'claude', 'hermes']) { + const result = mcp(harness, [ + ['memory_search', { query: 'orbit' }], + ['memory_read', { id: shared.id }], + ['memory_read', { id: targeted.id }], + ['memory_search', { query: 'orbit', scopes: ['user'] }], + ['memory_save', { title: 'spoof', body: 'Synthetic', sourceHarness: 'other' }], + ['memory_search', { query: 'orbit', targetHarness: 'codex' }], + ['memory_save', { title: 'trusted', body: 'Synthetic', trust: 'verified' }], + ['memory_read', { id: user.id, scope: 'user' }], + ['memory_save', { title: 'user write', body: 'Synthetic', scope: 'user' }], + ]); + check(`${harness}: CLI/MCP ordered search parity`, () => { + const expected = cli(['search', 'orbit', '--target-harness', harness]); + assert.deepEqual(payload(result[0]).results, expected.results.map(({ memory, score, excerpt }) => ({ memory, score, excerpt }))); + const ids = payload(result[0]).results.map(item => item.memory.id); + assert.ok(ids.includes(shared.id) && ids.includes(team.id)); + assert.equal(ids.includes(targeted.id), harness === 'codex'); + assert.ok(!ids.includes(user.id) && !ids.includes(other.id)); + }); + check(`${harness}: read preserves provenance and unreviewed trust`, () => { + const read = payload(result[1]).memory; + assert.equal(read.body, body); + for (const field of ['id', 'scope', 'sourceHarness', 'targetHarnesses', 'createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'trust']) { + assert.deepEqual(read[field], shared[field]); + } + assert.equal(read.trust, 'unreviewed'); + const cliRead = cli(['read', shared.id]).memory; + assert.deepEqual(verifyEvidence(read.body, sources, { workspace: 'alpha', scope: read.scope }), + verifyEvidence(cliRead.body, sources, { workspace: 'alpha', scope: cliRead.scope })); + }); + check(`${harness}: direct target visibility enforced by MCP`, () => { + if (harness === 'codex') assert.equal(payload(result[2]).memory.id, targeted.id); + else assert.equal(result[2].result.isError, true); + }); + check(`${harness}: scope elevation, identity spoofing and trust promotion rejected`, () => { + for (const response of result.slice(3)) assert.equal(response.error?.code, -32602); + }); + check(`${harness}: query reproducible across process restart`, () => { + assert.deepEqual(payload(mcp(harness, [['memory_search', { query: 'orbit' }]])[0]), payload(result[0])); + }); + } + check('MCP write identity and evidence survive CLI handoff read', () => { + sources.set('fixture:handoff', Object.freeze({ workspace: 'alpha', scope: 'project', text: 'Synthetic handoff.', + observedAt: startedAt, sessionId: 'fixture-hermes-session', checkpointId: 'fixture-handoff' })); + const handoffBody = encodeEvidence('fixture:handoff', sources, evidenceContext); + const saved = payload(mcp('hermes', [['memory_save', { title: 'handoff fixture', body: handoffBody, + kind: 'handoff', targetHarnesses: ['codex'], links: [shared.id] }]])[0]).memory; + assert.equal(saved.sourceHarness, 'hermes'); + assert.equal(saved.trust, 'unreviewed'); + const read = payload(mcp('codex', [['memory_read', { id: saved.id }]])[0]).memory; + assert.deepEqual(read.links, [shared.id]); + const cliRead = cli(['read', saved.id]).memory; + assert.equal(cliRead.body, handoffBody); + assert.equal(cliRead.sourceHarness, 'hermes'); + assert.equal(cliRead.trust, 'unreviewed'); + assert.deepEqual(verifyEvidence(cliRead.body, sources, { workspace: 'alpha', scope: cliRead.scope }), + verifyEvidence(read.body, sources, { workspace: 'alpha', scope: read.scope })); + }); + check('operator opt-in enables only explicit user recall', () => { + const result = mcp('hermes', [['memory_search', { query: 'orbit', scopes: ['user'] }], + ['memory_search', { query: 'orbit' }]], 'alpha', true); + assert.deepEqual(payload(result[0]).results.map(item => item.memory.id), [user.id]); + assert.ok(!payload(result[1]).results.some(item => item.memory.id === user.id)); + }); + check('separate project root excludes alpha records', () => { + const read = mcp('hermes', [['memory_search', { query: 'orbit' }], ['memory_read', { id: shared.id }]], 'beta'); + assert.deepEqual(payload(read[0]).results.map(item => item.memory.id), [other.id]); + assert.equal(read[1].result.isError, true); + }); + check('CLI direct read is operator access, not target authorization', () => { + assert.equal(cli(['read', targeted.id]).memory.id, targeted.id); + }); + check('missing configured identity prevents MCP startup', () => { + const result = run('scripts/memory-mcp.mjs', [], '', envFor('alpha', null)); + assert.equal(result.status, 1); + assert.match(result.stderr, /ECC_MEMORY_HARNESS/); + }); + check('recalled evidence rejects tamper, unavailable source and foreign context', () => { + const read = payload(mcp('codex', [['memory_read', { id: shared.id }]])[0]).memory; + const altered = JSON.stringify({ ...JSON.parse(read.body), text: 'Synthetic altered evidence.' }); + assert.throws(() => verifyEvidence(altered, sources, evidenceContext), { code: 'SOURCE_MISMATCH' }); + assert.throws(() => verifyEvidence(read.body, new Map(), evidenceContext), { code: 'SOURCE_UNAVAILABLE' }); + assert.throws(() => verifyEvidence(read.body, sources, { ...evidenceContext, workspace: 'beta' }), + { code: 'CONTEXT_MISMATCH' }); + assert.throws(() => verifyEvidence(read.body, sources, { ...evidenceContext, scope: 'user' }), + { code: 'CONTEXT_MISMATCH' }); + }); + check('stored altered content and digest fail evidence verification after MCP recall', () => { + for (const change of [{ text: 'Synthetic altered content.' }, { sha256: '0'.repeat(64) }]) { + const altered = JSON.stringify({ ...JSON.parse(body), ...change }); + const saved = save('evidence rejection fixture', 'project', 'all', 'alpha', altered); + const read = payload(mcp('hermes', [['memory_read', { id: saved.id }]])[0]).memory; + assert.equal(read.id, saved.id); + assert.equal(read.body, altered); + assert.equal(read.trust, 'unreviewed'); + assert.throws(() => verifyEvidence(read.body, sources, { workspace: 'alpha', scope: read.scope }), + { code: 'SOURCE_MISMATCH' }); + } + }); + check('synthetic private-key marker rejected without changing recalled dataset', () => { + // Deliberately incomplete synthetic marker; never a real key or private input. + const marker = '-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nSynthetic non-key fixture.'; + const beforePrivacy = cli(['search', 'orbit', '--target-harness', 'codex']).results; + const cliDenied = run('scripts/memory.js', ['save', '--title', 'orbit rejected fixture', '--stdin', '--json'], + marker, envFor()); + assert.equal(cliDenied.status, 1, 'Synthetic sensitive write must be rejected'); + assert.equal(cliDenied.error, undefined, 'CLI rejection must not be a subprocess failure'); + assert.match(cliDenied.stderr, /suspected secret/i); + const mcpDenied = mcp('codex', [['memory_save', { title: 'orbit rejected fixture', body: marker }]])[0]; + assert.equal(mcpDenied.result.isError, true, 'Synthetic sensitive write must be a tool rejection'); + const rejection = JSON.parse(mcpDenied.result.content.find(item => item.type === 'text').text); + assert.equal(rejection.error.code, 'MEMORY_WRITE_REJECTED'); + assert.equal(rejection.error.message, 'Memory operation rejected a suspected secret.'); + assert.deepEqual(cli(['search', 'orbit', '--target-harness', 'codex']).results, beforePrivacy); + assert.deepEqual(payload(mcp('codex', [['memory_search', { query: 'orbit' }]])[0]).results, beforePrivacy); + }); + check('source files and HEAD unchanged after execution', () => { + assert.deepEqual(snapshot(), before); + assert.equal(sourceHead(), headBefore); + }); + process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 'ecc.memory.conformance.receipt.v1', + status: 