Carry forward PR #3055 at 92f53c4c onto ef648e01, preserving contributor attribution and current main. Focused maintainer fixes reuse shared input ceilings, preserve late root context through outer bootstrap, bound frontmatter before immutable parsing, and assert real oversized input in the limits workflow.
main resolves SQL clients behind env -S and its launcher grammars, but a
destructive statement still passed under four forms:
- a shell -c inside a short-option cluster (bash -lc, sh -ec), since only
an exact -c was looked up;
- su, whose -c / --command / -lc value runs through the target user's
shell, before or after --;
- taskset, whose mask or CPU list precedes the command, like timeout's
duration;
- a command nested past the shell -c recursion limit, which was allowed
instead of denied.
The first three are checked like sh -c; past the limit the check now
fails closed.
* chore: retire the Everything Claude Code name, ECC only
Replace the expanded product name and the everything-claude-code slug
with ECC across READMEs, translated docs, harness folders, skills,
commands, scripts and examples. Repo URLs now point at affaan-m/ECC.
Rename repo-internal artifacts to ecc forms (ecc-conventions skill,
ecc-guardrails, ecc-research-playbook, ecc-team-config, ecc-instincts
with ecc-* ids) and update .claude/ecc-tools.json.
Legacy install ids, plugin dirs, package names and MCP prefixes stay
where existing installs resolve against them. The codex global-state
check and harness-audit repo detection accept the new name first and
the legacy one as a fallback. The Discord bot prefers ~/GitHub/ECC and
falls back to the nested legacy checkout path.
Refresh the skill-triggers registryDigest for the changed skill text.
* fix(ecc-tools): drop managed paths to the removed Claude repo skill
.claude/skills/<repo-skill>/SKILL.md was deleted in #2770 but stayed listed in
ecc-tools.json and the team config. Remove those entries and point the Claude
Code adapter at the existing .agents/skills/ecc-conventions/SKILL.md.
Preserve the original contributor histories and apply the exact independently reviewed repair.
Source-Parent: 74023e5689
Review-Manifest-SHA256: 208a6350119857df7c1e5b83a46cdba0b7f7399f58ed60167397920c7a21b454
Preserve the original contributor histories and apply the exact independently reviewed repair.
Source-Parent: dee884656e
Review-Manifest-SHA256: 0c7eeef7c2722a605d049daf2dc3c2473c10dd616005afcba21049fc036d8ce9
Preserve original contributor history and all current-main assertions while bounding quote, heredoc, shell-option and deferred-scan handling.
Source-PR: https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC/pull/2965
Source-Parent: 5a878131de
Main-Parent: d3b8a3e908
Review-Manifest-SHA256: 5d23f47e60516b66733805aec0ebcd47f19265c964529fa0b1220c8aa6903add
Preserve contributor history and current-main behavior while resolving the exact reviewed follow-up.
Source-PR: https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC/pull/2829
Source-Parent: d811349224
Review-Manifest-SHA256: a7209685b2a5726777f7450a5983c28add8759654969b09ba3e4b803fcfaf8bd
Preserve the contributor repair and current main protections. Handle operand ordering, bounded literal command wrappers, executable containers and find actions while keeping quoted prose and option values passive.
Source-PR: https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC/pull/2829
Source-Head: c88b3f879a
Integration-Main: d3b8a3e908
* fix(gateguard): sanitize dangerous invisible unicode in denial paths
sanitizePath only stripped control characters and bidi overrides, so
the 394 codepoints that the repo-wide unicode safety policy classifies
as dangerous-invisible (zero-width U+200B-200D, U+2060, U+2061-2064,
variation selectors U+FE00-FE0F, tag block U+E0000-E007F, Hangul
fillers, U+FEFF, U+180E, U+3164) plus the U+2028/U+2029 line and
paragraph separators passed verbatim into Edit/Write denial messages.
Invisible characters in a quoted file path let a malicious path look
clean to a human reviewer.
Align sanitizePath with the CI policy list and cover it with a
hook-output regression test that asserts no dangerous invisible
character survives into the denial reason while visible path text
stays intact.
* refactor(gateguard): name the sanitizePath unicode policy constants
Address review feedback: move the code points and ranges out of
sanitizePath into descriptive constants mirroring
scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js, so the policy is auditable in one
place. Also seed the regression test input with U+2029 so the
paragraph-separator assertion is exercised rather than vacuous.
* fix(gateguard): sanitize C1 control characters in denial paths
Follow-up on the sanitizePath policy alignment: the Unicode C1 control
block (U+0080..U+009F) is invisible in every renderer like the ASCII
controls below 0x20, but the strip only covered the ASCII range. Add
C1_CONTROLS to the policy constants and seed U+0091 into the
regression test input.
* fix(gateguard): detect destructive SQL passed quoted to SQL clients
Quoted SQL like psql -c "drop table users" was stripped before the DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD regex ran, making it unreachable. Check dequoted tokens for known SQL clients (psql, mysql, sqlite3, ...) so real invocations are gated while git commit -m / echo mentions stay allowed. Fixesaffaan-m/ECC#3024.
* fix(gateguard): unwrap sudo/env flags and ignore SQL string literals
Address review: sudo -u/env VAR= wrappers now resolve to the real SQL client; SQL single/double/dollar-quoted literals are stripped before the destructive regex so SELECT 'drop table' stays allowed. Adds deny/allow regression tests for quoted SQL, wrappers, literals, and non-SQL clients.
* test(gateguard): cover env PGPASSWORD wrapper variant
* fix(gateguard): close wrapper sh-c, env dir, tagged literal gaps
Review 5189686662: recurse sh -c from unwrapped wrapper index (sudo/doas/env + sh -c now denied); consume env -C/--chdir separate values; strip tagged dollar-quoted literals ($tag$...\baseline). Tests: 200 passed.
Windows: compare repo identity via normalizeRepoPath/sameRepoIdentity (8.3 short names, case, separators; inode fallback). All nine windows-latest jobs green on 52587005.
A first-touch Edit/Write denial marks the file checked so the retry
passes. Sibling edits to the same file in the same parallel batch are
therefore judged against post-denial state and silently apply, leaving
the file in a state neither version intended.
Hooks see tool calls one at a time, so a batch-wide lock is not
possible. Instead make the partial application explicit: the Edit,
Write, MultiEdit, and condensed denials now name the file and warn
that other edits from the same batch may already have been applied,
and SKILL.md tells agents to send dependent edits sequentially and
re-read the file after a gated batch.
Expand proven-passive heredoc recognition beyond bare `cat` so documentation
writes via `tee`, `/bin/cat`, and `command cat` no longer trip the destructive
command detector on body text, while still failing closed for shells and pipes.
Review findings on the rebased branch.
Number.parseInt accepted partial values, so GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS
set to '3.5', '3oops', or '0x3' silently became a finite cap of 3 and weakened
the gate on a typo. The value is now matched whole and anything that is not a
complete non-negative decimal integer leaves the gate uncapped, which is the
stricter outcome.
Also names the setting in the condensed denial's recovery text, so a capped
session can discover the control that is dampening it, and documents that
malformed values fall back to uncapped.
Tests: adds a Write pass-through case, an exact-boundary case where the denial
that reaches the cap still denies and the next path passes, one case per
malformed value, and an assertion that the condensed denial names the cap.
Pass-through assertions now require a parsed output object rather than
accepting a missing one. 207 hook tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bvrwu6iCpKP3C2rh8tBsdJ
haelyra