diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 774f03ab5..fe8f9651b 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -20,14 +20,25 @@ and this project adheres to
 
 ### Added
 
-- ✨(collaboration) grant the browser only the two routes it uses. The
+- ✨(collaboration) let a user read the document's editing history from the
+  moment they were given access to it. The collaboration server's `activity` and
+  `changeset` routes are opened to the browser, bounded per user to the earliest
+  access they hold on the document or on one of its ancestors — the same cut-off
+  the version endpoints have always applied, now computed once in the backend
+  (`user_access_since`) and applied by the collaboration server as well. The
+  bound is enforced server-side and silently: a client asks for whatever range it
+  likes and receives only its own share. A reader who reaches a document through
+  its link alone holds no access and so has no date to bound a history with, and
+  gets none — as they never did
+
+- ✨(collaboration) grant the browser only the routes it uses. The
   collaboration server now answers what a caller may do with a document as a
   permission object, facet by facet, and enforces every facet itself. A browser
-  is granted the websocket and the document route the http fallback polls, and
-  nothing else — the history, activity, changeset, rollback and prune routes,
-  every backend-internal endpoint, and any endpoint a future release adds are
-  refused to it. `create-ydoc` in particular was reachable by any signed-in
-  editor and is now the backend's alone. The backend's admin token keeps full
+  is granted the websocket, the document route the http fallback polls and the
+  two history routes, and nothing else — rollback, prune, every backend-internal
+  endpoint, and any endpoint a future release adds are refused to it.
+  `create-ydoc` in particular was reachable by any signed-in editor and is now
+  the backend's alone. The backend's admin token keeps full
   access, minus the irreversible content erasure that the new version exposes
   over http for the first time
 
diff --git a/documentation/collaboration.md b/documentation/collaboration.md
index 3a99d4955..35e24de71 100644
--- a/documentation/collaboration.md
+++ b/documentation/collaboration.md
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ The Django backend reads and writes document content there too, so point it at t
 YHUB_API_BASE_URL: http://{yhub-service}:443
 ```
 
-Prefer the internal service url: the routes the backend calls are not meant to be reachable from the outside. Route `/collaboration/ws/` to the service publicly — that is the one the browsers open — plus the document routes (`/collaboration/ydoc/`, `rollback`, `prune`, `changeset`, `activity`) and `/collaboration/jwks/`, which carries public keys and nothing else. Keep `reset-connections`, `migrate`, `restore-ydoc`, `reset-ydoc` and `create-ydoc` in-cluster.
+Prefer the internal service url: the routes the backend calls are not meant to be reachable from the outside. Route `/collaboration/ws/` to the service publicly — that is the one the browsers open — plus `/collaboration/ydoc/` for the http fallback, `/collaboration/activity/` and `/collaboration/changeset/` for the editing history, and `/collaboration/jwks/`, which carries public keys and nothing else. Keep everything else in-cluster: `rollback`, `prune`, `reset-connections`, `migrate`, `restore-ydoc`, `reset-ydoc` and `create-ydoc` are refused to a browser by the permission tables anyway, and an endpoint that cannot be reached cannot be probed.
 
 Both directions are authenticated with short-lived RS256 JWTs rather than a shared secret, and each side verifies the other against the JWKS it publishes — so both need a signing key of their own, and neither needs a copy of the other's:
 
@@ -109,3 +109,25 @@ fallback request, so a modified or stale client changes nothing. See the access-
 
 Note this is deliberately stricter than the collaboration server's own default, which lets
 read-only connections broadcast cursors.
+
+## How much history a user may see
+
+The editing history is bounded per user: **you see the document's history from the moment you were
+given access to it, and no further back.** Joining a document that has been written for a year does
+not hand you the year — it hands you what happened since you arrived.
+
+This is not a new rule. It is the one the version endpoints have always applied ("only those
+created after the user got access to the document"); it now also bounds the collaboration server's
+`activity` and `changeset` routes, which are what a history view is built on.
+
+The date is the earliest access you hold on the document **or on one of its ancestors** — share a
+folder with someone and they get its whole subtree from that moment, including documents created in
+it later. The backend computes it (`user_access_since` on the document endpoint) and the
+collaboration server turns it into the start of the history it will serve. The bound is applied
+server-side and silently: a client asks for whatever range it likes and receives only its own
+share, so there is no bound for it to get wrong and none it can widen.
