mirror of
https://github.com/NLnetLabs/krill.git
synced 2026-09-20 16:37:43 +02:00
269 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
269 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
######################################################################################
|
|
# #
|
|
# DATA #
|
|
# #
|
|
######################################################################################
|
|
|
|
# Specify the directory where the publication server will store its data.
|
|
# Note that clustering through a shared data directory is not supported.
|
|
# But, we plan to look into a proper clustering solution later.
|
|
#
|
|
### data_dir = "./data"
|
|
|
|
# Specify the path to the PID file for Krill.
|
|
#
|
|
# Defaults to "krill.pid" under the 'data_dir' specified above.
|
|
#
|
|
### pid_file = "./data/krill.pid"
|
|
|
|
|
|
######################################################################################
|
|
# #
|
|
# LOGGING #
|
|
# #
|
|
######################################################################################
|
|
|
|
# Log level
|
|
#
|
|
# The maximum log level ("off", "error", "warn", "info", or "debug") for
|
|
# which to log messages.
|
|
#
|
|
# Defaults to "warn"
|
|
#
|
|
### log_level = "warn"
|
|
|
|
# Log type
|
|
#
|
|
# Where to log to. One of "stderr" for stderr, "syslog" for syslog, or "file"
|
|
# for a file. If "file" is given, the "log_file" field needs to be given, too.
|
|
#
|
|
### log_type = "file"
|
|
|
|
# Syslog facility
|
|
#
|
|
# The syslog facility to log to if syslog logging is used. Defaults to "daemon".
|
|
#
|
|
### syslog_facility = "daemon"
|
|
|
|
# Log file
|
|
#
|
|
# The path to the file to log to if file logging is used. If the path is
|
|
# relative, it is relative to the current working directory from which
|
|
# the binary is executed.
|
|
#
|
|
### log_file = "./krill.log"
|
|
|
|
|
|
######################################################################################
|
|
# #
|
|
# ACCESS #
|
|
# #
|
|
######################################################################################
|
|
|
|
# Master Authorization Bearer Token
|
|
#
|
|
# Define a master token that can be used to interact with the API. Token use
|
|
# is modelled after OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens (RFC 6750), which are expected be
|
|
# included as an HTTP header in requests by clients.
|
|
#
|
|
# If you do not specify a value here, the server will insist that you provide
|
|
# a token as an environment variable with the key "KRILL_AUTH_TOKEN".
|
|
#
|
|
### auth_token =
|
|
|
|
# Specify the ip address and port number that the server will use.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: we recommend that you use the defaults and use a proxy if you
|
|
# must make your Krill instance accessible remotely.
|
|
#
|
|
### ip = "localhost"
|
|
### port = 3000
|
|
|
|
# Specify the base public service URI hostname and port.
|
|
#
|
|
# The default service URI is set to https://localhost:3000/ regardless of the
|
|
# IP and port configured above (but matching their default). This is fine for
|
|
# simple setups where you use Krill to run your own CA only and you use the
|
|
# CLI from localhost.
|
|
#
|
|
# However, if you need to access Krill remotely, or if you are serving as a
|
|
# parent CA to others, then make sure that you use a public URI here *and* make
|
|
# sure that you use a proxy server with a proper HTTPS certificate in front of Krill.
|
|
#
|
|
# At present this MUST be an https URI with a hostname and optional port number only.
|
|
# It is not allowed to use a Krill specific path prefix. If you have a strong
|
|
# motivation for this, then please comment on the following github issue:
|
|
# https://github.com/NLnetLabs/krill/issues/263
|
|
#
|
|
# Krill UI, API and service URIs will be derived as follows:
|
|
# <service_uri>api/v1/... (api)
|
|
# <service_uri>rfc6492 (for remote children)
|
|
# <service_uri>rrdp/.. (override with rddp_service_uri, see below)
|
|
# <service_uri>... (various UI resources)
|
|
### service_uri = "https://localhost:3000/"
|
|
|
|
######################################################################################
|
|
# #
|
|
# OTHER SEVER SETTINGS #
|
|
# #
|
|
######################################################################################
|
|
|
|
|
|
# CA certificate refresh rate
|
|
#
|
|
# This defines the rate, in seconds, for Krill CAs to to contact their parent
|
|
# CA and query for updates in resource entitlements.
|
|
#
|
|
# Defaults to 10 minutes
|
|
#
|
|
### ca_refresh = 600
|
|
|
|
# Enable loading BGP Dumps from RIS for ROA vs BGP analysis.
|
|
#
|
|
# bgp_risdumps_enabled = true
|
|
# bgp_risdump_v4_uri = http://www.ris.ripe.net/dumps/riswhoisdump.IPv4.gz
|
|
# bgp_risdump_v6_uri = http://www.ris.ripe.net/dumps/riswhoisdump.IPv6.gz
|
|
|
|
# Restrict size of messages sent to the API.
|
|
#
|
|
# Default 256 kB
|
|
#
|
|
### post_limit_api = 262144
|
|
|
|
# Restrict size of messages sent to the RFC 6492 up-down protocol. Only relevant
|
|
# if you operate Krill as a parent to other CAs.
|
|
#
|
|
# Default 1MB (enough for a keyroll with certs of ~400kb, the biggest known cert is 220kB)
|
|
#
|
|
### post_limit_rfc6492 = 1048576
|
|
|
|
|
|
######################################################################################
|
|
# #
|
|
# --------======== DANGER ZONE ========-------- #
|
|
# #
|
|
# Do not change the options below, unless you are really certain that you need to #
|
|
# override Krill's default behaviour. #
|
|
# #
|
|
######################################################################################
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Set the following to true to force Krill to always perform full rechecks
