Include and exclusion globs now honour class members, ranges and negation.
A malformed class admits nothing as an include and covers the target as an exclusion.
- Ask class-specific first-touch questions (instruction, test, prose,
config, code); code questions are unchanged.
- Credit a completed Glob/Grep/LS or shell search from the current human
turn that covered the target; Read and exclusion globs never count.
- Collapse same-class new-file creations in one directory within a turn.
- Add opt-in GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS session cap (from #2755).
- Always gate sensitive targets, judged on lexical and real paths.
- Canonicalize checked-path keys.
Closes#2608
Co-authored-by: SulimanAbdulrazzaq <suliman9000a@gmail.com>
Preserve the original contributor histories and apply the exact independently reviewed repair.
Source-Parent: 74023e5689
Review-Manifest-SHA256: 208a6350119857df7c1e5b83a46cdba0b7f7399f58ed60167397920c7a21b454
Preserve the original contributor histories and apply the exact independently reviewed repair.
Source-Parent: dee884656e
Review-Manifest-SHA256: 0c7eeef7c2722a605d049daf2dc3c2473c10dd616005afcba21049fc036d8ce9
Preserve original contributor history and all current-main assertions while bounding quote, heredoc, shell-option and deferred-scan handling.
Source-PR: https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC/pull/2965
Source-Parent: 5a878131de
Main-Parent: d3b8a3e908
Review-Manifest-SHA256: 5d23f47e60516b66733805aec0ebcd47f19265c964529fa0b1220c8aa6903add
Preserve contributor history and current-main behavior while resolving the exact reviewed follow-up.
Source-PR: https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC/pull/2829
Source-Parent: d811349224
Review-Manifest-SHA256: a7209685b2a5726777f7450a5983c28add8759654969b09ba3e4b803fcfaf8bd
Preserve the contributor repair and current main protections. Handle operand ordering, bounded literal command wrappers, executable containers and find actions while keeping quoted prose and option values passive.
Source-PR: https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC/pull/2829
Source-Head: c88b3f879a
Integration-Main: d3b8a3e908
* fix(gateguard): sanitize dangerous invisible unicode in denial paths
sanitizePath only stripped control characters and bidi overrides, so
the 394 codepoints that the repo-wide unicode safety policy classifies
as dangerous-invisible (zero-width U+200B-200D, U+2060, U+2061-2064,
variation selectors U+FE00-FE0F, tag block U+E0000-E007F, Hangul
fillers, U+FEFF, U+180E, U+3164) plus the U+2028/U+2029 line and
paragraph separators passed verbatim into Edit/Write denial messages.
Invisible characters in a quoted file path let a malicious path look
clean to a human reviewer.
Align sanitizePath with the CI policy list and cover it with a
hook-output regression test that asserts no dangerous invisible
character survives into the denial reason while visible path text
stays intact.
* refactor(gateguard): name the sanitizePath unicode policy constants
Address review feedback: move the code points and ranges out of
sanitizePath into descriptive constants mirroring
scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js, so the policy is auditable in one
place. Also seed the regression test input with U+2029 so the
paragraph-separator assertion is exercised rather than vacuous.
* fix(gateguard): sanitize C1 control characters in denial paths
Follow-up on the sanitizePath policy alignment: the Unicode C1 control
block (U+0080..U+009F) is invisible in every renderer like the ASCII
controls below 0x20, but the strip only covered the ASCII range. Add
C1_CONTROLS to the policy constants and seed U+0091 into the
regression test input.
* fix(gateguard): detect destructive SQL passed quoted to SQL clients
Quoted SQL like psql -c "drop table users" was stripped before the DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD regex ran, making it unreachable. Check dequoted tokens for known SQL clients (psql, mysql, sqlite3, ...) so real invocations are gated while git commit -m / echo mentions stay allowed. Fixesaffaan-m/ECC#3024.
* fix(gateguard): unwrap sudo/env flags and ignore SQL string literals
Address review: sudo -u/env VAR= wrappers now resolve to the real SQL client; SQL single/double/dollar-quoted literals are stripped before the destructive regex so SELECT 'drop table' stays allowed. Adds deny/allow regression tests for quoted SQL, wrappers, literals, and non-SQL clients.
* test(gateguard): cover env PGPASSWORD wrapper variant
* fix(gateguard): close wrapper sh-c, env dir, tagged literal gaps
Review 5189686662: recurse sh -c from unwrapped wrapper index (sudo/doas/env + sh -c now denied); consume env -C/--chdir separate values; strip tagged dollar-quoted literals ($tag$...\baseline). Tests: 200 passed.
Windows: compare repo identity via normalizeRepoPath/sameRepoIdentity (8.3 short names, case, separators; inode fallback). All nine windows-latest jobs green on 52587005.
A first-touch Edit/Write denial marks the file checked so the retry
passes. Sibling edits to the same file in the same parallel batch are
therefore judged against post-denial state and silently apply, leaving
the file in a state neither version intended.
Hooks see tool calls one at a time, so a batch-wide lock is not
possible. Instead make the partial application explicit: the Edit,
Write, MultiEdit, and condensed denials now name the file and warn
that other edits from the same batch may already have been applied,
and SKILL.md tells agents to send dependent edits sequentially and
re-read the file after a gated batch.
Expand proven-passive heredoc recognition beyond bare `cat` so documentation
writes via `tee`, `/bin/cat`, and `command cat` no longer trip the destructive
command detector on body text, while still failing closed for shells and pipes.
Jeffrey Montoya