+
+A reader who reaches a document through its link alone — a public or authenticated-reach document
+they hold no access on — gets **no history at all**, not a bounded one. There is no access record
+and therefore no date to bound it with, which is the same reason the version endpoints have always
+refused them.
diff --git a/src/backend/core/api/serializers.py b/src/backend/core/api/serializers.py
index eb8f27261..8c291cbbc 100644
--- a/src/backend/core/api/serializers.py
+++ b/src/backend/core/api/serializers.py
@@ -183,6 +183,16 @@ class DocumentSerializer(ListDocumentSerializer):
     file = serializers.FileField(
         required=False, write_only=True, allow_null=True, max_length=255
     )
+    # When the current user gained access to this document — the earliest access they hold on
+    # it or on one of its ancestors, `null` when they reach it through its link reach alone.
+    # It bounds the history they may read: the collaboration server fetches this endpoint to
+    # authorize a connection and turns this into `history.from`.
+    #
+    # Read from the `user_access_since` annotation, which `filter_queryset` applies — so it is
+    # answered on the retrieve endpoint, the one that is read for it. It falls back to `null`
+    # on the write responses (create/update), which serialize an instance that never came from
+    # that queryset; nothing consumes it there.
+    user_access_since = serializers.DateTimeField(read_only=True, default=None)
 
     class Meta:
         model = models.Document
@@ -208,6 +218,7 @@ class DocumentSerializer(ListDocumentSerializer):
             "path",
             "title",
             "updated_at",
+            "user_access_since",
             "user_role",
         ]
         read_only_fields = [
@@ -229,6 +240,7 @@ class DocumentSerializer(ListDocumentSerializer):
             "numchild",
             "path",
             "updated_at",
+            "user_access_since",
             "user_role",
         ]
 
diff --git a/src/backend/core/api/viewsets.py b/src/backend/core/api/viewsets.py
index b8c78c0ba..aa2e664a1 100644
--- a/src/backend/core/api/viewsets.py
+++ b/src/backend/core/api/viewsets.py
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ from django.core.validators import URLValidator
 from django.db import DatabaseError, transaction
 from django.db import models as db
 from django.db.models.expressions import RawSQL
-from django.db.models.functions import Greatest, Left, Length
+from django.db.models.functions import Greatest
 from django.http import Http404, StreamingHttpResponse
 from django.urls import reverse
 from django.utils import timezone
@@ -561,6 +561,7 @@ class DocumentViewSet(
     all_serializer_class = serializers.ListDocumentSerializer
     children_serializer_class = serializers.ListDocumentSerializer
     descendants_serializer_class = serializers.ListDocumentSerializer
+    favorite_list_serializer_class = serializers.ListDocumentSerializer
     list_serializer_class = serializers.ListDocumentSerializer
     trashbin_serializer_class = serializers.ListDocumentSerializer
     tree_serializer_class = serializers.ListDocumentSerializer
@@ -605,6 +606,9 @@ class DocumentViewSet(
         queryset = queryset.annotate_is_favorite(user)
         queryset = queryset.annotate_user_roles(user)
         queryset = queryset.annotate_user_has_link_trace(user)
+        # Detail views only — `list` builds its own annotation chain below and does not need
+        # this one, so the list endpoint keeps its current query cost
+        queryset = queryset.annotate_user_access_since(user)
 
         return queryset
 
@@ -1805,16 +1809,14 @@ class DocumentViewSet(
         document = self.get_object()
 
         # Users should not see version history dating from before they gained access to the
-        # document. Filter to get the minimum access date for the logged-in user
-        access_queryset = models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
-            db.Q(user=user) | db.Q(team__in=user.teams),
-            document__path=Left(db.Value(document.path), Length("document__path")),
-        ).aggregate(min_date=db.Min("created_at"))
-
-        # Handle the case where the user has no accesses
-        min_datetime = access_queryset["min_date"]
-        if not min_datetime:
-            return drf.exceptions.PermissionDenied(
+        # document. `user_access_since` is annotated onto the queryset (see
+        # `DocumentQuerySet.annotate_user_access_since`) and is the one definition of that
+        # date — the collaboration server is handed the same value to bound the history it
+        # serves. It is None for a user who reaches the document through its link reach
+        # alone: no access, no date, and so no history.