|
|
# of its data directories at startup. This is disabled by default because
|
|
# if can slow down startup significantly.
|
|
#
|
|
# By default Krill will do some basic checks at startup already, and if any
|
|
# errors are encountered force a full recovery automatically: Krill will try
|
|
# to load all its state in its internal memory cache at startup. If there are
|
|
# no errors in reloading the latest 'info' about the state, any surplus data
|
|
# will be assumed to be the result from an incompletely finished transaction - or -
|
|
# a data directory backup which was taken during a transaction. In either case
|
|
# additional data is discarded and the last (committed) state is recreated.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note that this 'recovery' will make Krill fall back to the last possible
|
|
# consistent state that it can. But, there may be important changes missing.
|
|
# For example any changes in ROAs made after the last recoverable state will
|
|
# be missing. You will have to verify the state yourself.
|
|
#
|
|
# In short: use this option only if you suspect that there is an issue with
|
|
# your backed up data. And if you do, you may want to set the ENV variable
|
|
# "KRILL_UPGRADE_ONLY" as well, in order to force that Krill exits after doing
|
|
# all its data checks and clean ups, and you have a chance to check the logs
|
|
# before proceeding.
|
|
#
|
|
### always_recover_data = false
|
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# ROA Aggregation
|
|
#
|
|
# It is recommended that separate ROAs are used for each authorized prefix, even
|
|
# though the RFC allows for multiple prefixes for the same ASN to be combined on
|
|
# a single ROA object. The reason for this is that the ROA will become invalid
|
|
# if any of the listed prefixes no longer appears on your CA's certificate. Note
|
|
# that Krill will automatically clean up over-claiming ROAs when it finds that its
|
|
# resources have been shrunk, but there is a possible time window where ROAs can
|
|
# be invalid before Krill discovers the shrinkage.
|
|
#
|
|
# That said, if there would be too many ROAs then this will impact all RPKI
|
|
# validators, therefore Krill will by default start aggregating ROAs per ASN
|
|
# when more than 100 ROAs would be issued. Conversely, Krill will start de-
|
|
# aggregating again when the number of authorizations drops below 90.
|
|
#
|
|
# This behaviour can be overridden with the following directives:
|
|
# roa_aggregate_threshold = 100
|
|
# roa_deaggregate_threshold = 90
|
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# Republication Intervals
|
|
#
|
|
# The RPKI uses Manifests (RFC 6486) to communicate the list of current RPKI
|
|
# objects (such as ROAs) to RPKI Validators. Manifests are used to protect against
|
|
# attacks, or incidents, where Validators only see a partial view of the RPKI
|
|
# repository. For this to work properly Validators will need to know how 'fresh'
|
|
# the Manifests are - otherwise they would be vulnerable to replay attacks where
|
|
# they are presented old versions of Manifests thus withholding them from discovering
|
|
# new RPKI objects.
|
|
#
|
|
# Manifests have two important dates included in them:
|
|
# 1- the 'next update time'
|
|
# 2- an expiration time
|
|
#
|
|
# When the next update time is passed manifests will become 'stale'. This means
|
|
# the Validators may either warn about the objects listed in these manifests, or
|
|
# they may even reject these objects altogether. There is current discussion about
|
|
# aligning this behaviour in the IETF - but for the moment the outcome will vary
|
|
# between Validator implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
# When the expiration time (not after time on the embedded EE certificate of the
|
|
# Manifest) passes, then the Manifest will be considered invalid by all Validator
|
|
# implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
# So, if Validators are subject to replay attacks of Manifests they will be
|
|
# unaware until these times have passed. After these times the Manifest and all
|
|
# listed RPKI objects will become invalid. When ROA objects become invalid, this
|
|
# typically means that the Route Announcement will be considered "Not Found", rather
|
|
# than invalid. So, typically they would not be dropped, but they are no longer
|
|
# protected by RPKI.
|
|
#
|
|
# One could therefore argue that short times should be used. However, if the times
|
|
# chosen are too short, then this will leave your CA vulnerable to possible
|
|
# operational issues with its RPKI repository - or outages of your CA itself.
|
|
#
|
|
# So, in short, the chosen values are a balance between the wish to limit the
|
|
# vulnerability to replay attacks vs the time an operator has to solve operational
|
|
# issues.
|
|
#
|
|
# Krill uses the following defaults:
|
|
#
|
|
# The "next update" time is 24 hours:
|
|
# timing_publish_next_hours = 24
|
|
#
|
|
# The "not after time" on the EE certificate is 7 days from issuance:
|
|
# timing_publish_valid_days = 7
|
|
#
|
|
# Krill will automatically re-publish new Manifests if they would become stale
|
|
# in 8 hours. Because re-publication happens hourly, this leaves the operator
|
|
# with a minimum of 7 hours to fix issues if re-publication should fail.
|
|
# timing_publish_hours_before_next = 8
|
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# ROA and Delegate Certificate Times
|
|
#
|
|
# Krill will issue ROAs, and child CA certificates if you have delegated resources
|
|
# to child CAs, with a "not after" time of 52 weeks from issuance, and it will
|
|
# re-issue those ROAs and certificates 4 weeks before they would expire.
|
|
#
|
|
# Because of the automatic renewal there should be no real need to use longer
|
|
# validity times. In fact using longer times could have a negative impact on
|
|
# Validator performance because the Certificate Revocation Lists would become
|
|
# bigger.
|
|
#
|
|
# So, we do NOT recommend overriding the following values, except perhaps for
|
|
# testing purposes:
|
|
# timing_child_certificate_valid_weeks = 52
|
|
# timing_child_certificate_reissue_weeks_before = 4
|
|
# timing_roa_valid_weeks = 52
|
|
# timing_roa_reissue_weeks_before = 4 |