mirror of
https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC.git
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* fix: harden local data boundaries Bind the capabilities dashboard exclusively to loopback and reject untrusted Host and Origin values. Constrain project-configured agent data paths to the Cursor data root, and harden lifecycle repair/uninstall operations against state-file traversal, symlink swaps, unsafe sources, and forged install-state destinations.\n\nCloses #2506 * fix: eliminate repair source read race Read source bytes and mode from one no-follow file descriptor so a path replacement cannot mix metadata from one inode with content from another. Add a regression that rejects separate path-based source metadata lookup. * fix: close dashboard hardening review gaps
184 lines
6.3 KiB
JavaScript
184 lines
6.3 KiB
JavaScript
'use strict';
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/**
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* Tests for scripts/lib/path-safety.js — the install-state containment guard
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* that fixes arbitrary file write/delete via attacker-controlled install-state
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* (GHSA-hfpv-w6mp-5g95).
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*/
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const assert = require('assert');
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const fs = require('fs');
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const os = require('os');
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const path = require('path');
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const {
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assertWithinTrustedRoot,
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isWithinRoot,
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realpathNearestExisting
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} = require('../../scripts/lib/path-safety');
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let passed = 0;
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let failed = 0;
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function test(name, fn) {
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try {
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fn();
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console.log(` PASS ${name}`);
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passed += 1;
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} catch (error) {
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console.log(` FAIL ${name}`);
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console.log(` ${error.message}`);
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failed += 1;
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}
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}
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const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'path-safety-root-'));
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const outside = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'path-safety-out-'));
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try {
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test('allows a path inside the trusted root', () => {
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const p = path.join(root, '.cursor', 'rules', 'x.md');
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// Returns the canonicalized path (symlinks like /var -> /private/var resolved).
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assert.doesNotThrow(() => assertWithinTrustedRoot(p, root, 'repair'));
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assert.ok(assertWithinTrustedRoot(p, root, 'repair').endsWith(path.join('.cursor', 'rules', 'x.md')));
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assert.strictEqual(isWithinRoot(p, root), true);
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});
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test('allows the root itself', () => {
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assert.strictEqual(isWithinRoot(root, root), true);
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});
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test('allows a non-existent destination beneath a non-existent trusted root', () => {
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const futureRoot = path.join(root, 'future-root');
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const futureDestination = path.join(futureRoot, 'session-data', 'session.json');
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assert.strictEqual(isWithinRoot(futureDestination, futureRoot), true);
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assert.strictEqual(
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assertWithinTrustedRoot(futureDestination, futureRoot, 'write'),
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realpathNearestExisting(futureDestination)
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);
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});
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test('canonicalizes the nearest existing ancestor for a non-existent trusted root', () => {
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const realParent = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'path-safety-real-'));
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const linkedParent = path.join(
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os.tmpdir(),
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`path-safety-link-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`
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);
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try {
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fs.symlinkSync(realParent, linkedParent, 'dir');
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} catch {
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console.log(' (symlink unsupported on this platform; skipping)');
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fs.rmSync(realParent, { recursive: true, force: true });
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return;
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}
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try {
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const futureRoot = path.join(linkedParent, '.cursor', 'ecc');
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const futureDestination = path.join(futureRoot, 'session-data', 'session.json');
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assert.strictEqual(isWithinRoot(futureDestination, futureRoot), true);
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assert.strictEqual(
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assertWithinTrustedRoot(futureDestination, futureRoot, 'write'),
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path.join(
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fs.realpathSync(realParent),
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'.cursor',
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'ecc',
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'session-data',
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'session.json'
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)
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);
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(linkedParent, { force: true });
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fs.rmSync(realParent, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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test('returns the same canonical destination that was checked for containment', () => {
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const destination = path.join(root, 'single-canonicalization.txt');
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const originalRealpathSync = fs.realpathSync;
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let destinationCanonicalizations = 0;
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fs.writeFileSync(destination, 'safe\n');
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fs.realpathSync = function countedRealpathSync(candidatePath, options) {
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if (path.resolve(candidatePath) === path.resolve(destination)) {
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destinationCanonicalizations += 1;
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}
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return originalRealpathSync.call(fs, candidatePath, options);
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};
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try {
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assert.strictEqual(
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assertWithinTrustedRoot(destination, root, 'write'),
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originalRealpathSync(destination)
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);
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} finally {
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fs.realpathSync = originalRealpathSync;
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}
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assert.strictEqual(destinationCanonicalizations, 1);
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});
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test('refuses an absolute path outside the root', () => {
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const evil = path.join(outside, 'PWNED.txt');
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assert.throws(() => assertWithinTrustedRoot(evil, root, 'repair'), /outside the install root/);
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assert.strictEqual(isWithinRoot(evil, root), false);
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});
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test('refuses an escape from a non-existent trusted root', () => {
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const futureRoot = path.join(root, 'future-root');
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const evil = path.join(futureRoot, '..', 'escape.txt');
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assert.throws(() => assertWithinTrustedRoot(evil, futureRoot, 'write'), /outside the install root/);
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assert.strictEqual(isWithinRoot(evil, futureRoot), false);
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});
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test('refuses a ../ traversal escape', () => {
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const evil = path.join(root, '..', 'escape.txt');
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assert.throws(() => assertWithinTrustedRoot(evil, root, 'uninstall'), /outside the install root/);
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});
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test('refuses a symlinked intermediate directory that escapes the root', () => {
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const linkDir = path.join(root, 'link');
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try {
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fs.symlinkSync(outside, linkDir, 'dir');
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} catch {
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console.log(' (symlink unsupported on this platform; skipping)');
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return;
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}
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// root/link -> outside, so root/link/PWNED resolves outside the root.
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const evil = path.join(linkDir, 'PWNED.txt');
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assert.throws(() => assertWithinTrustedRoot(evil, root, 'repair'), /outside the install root/);
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});
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test('refuses a dangling symlinked intermediate directory', () => {
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const danglingTarget = path.join(outside, 'missing-target');
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const linkDir = path.join(root, 'dangling-link');
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try {
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fs.symlinkSync(danglingTarget, linkDir, 'dir');
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} catch {
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console.log(' (symlink unsupported on this platform; skipping)');
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return;
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}
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const evil = path.join(linkDir, 'session-data', 'session.json');
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assert.strictEqual(isWithinRoot(evil, root), false);
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assert.throws(
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() => assertWithinTrustedRoot(evil, root, 'write'),
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/outside the install root/
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);
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});
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test('refuses when no trusted root is resolved', () => {
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assert.throws(() => assertWithinTrustedRoot(path.join(root, 'x'), null, 'repair'), /no trusted install root/);
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});
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test('refuses a missing destination path', () => {
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assert.throws(() => assertWithinTrustedRoot('', root, 'repair'), /missing destination path/);
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});
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
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fs.rmSync(outside, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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console.log(`\nResults: Passed: ${passed}, Failed: ${failed}`);
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if (failed > 0) {
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process.exit(1);
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}
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