+        min_datetime = document.user_access_since
+        if min_datetime is None:
+            raise drf.exceptions.PermissionDenied(
                 "Only users with specific access can see version history"
             )
 
@@ -1836,22 +1838,21 @@ class DocumentViewSet(
         """Custom action to retrieve a specific version of a document"""
         document = self.get_object()
 
+        # Don't let users access versions that were created before they were given access to
+        # the document — the same cut-off as `versions_list`, from the same annotation.
+        # Checked before the object is fetched: a caller who may see no version at all should
+        # not learn from a 404 whether this one exists.
+        min_datetime = document.user_access_since
+        if min_datetime is None:
+            raise drf.exceptions.PermissionDenied(
+                "Only users with specific access can see version history"
+            )
+
         try:
             response = document.get_content_response(version_id=version_id)
         except (FileNotFoundError, ClientError) as err:
             raise Http404 from err
 
-        # Don't let users access versions that were created before they were given access
-        # to the document
-        user = request.user
-        min_datetime = min(
-            access.created_at
-            for access in models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
-                db.Q(user=user) | db.Q(team__in=user.teams),
-                document__path=Left(db.Value(document.path), Length("document__path")),
-            )
-        )
-
         if response["LastModified"] < min_datetime:
             raise Http404
 
diff --git a/src/backend/core/models.py b/src/backend/core/models.py
index 34e54c9cc..99bc53493 100644
--- a/src/backend/core/models.py
+++ b/src/backend/core/models.py
@@ -924,6 +924,46 @@ class DocumentQuerySet(MP_NodeQuerySet):
             user_roles=models.Value([], output_field=output_field),
         )
 
+    def annotate_user_access_since(self, user):
+        """
+        Annotate document queryset with the moment the current user gained access to the
+        document — the earliest access they hold on it or on one of its ancestors.
+
+        This is the point from which they may see the document's history: the collaboration
+        server turns it into a `history.from` permission, and the version endpoints filter on
+        it. `None` when the user reaches the document through its link reach alone, which is
+        not an access and carries no date — those users get no history at all, deliberately
+        (see the comment in `get_abilities`).
+        """
+        if user.is_authenticated:
+            # the same ancestor-aware subquery as `annotate_user_roles`: the access's document
+            # path is a prefix of this one's, so it matches the document and every ancestor
+            user_access_since_subquery = (
+                DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
+                    models.Q(user=user) | models.Q(team__in=user.teams),
+                    document__path=Left(
+                        models.OuterRef("path"), Length("document__path")
+                    ),
+                )
+                .order_by()
+                .values("user")
+                .annotate(min_created_at=models.Min("created_at"))
+                .values("min_created_at")
+            )
+
+            return self.annotate(
+                user_access_since=models.Subquery(
+                    user_access_since_subquery,
+                    output_field=models.DateTimeField(),
+                )
+            )
+
+        return self.annotate(
+            user_access_since=models.Value(
+                None, output_field=models.DateTimeField()
+            ),
+        )
+
     def annotate_user_has_link_trace(self, user):
         """
         Annotate document queryset with a boolean to know if the current user
diff --git a/src/backend/core/tests/documents/test_api_documents_retrieve.py b/src/backend/core/tests/documents/test_api_documents_retrieve.py
index c4cd90b3a..fc7625e07 100644
--- a/src/backend/core/tests/documents/test_api_documents_retrieve.py
+++ b/src/backend/core/tests/documents/test_api_documents_retrieve.py
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_standalone():
         "path": document.path,
         "title": document.title,
         "updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "user_access_since": None,
         "user_role": None,
     }
 
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_parent():
         "path": document.path,
         "title": document.title,
         "updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "user_access_since": None,
         "user_role": None,
     }
 
@@ -268,6 +270,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated(
         "path": document.path,
         "title": document.title,
         "updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "user_access_since": None,
         "user_role": None,
     }
     assert (
@@ -351,6 +354,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(rea
         "path": document.path,
         "title": document.title,
         "updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "user_access_since": None,
         "user_role": None,
     }
 
@@ -465,6 +469,9 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_direct():
         "path": document.path,
         "title": document.title,
         "updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "user_access_since": access.created_at.isoformat().replace(
+            "+00:00", "Z"
+        ),
         "user_role": access.role,
     }
 
@@ -548,6 +555,9 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_parent():
         "path": document.path,
         "title": document.title,
         "updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "user_access_since": access.created_at.isoformat().replace(
+            "+00:00", "Z"
+        ),
         "user_role": access.role,
     }
 
@@ -678,6 +688,14 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_members(
     factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document, team="owners", role="owner")
     factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
     factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory()
+    # the history this user may read starts at the earliest access they hold —
+    # here through one of their teams
+    expected_access_since = (
