Files
NLnetLabs-krill/cms_proxy/src/sigmsg.rs
T

234 lines
6.7 KiB
Rust
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
//! CMS structure that is used to encompass publication and publishing
//! messages.
// XXX TODO: Remove these dependencies
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use untrusted::Input;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use ring::digest;
use bcder::decode;
use bcder::{Mode, Oid, Tag};
use bcder::string::OctetString;
use bytes::Bytes;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use rpki::crypto::DigestAlgorithm;
use rpki::oid;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use rpki::sigobj::SignedObject;
use rpki::x509::ValidationError;
use rpki::x509::Time;
use crate::id::IdCert;
//------------ Cms -----------------------------------------------------------
/// A protocol CMS.
///
/// This is a signed CMS object that contains XML messages used in the
/// provisioning and publication protocols, and that is signed using an
/// EE IdCert, signed under a TA IdCert.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct SignedMessage {
content_type: Oid<Bytes>,
content: OctetString,
id_cert: IdCert,
// signer_info: SignerInfo,
}
/// # Decoding
///
impl SignedMessage {
pub fn decode<S: decode::Source>(
source: S,
strict: bool
) -> Result<Self, S::Err> {
if strict { Mode::Der }
else { Mode::Ber }
.decode(source, Self::take_from)
}
}
/// # Accessors
///
impl SignedMessage {
pub fn content(&self) -> &OctetString {
&self.content
}
}
/// # Parsing
///
impl SignedMessage {
pub fn take_from<S: decode::Source>(
cons: &mut decode::Constructed<S>
) -> Result<Self, S::Err> {
cons.take_sequence(|cons| {
oid::SIGNED_DATA.skip_if(cons)?; // contentType
cons.take_constructed_if(Tag::CTX_0, Self::take_signed_data)
})
}
fn take_signed_data<S: decode::Source>(
_cons: &mut decode::Constructed<S>
) -> Result<Self, S::Err> {
// cons.take_sequence(|cons| {
// cons.skip_u8_if(3)?; // version -- must be 3
// DigestAlgorithm::skip_set(cons)?; // digestAlgorithms
// let (content_type, content) =
// SignedObject::take_encap_content_info(cons)?;
//
//
// if content_type != oid::PROTOCOL_CONTENT_TYPE {
// return xerr!(Err(decode::Malformed.into()))
// }
//
// let id_cert = Self::take_certificates(cons)?;
//
// Self::drop_crls(cons)?;
// let signer_info = cons.take_set(SignerInfo::take_from)?;
//
// Ok(SignedMessage {
// content_type,
// content,
// id_cert,
//// crl,
// signer_info
// })
// })
unimplemented!()
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
fn take_certificates<S: decode::Source>(
cons: &mut decode::Constructed<S>
) -> Result<IdCert, S::Err> {
cons.take_constructed_if(Tag::CTX_0, |cons| {
cons.take_constructed(|tag, cons| {
match tag {
Tag::SEQUENCE => IdCert::from_constructed(cons),
_ => {
xerr!(Err(decode::Unimplemented.into()))
}
}
})
})
}
// Drop the utterly useless CRL to the floor, if present.
//
// The ones from DRL don't parse. And even if they did,
// are you going to send us a validly signed CMS, with a validly
// signed embedded EE cert, AND a validly signed CRL that revokes
// that cert?
//
// These CRLs only really protect if an operator use multi-use
// keys for their EE certificates and is given some frequently
// re-signed CRL by the CA cert for inclusion.. then if the EE
// key is stolen you get a bit of protection.
//
// But given that this is very far fetched, and every implementation
// worth their bytes uses single-use keys which are promptly
// forgotten there really isn't all that much here.
#[allow(dead_code)]
fn drop_crls<S: decode::Source>(
cons: &mut decode::Constructed<S>
) -> Result<(), S::Err> {
cons.take_constructed_if(Tag::CTX_1, |cons| {
cons.skip_all()
})
}
}
/// # Validation
///
impl SignedMessage {
/// Validates the signed message.
///
/// The requirements for an object to be valid are given in section 3
/// of [RFC 6488].
pub fn validate(&self, issuer: &IdCert) -> Result<(), ValidationError> {
self.validate_at(issuer, Time::now())
}
/// Validates a signed message for a given point in time.
pub fn validate_at(
&self,
issuer: &IdCert,
now: Time
) -> Result<(), ValidationError> {
self.verify_signature()?;
self.id_cert.validate_ee_at(issuer, now)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Verifies the signature of the object against contained certificate.
///
/// This is item 2 of [RFC 6488]s section 3.
fn verify_signature(&self) -> Result<(), ValidationError> {
// let digest = {
// let mut context = digest::Context::new(&digest::SHA256);
// self.content.iter().for_each(|x| context.update(x));
// context.finish()
// };
// if digest.as_ref() != self.signer_info.message_digest() {
// return Err(ValidationError)
// }
// let msg = self.signer_info.signed_attrs().encode_verify();
// ::ring::signature::verify(
// &::ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256,
// Input::from(self.id_cert.public_key()),
// Input::from(&msg),
// Input::from(self.signer_info.signature().value().as_ref())
// ).map_err(|_| ValidationError)
unimplemented!()
}
}
//------------ Tests ---------------------------------------------------------
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
#[ignore]
fn should_parse_and_validate_signed_message() {
let der = include_bytes!("../test/remote/pdu_200.der");
let msg = SignedMessage::decode(
Bytes::from_static(der), false
).unwrap();
let b = include_bytes!("../test/remote/cms_ta.cer");
let id_cert = IdCert::decode(Bytes::from_static(b)).unwrap();
msg.validate_at(&id_cert, Time::utc(2012, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)).unwrap();
}
#[test]
#[ignore]
fn should_reject_invalid_signed_message() {
let der = include_bytes!("../test/remote/pdu_200.der");
let msg = SignedMessage::decode(
Bytes::from_static(der), false
).unwrap();
let b = include_bytes!("../test/oob/id_publisher_ta.cer");
let id_cert = IdCert::decode(Bytes::from_static(b)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
msg.validate_at(
&id_cert, Time::utc(2012, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
).unwrap_err(),
ValidationError,
);
}
}