Files
langgraph/.github/workflows/_test_release.yml
T
John KennedyandGitHub bcf3077267 ci: SHA-pin all third-party GitHub Actions (#7277)
## Summary

- SHA-pins 7 distinct third-party actions across 10 workflow files to
full commit SHAs
- Prevents supply chain attacks via tag hijacking (mutable tags can be
force-pushed by a compromised maintainer account)
- Tag retained as an inline comment for readability

| Action | Before | After |
|--------|--------|-------|
| `dorny/paths-filter` | `@v4` | `@fbd0ab8...` |
| `Ana06/get-changed-files` | `@v2.3.0` | `@25f79e6...` |
| `docker/login-action` | `@v4` | `@b45d80f...` |
| `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish` | `@release/v1` | `@ed0c539...` |
| `ncipollo/release-action` | `@v1` | `@339a818...` |
| `amannn/action-semantic-pull-request` | `@v6` | `@48f2562...` |
| `peter-evans/create-pull-request` | `@v8` | `@c0f553f...` |

## Test plan

- [x] CI passes on this PR
- [x] Verify each pinned action still functions (no behaviour change,
only ref format)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-03-25 10:58:38 -07:00

98 lines
3.2 KiB
YAML

name: test-release
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
working-directory:
required: true
type: string
description: "From which folder this pipeline executes"
env:
PYTHON_VERSION: "3.10"
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
pkg-name: ${{ steps.check-version.outputs.pkg-name }}
version: ${{ steps.check-version.outputs.version }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- name: Set up Python ${{ env.PYTHON_VERSION }}
uses: ./.github/actions/uv_setup
with:
python-version: ${{ env.PYTHON_VERSION }}
cache-suffix: "release"
working-directory: ${{ inputs.working-directory }}
# We want to keep this build stage *separate* from the release stage,
# so that there's no sharing of permissions between them.
# The release stage has trusted publishing and GitHub repo contents write access,
# and we want to keep the scope of that access limited just to the release job.
# Otherwise, a malicious `build` step (e.g. via a compromised dependency)
# could get access to our GitHub or PyPI credentials.
#
# Per the trusted publishing GitHub Action:
# > It is strongly advised to separate jobs for building [...]
# > from the publish job.
# https://github.com/pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish#non-goals
- name: Build project for distribution
run: uv build
working-directory: ${{ inputs.working-directory }}
- name: Upload build
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
with:
name: test-dist
path: ${{ inputs.working-directory }}/dist/
- name: Check Version
id: check-version
shell: bash
working-directory: ${{ inputs.working-directory }}
run: |
echo pkg-name=$(grep -m 1 "^name = " pyproject.toml | cut -d '"' -f 2)
echo version=$(grep -m 1 "^version = " pyproject.toml | cut -d '"' -f 2)
publish:
needs:
- build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
# This permission is used for trusted publishing:
# https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2023-04-20-introducing-trusted-publishers/
#
# Trusted publishing has to also be configured on PyPI for each package:
# https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/adding-a-publisher/
id-token: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
with:
name: test-dist
path: ${{ inputs.working-directory }}/dist/
- name: Publish to test PyPI
uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@ed0c53931b1dc9bd32cbe73a98c7f6766f8a527e # release/v1
with:
packages-dir: ${{ inputs.working-directory }}/dist/
verbose: true
print-hash: true
repository-url: https://test.pypi.org/legacy/
# We overwrite any existing distributions with the same name and version.
# This is *only for CI use* and is *extremely dangerous* otherwise!
# https://github.com/pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish#tolerating-release-package-file-duplicates
skip-existing: true
# Temp workaround since attestations are on by default as of gh-action-pypi-publish v1.11.0
attestations: false