+        models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(document=document, team__in=teams)
+        .earliest("created_at")
+        .created_at.isoformat()
+        .replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    )
 
     response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
 
@@ -704,6 +722,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_members(
         "path": document.path,
         "title": document.title,
         "updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "user_access_since": expected_access_since,
         "user_role": role,
     }
 
@@ -744,6 +763,14 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_administrators(
     factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document, team="owners", role="owner")
     factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
     factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory()
+    # the history this user may read starts at the earliest access they hold —
+    # here through one of their teams
+    expected_access_since = (
+        models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(document=document, team__in=teams)
+        .earliest("created_at")
+        .created_at.isoformat()
+        .replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    )
 
     response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
 
@@ -770,6 +797,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_administrators(
         "path": document.path,
         "title": document.title,
         "updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "user_access_since": expected_access_since,
         "user_role": role,
     }
 
@@ -810,6 +838,14 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_owners(
     factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document, team="owners", role="owner")
     factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
     factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory()
+    # the history this user may read starts at the earliest access they hold —
+    # here through one of their teams
+    expected_access_since = (
+        models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(document=document, team__in=teams)
+        .earliest("created_at")
+        .created_at.isoformat()
+        .replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    )
 
     response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
 
@@ -836,6 +872,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_owners(
         "path": document.path,
         "title": document.title,
         "updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "user_access_since": expected_access_since,
         "user_role": role,
     }
 
@@ -1053,3 +1090,58 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_permanently_deleted_related(role, depth):
 
     assert response.status_code == 404
     assert response.json() == {"detail": "Not found."}
+
+
+def test_api_documents_retrieve_user_access_since_is_ancestor_aware():
+    """
+    `user_access_since` is the earliest access the user holds on the document or on any of
+    its ancestors. It is what bounds the history they may read — the collaboration server
+    turns it into `history.from` — so a later access on the document itself must not shorten
+    what an earlier one on a parent already gave them.
+    """
+    user = factories.UserFactory()
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.force_login(user)
+
+    parent = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted")
+    child = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent, link_reach="restricted")
+
+    ten_days_ago = timezone.now() - timedelta(days=10)
+    with mock.patch("django.utils.timezone.now", return_value=ten_days_ago):
+        parent_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
+            document=parent, user=user, role="reader"
+        )
+    # granted later, and deliberately the stronger role: recency must not win
+    factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child, user=user, role="editor")
+
+    response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{child.id!s}/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    expected = parent_access.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    assert response.json()["user_access_since"] == expected
+
+
+def test_api_documents_retrieve_user_access_since_is_null_without_an_access():
+    """
+    A user who reaches a document through its link reach alone holds no access, so there is
+    no date to bound their history with — and they get none at all. This is the reason the
+    version endpoints have always refused them, and the collaboration server withholds the
+    `history` facet on the same grounds.
+    """
+    document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="public", link_role="editor")
+
+    # anonymous
+    assert (
+        APIClient().get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/").json()[
+            "user_access_since"
+        ]
+        is None
+    )
+
+    # signed in, but still reaching it only through the link
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.force_login(factories.UserFactory())
+    response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.json()["user_access_since"] is None
diff --git a/src/helm/impress/values.yaml b/src/helm/impress/values.yaml
index eacc127ff..e51c69c16 100644
--- a/src/helm/impress/values.yaml
+++ b/src/helm/impress/values.yaml
@@ -127,8 +127,14 @@ ingressCollaborationApi:
   ##
   ## `jwks` is public on purpose: it carries the public halves of the keys
   ## yhub signs with, and nothing else.
+  ##
+  ## `activity` and `changeset` carry the editing history, bounded per user to
+  ## the moment they were given access to the document — a user who holds no
+  ## access on it, only its link, is refused both.
   paths:
     - /collaboration/ydoc/
+    - /collaboration/activity/
+    - /collaboration/changeset/
     - /collaboration/jwks/
   ## @param ingressCollaborationApi.hosts Additional host to configure for the Ingress
   hosts: []
diff --git a/src/yhub-server/README.md b/src/yhub-server/README.md
index 3e63bfc2a..f5ab27427 100644
--- a/src/yhub-server/README.md
+++ b/src/yhub-server/README.md
@@ -80,14 +80,14 @@ It is not a fork of yhub — it is a thin wrapper:
 - mirrors the environment conventions used elsewhere in this repository
   (`*_FILE` secret indirection, `COLLABORATION_SERVER_ORIGIN` allowlist, …).
