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d29cf651c7 fix(skills): declare activation triggers in descriptions and normalize version metadata (#2618 )

* fix(skills): move version into metadata and normalize to semver

29 skills declared `version` at the top level of their frontmatter. The
schema reads it from `metadata`, so tooling that follows the schema either
misses it or has to special-case the top level.

Three motion skills also declared `version: 1.0`, which is not a valid
semantic version; normalized to `1.0.0`.

No behavioral change — frontmatter metadata only.

* fix(skills): state activation triggers in skill descriptions

148 skills described what they cover but never named the situation that
should trigger them. Since the description is what Claude matches against
to decide whether to load a skill, a description without a trigger makes
activation guesswork — the skill is either missed or loaded at the wrong
time.

Added a "Use when ..." clause to each, derived from the skill's own body
(most already stated the trigger under "## When to Use" or in the opening
line; that intent is now reflected in the frontmatter where it is actually
read from).

Descriptions were only appended to; no existing wording was removed.

* fix(skills): sync activation triggers into the Codex skill mirror

10 of the skills whose descriptions changed are also mirrored under
`.agents/skills/`, where the description was previously a verbatim copy.
Left alone, the two surfaces would disagree about when the skill applies.

Only the description line is synced; the Codex copies keep their reduced
frontmatter, since that validator accepts only name, description,
metadata, license, and allowed-tools.

* fix(skills): correct three activation clauses from review

- autonomous-loops: the clause pulled new loop work into a skill that its
  own body marks as a compatibility shim retained for one release. It now
  points at the canonical continuous-agent-loop instead.
- continuous-learning: the description carried the v1 routing directive
  twice; collapsed to one.
- homelab-pihole-dns: the clause fired on any broken home DNS. Narrowed to
  tasks that actually involve Pi-hole.

* chore: retain current main lockfile

---------

Co-authored-by: Çağrı Solakoğlu <cagri.solakoglu@vtcenerji.com>
Co-authored-by: haelyra <49814733+haelyra@users.noreply.github.com>

2026-08-11 23:58:14 -04:00

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name, description, metadata

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description

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security-scan

Scan your Claude Code configuration (.claude/ directory) for security vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and injection risks using AgentShield. Checks CLAUDE.md, settings.json, MCP servers, hooks, and agent definitions. Use when auditing a .claude/ directory — CLAUDE.md, settings.json, MCP servers, hooks, or agent definitions.

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ECC

Security Scan Skill

Audit your Claude Code configuration for security issues using AgentShield.

When to Activate

Setting up a new Claude Code project
After modifying .claude/settings.json, CLAUDE.md, or MCP configs
Before committing configuration changes
When onboarding to a new repository with existing Claude Code configs
Periodic security hygiene checks

What It Scans

File	Checks
`CLAUDE.md`	Hardcoded secrets, auto-run instructions, prompt injection patterns
`settings.json`	Overly permissive allow lists, missing deny lists, dangerous bypass flags
`mcp.json`	Risky MCP servers, hardcoded env secrets, npx supply chain risks
`hooks/`	Command injection via interpolation, data exfiltration, silent error suppression
`agents/*.md`	Unrestricted tool access, prompt injection surface, missing model specs

Prerequisites

AgentShield must be installed. Check and install if needed:

# Check if installed
npx ecc-agentshield --version

# Install globally (recommended)
npm install -g ecc-agentshield

# Or run directly via npx (no install needed)
npx ecc-agentshield scan .

Usage

Basic Scan

Run against the current project's .claude/ directory:

# Scan current project
npx ecc-agentshield scan

# Scan a specific path
npx ecc-agentshield scan --path /path/to/.claude

# Scan with minimum severity filter
npx ecc-agentshield scan --min-severity medium

Output Formats

# Terminal output (default) — colored report with grade
npx ecc-agentshield scan

# JSON — for CI/CD integration
npx ecc-agentshield scan --format json

# Markdown — for documentation
npx ecc-agentshield scan --format markdown

# HTML — self-contained dark-theme report
npx ecc-agentshield scan --format html > security-report.html

Auto-Fix

Apply safe fixes automatically (only fixes marked as auto-fixable):

npx ecc-agentshield scan --fix

This will:

Replace hardcoded secrets with environment variable references
Tighten wildcard permissions to scoped alternatives
Never modify manual-only suggestions

Opus 4.6 Deep Analysis

Run the adversarial three-agent pipeline for deeper analysis:

# Requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=your-key
npx ecc-agentshield scan --opus --stream

This runs:

Attacker (Red Team) — finds attack vectors
Defender (Blue Team) — recommends hardening
Auditor (Final Verdict) — synthesizes both perspectives

Initialize Secure Config

Scaffold a new secure .claude/ configuration from scratch:

npx ecc-agentshield init

Creates:

settings.json with scoped permissions and deny list
CLAUDE.md with security best practices
mcp.json placeholder

GitHub Action

Add to your CI pipeline:

- uses: affaan-m/agentshield@v1
  with:
    path: '.'
    min-severity: 'medium'
    fail-on-findings: true

Severity Levels

Grade	Score	Meaning
A	90-100	Secure configuration
B	75-89	Minor issues
C	60-74	Needs attention
D	40-59	Significant risks
F	0-39	Critical vulnerabilities

Interpreting Results

Critical Findings (fix immediately)

Hardcoded API keys or tokens in config files
Bash(*) in the allow list (unrestricted shell access)
Command injection in hooks via ${file} interpolation
Shell-running MCP servers

High Findings (fix before production)

Auto-run instructions in CLAUDE.md (prompt injection vector)
Missing deny lists in permissions
Agents with unnecessary Bash access

Medium Findings (recommended)

Silent error suppression in hooks (2>/dev/null, || true)
Missing PreToolUse security hooks
npx -y auto-install in MCP server configs

Info Findings (awareness)

Missing descriptions on MCP servers
Prohibitive instructions correctly flagged as good practice

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