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* fix: make the installer runtime pass strict supply-chain vetting
Remediate the four enterprise supply-chain vetting blockers from
affaan-m/ECC#2502 so the installer runtime (package.json + manifests +
scripts/lib/**) passes strict exact-pin evidence policy:
1. Remove the package.json `postinstall` lifecycle script (it only echoed a
post-install banner) and move that banner to an explicit opt-in
`npm run welcome` command. No install-time lifecycle script remains.
2. Exact-pin every dependency in package.json (dependencies + devDependencies)
to the versions already resolved in package-lock.json; no ^/~ ranges.
3. Replace non-ASCII characters on the installer runtime script/config surface:
em-dashes (U+2014) in scripts/lib/{path-safety,install-executor,
install/link-rewrite}.js comments and the two "Itô" (U+00F4) occurrences in
manifests/{install-components,install-modules}.json descriptions become
ASCII, so strict-surface Unicode scanners are clean.
4. Drop the bare `require("ajv")` from scripts/lib/install-state.js; the file
already carries a complete hand-rolled validator enforcing the same
schemas/install-state.schema.json (ecc.install.v1) constraints, so the
installer closure is dependency-free (zero non-builtin bare requires).
Refs affaan-m/ECC#2502
* fix: avoid unpinned welcome invocations
Signed-off-by: Samar Tomar <samar_tomar@hotmail.com>
* fix: validate translated skill frontmatter
Signed-off-by: Samar Tomar <samar_tomar@hotmail.com>
* fix: repair skill frontmatter YAML
Signed-off-by: Samar Tomar <samar_tomar@hotmail.com>
* fix: add MIT license to core skill manifests; pin verification-loop tsc invocation
* fix: preserve tsc/pyright exit status in verification-loop type-check (set -o pipefail)
* chore(deps): sync lockfiles with exact-pinned package.json
Regenerate package-lock.json and yarn.lock so the pinned dependency
specs are reflected in both lockfiles. npm ci and Yarn's --immutable
install now pass the sync check. The resolution tree is unchanged
(231 yarn resolutions, byte-identical set; zero npm transitive drift);
only the root descriptor strings move from ranges to the versions
already resolved in the committed lockfiles.
Addresses the Codex P1 on #2503.
---------
Signed-off-by: Samar Tomar <samar_tomar@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Samarjeet Singh Tomar <samartomar@gmail.com>
83 lines
2.4 KiB
JavaScript
83 lines
2.4 KiB
JavaScript
'use strict';
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const fs = require('fs');
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const path = require('path');
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/**
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* Path containment helpers for install-state-driven file operations.
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*
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* Install-state files are project-local and therefore attacker-controllable
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* (a cloned/forked repo can ship a crafted `.cursor/ecc-install-state.json`).
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* `repair`/`uninstall`/`auto-update` replay recorded operations, so every
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* write/delete destination MUST be confined to the adapter-derived trusted
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* root - never trusted from the state file itself (GHSA-hfpv-w6mp-5g95).
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*/
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function safeRealpath(target) {
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try {
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return fs.realpathSync(path.resolve(target));
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} catch {
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return path.resolve(target);
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}
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}
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/**
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* Canonicalize a path that may not exist yet: realpath its nearest existing
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* ancestor, then re-append the missing tail. This defeats symlink escapes
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* where an intermediate directory is a symlink pointing out of the root.
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*/
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function realpathNearestExisting(target) {
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let current = path.resolve(target);
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const tail = [];
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while (!fs.existsSync(current)) {
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const parent = path.dirname(current);
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if (parent === current) {
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break;
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}
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tail.unshift(path.basename(current));
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current = parent;
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}
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const real = safeRealpath(current);
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return tail.length > 0 ? path.join(real, ...tail) : real;
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}
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/**
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* True when `target` resolves to `root` itself or a path beneath it, with
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* symlinks resolved on both sides.
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*/
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function isWithinRoot(target, root) {
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if (!root) {
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return false;
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}
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const realRoot = safeRealpath(root);
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const realTarget = realpathNearestExisting(target);
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if (realTarget === realRoot) {
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return true;
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}
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const rel = path.relative(realRoot, realTarget);
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return rel !== '' && !rel.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(rel);
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}
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/**
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* Fail-closed guard: throw unless `target` is contained within `root`.
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* Returns the canonicalized target path on success.
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*/
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function assertWithinTrustedRoot(target, root, action = 'write') {
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if (!target || typeof target !== 'string') {
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throw new Error(`Refusing to ${action}: missing destination path.`);
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}
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if (!root) {
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throw new Error(`Refusing to ${action} '${target}': no trusted install root resolved.`);
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}
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if (!isWithinRoot(target, root)) {
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throw new Error(`Refusing to ${action} outside the install root: '${target}' is not within '${root}'.`);
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}
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return realpathNearestExisting(target);
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}
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module.exports = {
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realpathNearestExisting,
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isWithinRoot,
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assertWithinTrustedRoot
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};
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