 
-Public exposure: the browser needs two routes, the websocket
-`/collaboration/ws/` and `/collaboration/ydoc/` for the http fallback, plus
+Public exposure: the browser needs the websocket `/collaboration/ws/`,
+`/collaboration/ydoc/` for the http fallback, `/collaboration/activity/` and
+`/collaboration/changeset/` for the editing history, plus
 `/collaboration/jwks/v1`, which carries public keys and nothing else. Every
-other route this server serves — `rollback`, `prune`, `changeset`, `activity`,
-`reset-connections`, `migrate`, `create-ydoc`, `restore-ydoc`, `reset-ydoc` —
-is now refused to a browser by the permission tables themselves (see "Access
-control" below), so publishing one is no longer the security boundary it was
-under yhub 0.7. Keep them off the
+other route this server serves — `rollback`, `prune`, `reset-connections`,
+`migrate`, `create-ydoc`, `restore-ydoc`, `reset-ydoc` — is refused to a browser
+by the permission tables themselves (see "Access control" below), so publishing
+one is no longer the security boundary it was under yhub 0.7. Keep them off the
 public ingress all the same: an endpoint that cannot be reached cannot be
 probed. The two probes are not worth publishing either — kubelet calls them from
 inside — and the helm chart's ingress lists what it routes rather than what it
@@ -105,21 +105,25 @@ out of `server.js` so they can be read and tested without redis and postgres.
 
 Masks are positional `crud` strings where `-` denies, so `'-r--'` is read-only.
 
-| Facet | Reader | Editor | Admin token |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `ydoc` | `-r--` | `-ru-` | `cru-` |
-| `awareness` | `-r--` | `-ru-` | `-ru-` |
-| `history` | — | — | `from: 0` |
-| `delete` | — | — | `['soft']` |
-| `endpoint.ws` | `-r--` | `-ru-` | `crud` (`'*'`) |
-| `endpoint.ydoc` | `-r--` | `-ru-` | `crud` (`'*'`) |
-| every other endpoint | — | — | `crud` (`'*'`) |
+| Facet | Reader | Editor | Link-only reader | Admin token |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `ydoc` | `-r--` | `-ru-` | as reader/editor | `cru-` |
+| `awareness` | `-r--` | `-ru-` | as reader/editor | `-ru-` |
+| `history` | `from: <access date>` | `from: <access date>` | — | `from: 0` |
+| `delete` | — | — | — | `['soft']` |
+| `endpoint.ws` | `-r--` | `-ru-` | as reader/editor | `crud` (`'*'`) |
+| `endpoint.ydoc` | `-r--` | `-ru-` | as reader/editor | `crud` (`'*'`) |
+| `endpoint.activity` | `-r--` | `-r--` | — | `crud` (`'*'`) |
+| `endpoint.changeset` | `-r--` | `-r--` | — | `crud` (`'*'`) |
+| every other endpoint | — | — | — | `crud` (`'*'`) |
 
-Reader and editor are the same document permission, `browserDocumentPermissions`,
-switched on the backend's `abilities.update`; `abilities.retrieve` decided
-whether there is any access at all before that.
+All three browser columns are the same document permission,
+`browserDocumentPermissions`, switched on two things the backend sends:
+`abilities.update` for reader-vs-editor, and `user_access_since` for whether
+there is a history to read. `abilities.retrieve` decided whether there is any
+access at all before either.
 
-Four of those cells are decisions rather than transcriptions:
+Five of those cells are decisions rather than transcriptions:
 
 - **`awareness: '-r--'` for a reader.** A reader receives presence and never
   publishes it — [suitenumerique/docs#2544](https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/pull/2544),
@@ -131,14 +135,32 @@ Four of those cells are decisions rather than transcriptions:
   a feature. The frontend has to know it too: the http fallback provider has no
   receive-only setting, so a reader's `HttpProvider` is built with no awareness
   instance at all, or its first `PATCH` would take a 403 and close it for good.