'passed', startedAt, completedAt: new Date().toISOString(), nodeVersion: process.version, + source: { head: headBefore, files: before, + executionMode: 'local source files with existing dependencies; no fetch performed', + identityBoundary: 'File digests identify executed source; HEAD alone does not establish a clean tree.' }, + exampleSha256: sha256(fs.readFileSync(__filename)), checks, + evidenceBoundary: 'Synthetic real CLI/stdio execution. No live harness, Graphiti, OAuth, replication or deployment verification.', + }, null, 2) + '\n'); +} catch (error) { + // Never print raw process output or assertion values into the receipt. + process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify({ status: 'failed', passedChecks: checks.map(item => item.name), + errorType: error.name, message: 'Conformance failed after the listed checks; inspect the next synthetic operation.' }) + '\n'); + process.exitCode = 1; +} finally { + fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); +} diff --git a/examples/unified-memory/evidence.cjs b/examples/unified-memory/evidence.cjs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ba12aaf92 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/unified-memory/evidence.cjs @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +'use strict'; + +// Example-only integrity checks. A host-owned catalog is not an identity provider. +const { createHash } = require('node:crypto'); +const SCHEMA = 'ecc.memory.example-evidence.v1'; +const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 16 * 1024; +const MAX_TEXT_BYTES = 8 * 1024; +const ENVELOPE_KEYS = ['schema', 'sourceRef', 'sha256', 'text', 'observedAt', 'sessionId', 'checkpointId']; +const SOURCE_KEYS = ['workspace', 'scope', 'text', 'observedAt', 'sessionId', 'checkpointId']; +const slug = value => typeof value === 'string' && /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$/.test(value); +const sourceRefIsValid = value => typeof value === 'string' && /^fixture:[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$/.test(value); +const digest = text => createHash('sha256').update(text, 'utf8').digest('hex'); + +function fail(code) { + const error = new Error(`Memory example evidence: ${code}`); + error.code = code; + throw error; +} +function hasExactKeys(value, keys) { + return value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value) + && Object.keys(value).length === keys.length && keys.every(key => Object.hasOwn(value, key)); +} +function validObservation(value) { + if (typeof value !== 'string' || !/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\.\d{3}Z$/.test(value)) return false; + const date = new Date(value); + return Number.isFinite(date.getTime()) && date.toISOString() === value; +} +function validSourceFields(value) { + return typeof value.text === 'string' && value.text.length > 0 && value.text.length <= MAX_TEXT_BYTES + && Buffer.byteLength(value.text, 'utf8') <= MAX_TEXT_BYTES + // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- Intentionally reject C0 except tab/LF/CR, and DEL. + && !/[\u0000-\u0008\u000b\u000c\u000e-\u001f\u007f]/.test(value.text) + && validObservation(value.observedAt) && slug(value.sessionId) && slug(value.checkpointId); +} +function validateEnvelope(value) { + if (!hasExactKeys(value, ENVELOPE_KEYS) || value.schema !== SCHEMA || !sourceRefIsValid(value.sourceRef) + || typeof value.sha256 !== 'string' || !/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(value.sha256) || !validSourceFields(value)) { + fail('INVALID_ENVELOPE'); + } +} +function getSource(sourceRef, catalog, context) { + if (!hasExactKeys(context, ['workspace', 'scope']) || !slug(context.workspace) + || !['project', 'team', 'user'].includes(context.scope)) fail('INVALID_CONTEXT'); + if (!