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https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC.git
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* fix: harden local data boundaries Bind the capabilities dashboard exclusively to loopback and reject untrusted Host and Origin values. Constrain project-configured agent data paths to the Cursor data root, and harden lifecycle repair/uninstall operations against state-file traversal, symlink swaps, unsafe sources, and forged install-state destinations.\n\nCloses #2506 * fix: eliminate repair source read race Read source bytes and mode from one no-follow file descriptor so a path replacement cannot mix metadata from one inode with content from another. Add a regression that rejects separate path-based source metadata lookup. * fix: close dashboard hardening review gaps
58 lines
1.8 KiB
JavaScript
58 lines
1.8 KiB
JavaScript
'use strict';
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/**
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* Host/Origin gating for ECC's loopback HTTP servers (control pane, plan
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* canvas). DNS rebinding can point an attacker-controlled hostname at
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* 127.0.0.1, so every request must present a Host header from this
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* allowlist before the server does any work.
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*/
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const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '[::1]', '::1']);
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// Extract the hostname portion of an HTTP Host header value, stripping any
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// port. Returns null when the header is missing or malformed.
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function parseHostHeader(value) {
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if (!value || typeof value !== 'string') return null;
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const trimmed = value.trim();
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if (!trimmed) return null;
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const match = trimmed.match(/^(\[[^\]]+\]|[^:]+)(?::(\d+))?$/);
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if (!match) return null;
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if (match[2] !== undefined) {
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const port = Number(match[2]);
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if (!Number.isInteger(port) || port > 65535) return null;
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}
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return match[1].toLowerCase();
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}
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function buildAllowedHostnames(configuredHost) {
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const set = new Set(LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES);
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if (configuredHost) set.add(String(configuredHost).toLowerCase());
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return set;
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}
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function isAllowedHostHeader(hostHeader, allowedHostnames) {
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const hostname = parseHostHeader(hostHeader);
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if (!hostname) return false;
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return allowedHostnames.has(hostname);
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}
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// Origin is absent on same-origin navigations and CLI clients; when present
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// it must resolve to an allowed hostname.
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function isAllowedOrigin(originHeader, allowedHostnames) {
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if (!originHeader || typeof originHeader !== 'string') return true;
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try {
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const url = new URL(originHeader);
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return allowedHostnames.has(url.hostname.toLowerCase());
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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module.exports = {
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LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES,
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buildAllowedHostnames,
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isAllowedHostHeader,
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isAllowedOrigin,
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parseHostHeader
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};
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