-- **No `'*'` endpoint fallback for the browser.** Only `ws` and `ydoc` are named,
-  so everything else is denied — including any endpoint a future yhub release
-  adds. Under 0.7 this fence was a `purpose != null` check, which `create-ydoc`
-  slipped through by declaring no purpose.
-- **No `history` facet for the browser.** This is what makes yhub refuse a
-  `gc=false` connection with a 403; Docs users are served the garbage-collected
-  document, and the full history is the backend's business. It also keeps
-  `activity` and `changeset` closed even if their endpoints were ever granted.
+- **No `'*'` endpoint fallback for the browser.** Only the four routes above are
+  named, so everything else is denied — including any endpoint a future yhub
+  release adds. Under 0.7 this fence was a `purpose != null` check, which
+  `create-ydoc` slipped through by declaring no purpose.
+- **`history.from` is the moment the user got access**, not the beginning of the
+  document. It is the backend's `user_access_since` — the earliest access they
+  hold on the document or on one of its ancestors — and it is the same rule the
+  version endpoints have always applied ("only those created after the user got
+  access to the document"). yhub clamps `from` up to it on every
+  `activity`/`changeset` read, so a client asks for whatever range it likes and
+  gets back only its own share: the bound is silent, enforced server-side, and a
+  stale client cannot widen it. Two properties fall out of it and are worth
+  keeping true:
+  - a **`gc=false` connection stays refused**, because that requires
+    `from === 0` exactly and a real access date never is;
+  - the ray is a **stored** bound (`DocumentAccess.created_at`), not a
+    wall-clock-relative one, which is what yhub's determinism contract asks for —
+    it re-derives identically on every websocket recheck instead of flapping the
+    connection.
+- **A reader who holds no access, only the link, gets no history.** There is no
+  access row and so no date; the backend has always refused those users their
+  version history for exactly that reason ("we wouldn't know from which date to
+  allow them anyway"). `activity` and `changeset` are withheld together with the
+  ray rather than granted alone, which would open a route that answers 403 by
+  itself. `rollback` and `prune` are withheld from everyone: they are
+  destructive and are granted by name.
 - **`delete: ['soft']` and not `'hard'` for the admin.** yhub 0.8 made
   `DELETE /ydoc?hard=true` reachable over REST for the first time. Docs keeps
   irreversible erasure programmatic, behind `reset-ydoc` (see "Deletion").
diff --git a/src/yhub-server/permissions.js b/src/yhub-server/permissions.js
index 9c819f3ea..0f556b3a0 100644
--- a/src/yhub-server/permissions.js
+++ b/src/yhub-server/permissions.js
@@ -29,27 +29,51 @@
  * `create-ydoc` with the admin token. `u` alone already creates the document on
  * first write.
  *
- * No `history` facet, and that is load-bearing rather than an omission: it is
- * what makes yhub refuse a `gc=false` connection with a 403. Docs users are
- * served the garbage-collected document; the full history is the backend's.
+ * `historyFrom` is the moment this user gained access to the document, in unix
+ * milliseconds — the backend's `user_access_since`, which is the earliest access
+ * they hold on the document or on one of its ancestors. It becomes the start of
+ * the history they may read, which is the rule Docs has always had rather than a
+ * new one: the version endpoints have always shown "only those created after the
+ * user got access to the document". yhub clamps `from` up to this on every
+ * changeset/activity read, so a client asks for whatever range it likes and gets
+ * back only its own share — it never has to know the bound, and a stale or
+ * modified one cannot widen it.
+ *
+ * `null` for a reader who reaches the document by link alone. There is no access
+ * row and so no date, and the backend has always refused those users their
+ * history for exactly that reason: "we wouldn't know from which date to allow
+ * them anyway" (`Document.get_abilities`). Without the facet, `activity` and
+ * `changeset` answer 403 on their own, so their endpoint entries are withheld
+ * together with it rather than granting a route that opens nothing.
+ *
+ * A bounded ray is not a wall-clock-relative grant: it comes from a stored
+ * `created_at`, so it re-derives identically on every websocket recheck, which is
+ * what yhub's determinism contract asks for. And it never unlocks a `gc=false`
+ * connection, which requires `from === 0` exactly — see the guard in server.js.