(catalog instanceof Map) || !sourceRefIsValid(sourceRef)) fail('INVALID_SOURCE'); + const source = catalog.get(sourceRef); + if (source === undefined) fail('SOURCE_UNAVAILABLE'); + if (!hasExactKeys(source, SOURCE_KEYS) || !validSourceFields(source) || !slug(source.workspace) + || !['project', 'team', 'user'].includes(source.scope)) fail('INVALID_SOURCE'); + if (source.workspace !== context.workspace || source.scope !== context.scope) fail('CONTEXT_MISMATCH'); + return source; +} +function decode(body) { + if (typeof body !== 'string' || body.length > MAX_BODY_BYTES || Buffer.byteLength(body, 'utf8') > MAX_BODY_BYTES) { + fail('INVALID_ENVELOPE'); + } + let value; + try { value = JSON.parse(body); } catch { fail('INVALID_ENVELOPE'); } + validateEnvelope(value); + return value; +} + +function encodeEvidence(sourceRef, catalog, context) { + const source = getSource(sourceRef, catalog, context); + const body = JSON.stringify({ schema: SCHEMA, sourceRef, sha256: digest(source.text), text: source.text, + observedAt: source.observedAt, sessionId: source.sessionId, checkpointId: source.checkpointId }); + decode(body); + return body; +} + +function verifyEvidence(body, catalog, context) { + const value = decode(body); + const source = getSource(value.sourceRef, catalog, context); + if (value.sha256 !== digest(source.text) || value.text !== source.text + || value.observedAt !== source.observedAt || value.sessionId !== source.sessionId + || value.checkpointId !== source.checkpointId) fail('SOURCE_MISMATCH'); + return Object.freeze({ status: 'source-content-match', sourceRef: value.sourceRef, sha256: value.sha256 }); +} + +module.exports = { encodeEvidence, verifyEvidence }; diff --git a/examples/unified-memory/evidence.test.cjs b/examples/unified-memory/evidence.test.cjs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..510a67e9c --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/unified-memory/evidence.test.cjs @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +'use strict'; + +// Pure synthetic checks: no subprocess, filesystem fixture, provider or server. +const assert = require('node:assert/strict'); +const { encodeEvidence, verifyEvidence } = require('./evidence.cjs'); +const sourceRef = 'fixture:orbit'; +const source = Object.freeze({ workspace: 'alpha', scope: 'project', + text: 'Synthetic orbit evidence: calibration color is amber.', + observedAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', sessionId: 'fixture-session', checkpointId: 'fixture-checkpoint' }); +const context = Object.freeze({ workspace: 'alpha', scope: 'project' }); +const catalog = new Map([[sourceRef, source]]); +const body = () => encodeEvidence(sourceRef, catalog, context); +const edit = change => JSON.stringify({ ...JSON.parse(body()), ...change }); +let passed = 0; +function test(name, fn) { + try { fn(); passed += 1; } + catch { throw new Error(`Synthetic evidence check failed: ${name}`); } +} +function rejects(fn, code) { + assert.throws(fn, error => error.code === code + && error.message === `Memory example evidence: ${code}`); +} + +test('valid source content and provenance match', () => { + const result = verifyEvidence(body(), catalog, context); + assert.equal(result.status, 'source-content-match'); + assert.equal(result.sourceRef, sourceRef); + assert.equal(result.sha256, JSON.parse(body()).sha256); + assert.ok(Object.isFrozen(result)); +}); +test('deterministic encoding preserves input catalog', () => { + const before = JSON.stringify([...catalog]); + assert.equal(body(), body()); + assert.equal(JSON.stringify([...catalog]), before); +}); +for (const [name, change] of [ + ['changed text', { text: 'Synthetic altered content.' }], + ['changed digest', { sha256: '0'.repeat(64) }], + ['changed observation', { observedAt: '2026-01-02T00:00:00.000Z' }], + ['changed session', { sessionId: 'other-session' }], + ['changed checkpoint', { checkpointId: 'other-checkpoint' }], +]) { + test(name, () => rejects(() => verifyEvidence(edit(change), catalog, context), 