Files
ECC/scripts/lib/path-safety.js
T
28e53a0bc1 feat(install): add guided multi-harness installer (#2649)
* feat(install): add guided Claude plugin setup

* fix: support Claude command shims on Windows

* feat: support safe Claude plugin scope migration

* fix(install): preserve interactive setup terminal

* fix(install): auto-migrate setup scope changes

* feat(install): add guided multi-harness installer

* fix(install): sync Yarn binary metadata

* fix(install): handle wizard EOF on Node 18

* ci: allow installer matrix tests to finish

* test(install): allow slower PowerShell delegation

* fix(install): harden guided provider reconciliation

* test(install): harden packaged and local compatibility

* chore: prepare guided installer release 2.2.0

* fix(install): report refreshed Codex marketplace state

* fix(install): verify managed content provenance

* test(install): allow empty Yarn smoke fixture

* test(install): invoke Windows package shims safely

* fix(install): close cross-platform release gaps

* fix(install): require trusted GitHub origins

* fix(install): preserve hook profile precedence

* refactor(install): centralize trusted GitHub origins

* ci: retrigger workflow run after merge of main

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 15:39:49 -04:00

110 lines
2.9 KiB
JavaScript

'use strict';
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
/**
* Path containment helpers for install-state-driven file operations.
*
* Install-state files are project-local and therefore attacker-controllable
* (a cloned/forked repo can ship a crafted `.cursor/ecc-install-state.json`).
* `repair`/`uninstall`/`auto-update` replay recorded operations, so every
* write/delete destination MUST be confined to the adapter-derived trusted
* root - never trusted from the state file itself (GHSA-hfpv-w6mp-5g95).
*/
function pathEntryExists(target) {
try {
fs.lstatSync(target);
return true;
} catch (error) {
if (error && (error.code === 'ENOENT' || error.code === 'ENOTDIR')) {
return false;
}
throw error;
}
}
/**
* Canonicalize a path that may not exist yet: realpath its nearest existing
* ancestor, then re-append the missing tail. This defeats symlink escapes
* where an intermediate directory is a symlink pointing out of the root.
*/
function realpathNearestExisting(target) {
let current = path.resolve(target);
const tail = [];
while (!pathEntryExists(current)) {
const parent = path.dirname(current);
if (parent === current) {
break;
}
tail.unshift(path.basename(current));
current = parent;
}
const real = fs.realpathSync(current);
return tail.length > 0 ? path.join(real, ...tail) : real;
}
/**
* True when `target` resolves to `root` itself or a path beneath it, with
* symlinks resolved on both sides.
*/
function resolveContainment(target, root) {
const realRoot = realpathNearestExisting(root);
const realTarget = realpathNearestExisting(target);
const relativePath = path.relative(realRoot, realTarget);
const contained = relativePath === ''
|| (
relativePath !== '..'
&& !relativePath.startsWith(`..${path.sep}`)
&& !path.isAbsolute(relativePath)
);
return {
contained,
realRoot,
realTarget
};
}
function isWithinRoot(target, root) {
if (!root) {
return false;
}
try {
return resolveContainment(target, root).contained;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Fail-closed guard: throw unless `target` is contained within `root`.
* Returns the canonicalized target path on success.
*/
function assertWithinTrustedRoot(target, root, action = 'write') {
if (!target || typeof target !== 'string') {
throw new Error(`Refusing to ${action}: missing destination path.`);
}
if (!root) {
throw new Error(`Refusing to ${action} '${target}': no trusted install root resolved.`);
}
let containment;
try {
containment = resolveContainment(target, root);
} catch {
containment = null;
}
if (!containment || !containment.contained) {
throw new Error(`Refusing to ${action} outside the install root: '${target}' is not within '${root}'.`);
}
return containment.realTarget;
}
module.exports = {
realpathNearestExisting,
isWithinRoot,
assertWithinTrustedRoot
};