  *
  * No `delete` facet: deleting a document is Django's, through the admin token.
+ * Deliberately absent too: `rollback` and `prune`, which are destructive and are
+ * granted by name — restoring a version is not something a reader, or an editor,
+ * does through this grant today.
  *
- * No `'*'` endpoint fallback, so everything not named here is denied. The browser
- * calls exactly two routes — the websocket, and `ydoc` for the http fallback.
- * `activity`, `changeset`, `rollback`, `prune` and every custom endpoint are
- * closed to it. Under 0.7 this fence was a `purpose != null` check in
- * `getAccessType`, which `create-ydoc` slipped through by declaring no purpose.
+ * No `'*'` endpoint fallback, so everything not named here is denied — including
+ * any endpoint a future yhub release adds. Under 0.7 this fence was a
+ * `purpose != null` check in `getAccessType`, which `create-ydoc` slipped through
+ * by declaring no purpose.
  */
-export const browserDocumentPermissions = (canEdit) => ({
+export const browserDocumentPermissions = (canEdit, historyFrom = null) => ({
   type: 'permissions:document:v1',
   ydoc: canEdit ? '-ru-' : '-r--',
   awareness: canEdit ? '-ru-' : '-r--',
+  ...(historyFrom ? { history: { from: historyFrom } } : null),
   endpoint: {
     // `r` opens the socket, `u` admits document updates over it
     ws: canEdit ? '-ru-' : '-r--',
     // GET is `r` and PATCH is `u`; DELETE (`d`) stays out — see `delete` above
     ydoc: canEdit ? '-ru-' : '-r--',
+    // the editing timeline, and one point in it — both GET-only, both clamped to
+    // the ray above
+    ...(historyFrom ? { activity: '-r--', changeset: '-r--' } : null),
   },
 });
 
diff --git a/src/yhub-server/permissions.test.js b/src/yhub-server/permissions.test.js
index 072a42f97..9a4e796c7 100644
--- a/src/yhub-server/permissions.test.js
+++ b/src/yhub-server/permissions.test.js
@@ -26,8 +26,22 @@ import {
  * not as a snapshot of the objects: a table may be respelled freely, but it may
  * not start answering a question differently.
  */
-const reader = normalizePermissions(browserDocumentPermissions(false));
-const editor = normalizePermissions(browserDocumentPermissions(true));
+/**
+ * When these two were given access to the document. Any positive number would
+ * do — what the assertions care about is that it is the value the ray starts at,
+ * and that it is not zero.
+ */
+const ACCESS_SINCE = 1_700_000_000_000;
+
+const reader = normalizePermissions(
+  browserDocumentPermissions(false, ACCESS_SINCE),
+);
+const editor = normalizePermissions(
+  browserDocumentPermissions(true, ACCESS_SINCE),
+);
+// the same two reaching the document by link alone: no access row, so no date
+const linkReader = normalizePermissions(browserDocumentPermissions(false));
+const linkEditor = normalizePermissions(browserDocumentPermissions(true));
 const admin = normalizePermissions(adminDocumentPermissions);
 
 const grants = (permissions, required) =>
@@ -87,13 +101,104 @@ describe('the http fallback route', () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe('the history a user may read', () => {
+  /**
+   * The rule Docs has always had, now expressed as a permission: a user sees the
+   * document's history from the moment they were given access to it, and no
+   * further back. yhub clamps every changeset/activity read up to this, so the
+   * bound is enforced on the server and the client never has to know it.