'SOURCE_MISMATCH')); +} +test('missing source never becomes successful empty evidence', () => { + rejects(() => verifyEvidence(body(), new Map(), context), 'SOURCE_UNAVAILABLE'); +}); +test('same reference in another workspace is denied', () => { + rejects(() => verifyEvidence(body(), catalog, { ...context, workspace: 'beta' }), 'CONTEXT_MISMATCH'); +}); +test('project evidence cannot be relabeled as user evidence', () => { + rejects(() => verifyEvidence(body(), catalog, { ...context, scope: 'user' }), 'CONTEXT_MISMATCH'); +}); +test('creation enforces host context too', () => { + rejects(() => encodeEvidence(sourceRef, catalog, { ...context, workspace: 'beta' }), 'CONTEXT_MISMATCH'); +}); +for (const [name, value] of [ + ['unknown schema', () => edit({ schema: 'unrecognized' })], + ['unknown authority field', () => edit({ trust: 'verified' })], + ['external URL is not a source lookup', () => edit({ sourceRef: 'https://example.invalid/source' })], + ['path is not a source lookup', () => edit({ sourceRef: '../private-source' })], + ['invalid timestamp', () => edit({ observedAt: '2026-02-30T00:00:00.000Z' })], + ['missing checkpoint', () => { const value = JSON.parse(body()); delete value.checkpointId; return JSON.stringify(value); }], + ['malformed JSON', () => '{'], + ['non-object JSON', () => 'null'], + ['oversized body', () => 'x'.repeat(16385)], +]) { + test(name, () => rejects(() => verifyEvidence(value(), catalog, context), 'INVALID_ENVELOPE')); +} +test('unavailable source is also denied during creation', () => { + rejects(() => encodeEvidence(sourceRef, new Map(), context), 'SOURCE_UNAVAILABLE'); +}); +test('changed catalog content invalidates a previously encoded body', () => { + const changed = new Map([[sourceRef, { ...source, text: 'Synthetic revised evidence.' }]]); + rejects(() => verifyEvidence(body(), changed, context), 'SOURCE_MISMATCH'); +}); +test('recomputed attacker digest does not replace host source binding', () => { + const crypto = require('node:crypto'); + const text = 'Synthetic attacker replacement.'; + const sha256 = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(text).digest('hex'); + rejects(() => verifyEvidence(edit({ text, sha256 }), catalog, context), 'SOURCE_MISMATCH'); +}); +test('invalid host source is not a record success', () => { + const invalid = new Map([[sourceRef, { ...source, text: '' }]]); + rejects(() => encodeEvidence(sourceRef, invalid, context), 'INVALID_SOURCE'); +}); +test('invalid host context is denied before source lookup', () => { + rejects(() => verifyEvidence(body(), catalog, { workspace: 'alpha', scope: 'all' }), 'INVALID_CONTEXT'); +}); +test('rejects forbidden C0 controls and DEL in source and recalled text', () => { + const codes = [...Array.from({ length: 32 }, (_, code) => code), 127] + .filter(code => ![9, 10, 13].includes(code)); + for (const code of codes) { + const text = `Synthetic ${String.fromCodePoint(code)} content.`; + const invalid = new Map([[sourceRef, { ...source, text }]]); + rejects(() => encodeEvidence(sourceRef, invalid, context), 'INVALID_SOURCE'); + rejects(() => verifyEvidence(edit({ text }), catalog, context), 'INVALID_ENVELOPE'); + } +}); +test('preserves allowed whitespace, printable boundaries and non-C0 Unicode', () => { + for (const code of [9, 10, 13, 32, 126, 128, 0x2028, 0x1f642]) { + const text = `Synthetic ${String.fromCodePoint(code)} content.`; + const allowed = new Map([[sourceRef, { ...source, text }]]); + const encoded = encodeEvidence(sourceRef, allowed, context); + assert.equal(verifyEvidence(encoded, allowed, context).status, 'source-content-match'); + } +}); +process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify({ status: 'passed', checks: passed, + boundary: 'Synthetic in-memory evidence checks; no authentication or runtime-service verification.' })}\n`);