+   */
+  it('starts the ray where the user got access', () => {
+    for (const who of [reader, editor]) {
+      assert.equal(grants(who, { history: { from: ACCESS_SINCE } }), true);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('does not reach back before that', () => {
+    // a requirement asking for a wider ray than the grant is not contained in it
+    for (const who of [reader, editor]) {
+      assert.equal(grants(who, { history: { from: ACCESS_SINCE - 1 } }), false);
+      assert.equal(grants(who, { history: { from: 0 } }), false);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('opens the timeline and one point in it, read only', () => {
+    for (const who of [reader, editor]) {
+      for (const name of ['activity', 'changeset']) {
+        assert.equal(grants(who, { endpoint: { [name]: '-r--' } }), true);
+        // GET only: neither endpoint has another verb, and granting one would
+        // be granting a route that does not exist
+        assert.equal(grants(who, { endpoint: { [name]: '--u-' } }), false);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('never grants the full ray, which is what would unlock gc=false', () => {
+    // `gc=false` demands `history.from === 0` exactly. A real access date is
+    // ~1.8e12, so this can only regress through a bug — assert on the object
+    // rather than through `hasPermissions`, because it is the literal value
+    // that matters here
+    for (const who of [reader, editor]) {
+      assert.notEqual(who.history, false);
+      assert.ok(who.history.from > 0);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('never grants rollback or prune', () => {
+    // destructive, granted by name, and restoring a version is not something
+    // this grant does
+    for (const who of [reader, editor]) {
+      assert.equal(
+        grants(who, { history: { from: ACCESS_SINCE, rollback: true } }),
+        false,
+      );
+      assert.equal(
+        grants(who, { history: { from: ACCESS_SINCE, prune: true } }),
+        false,
+      );
+      assert.equal(grants(who, { endpoint: { rollback: 'c---' } }), false);
+      assert.equal(grants(who, { endpoint: { prune: 'c---' } }), false);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe('a reader who holds no access, only the link', () => {
+  /**
+   * There is no access row and so no date. The backend has always refused these
+   * users their version history for exactly that reason — "we wouldn't know from
+   * which date to allow them anyway" — and the grant says the same thing by
+   * withholding the facet.
+   */
+  it('gets no history at all', () => {
+    for (const who of [linkReader, linkEditor]) {
+      assert.equal(who.history, false);
+      assert.equal(grants(who, { history: { from: 0 } }), false);
+      assert.equal(grants(who, { history: { from: ACCESS_SINCE } }), false);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('cannot reach the timeline either', () => {
+    // withheld together with the ray: without it these two answer 403 on their
+    // own, so granting them would open nothing and only muddy the grant
+    for (const who of [linkReader, linkEditor]) {
+      for (const name of ['activity', 'changeset']) {
+        assert.equal(grants(who, { endpoint: { [name]: '-r--' } }), false);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('still reads and syncs the document like anyone else', () => {
+    assert.equal(grants(linkReader, { ydoc: '-r--' }), true);
+    assert.equal(grants(linkEditor, { ydoc: '--u-' }), true);
+    assert.equal(grants(linkEditor, { endpoint: { ws: '--u-' } }), true);
+  });
+});
+
 describe('everything the browser must not reach', () => {
   // there is no '*' fallback in the browser grant, so an endpoint yhub adds in
   // a future release is denied until it is named — this is the property that
   // replaced 0.7's `purpose != null` check
   for (const name of [
-    'activity',
-    'changeset',
     'rollback',
     'prune',
     'create-ydoc',
@@ -108,10 +213,6 @@ describe('everything the browser must not reach', () => {
       assert.equal(grants(editor, { endpoint: { [name]: 'c---' } }), false);
     });
   }
-
-  it('withholds history, which is what refuses a gc=false connection', () => {
-    assert.equal(grants(editor, { history: { from: 0 } }), false);
-  });
 });
 
 describe('the admin token', () => {
diff --git a/src/yhub-server/server.js b/src/yhub-server/server.js
index cc068cb02..84d2c1626 100644
--- a/src/yhub-server/server.js
+++ b/src/yhub-server/server.js
@@ -450,7 +450,19 @@ const auth = createAuthPlugin({
       if (SOFT_MIGRATION) {
         await seedFromLegacyStore({ org, docid, branch });
       }
-      return browserDocumentPermissions(doc.abilities.update === true);
+      // When this caller was given access, which is where the history they may
+      // read starts. The backend sends ISO-8601 (null for a link-reach reader,
+      // who holds no access and so has no date); `history.from` is unix ms.
+      //
+      // Anything unparseable is *no* history rather than full history, and zero
+      // is refused with it: `from: 0` is the one value that also unlocks a
+      // `gc=false` websocket, and no real access date is ever zero, so a zero
+      // here could only ever be a bug upstream.
+      const accessSince = Date.parse(doc.user_access_since ?? '');
+      return browserDocumentPermissions(
+        doc.abilities.update === true,
+        Number.isFinite(accessSince) && accessSince > 0 ? accessSince : null,
+      );
     },
     async global() {
       return publicGlobalPermissions;