lasuite-docs/documentation/collaboration.md

Collaboration

By default with Docs, collaboration is enabled. To allow the collaboration between users, a connection to a websocket server is made (the yhub service), you only have to configure the Django backend URL and the allowed origin in your yhub service:

COLLABORATION_BACKEND_BASE_URL: https://{yourdocsdomain.tld}
COLLABORATION_SERVER_ORIGIN: https://{yourdocsdomain.tld}

The collaboration server keeps the live state of a document in Redis and persists it to a PostgreSQL database of its own, so it needs both:

REDIS: redis://{redis-host}:6379/0
POSTGRES: postgres://{user}:{password}@{postgres-host}:5432/yhub

Nothing creates that schema at startup: the server never runs DDL. Run the script yhub ships (npm run init-db, which the helm chart runs as a job) once before starting it, and again after every upgrade that adds a table. It creates the database when it is missing, it is idempotent, and until it has run every document read fails with relation "..." does not exist.

The Django backend reads and writes document content there too, so point it at the service:

YHUB_API_BASE_URL: http://{yhub-service}:443

Prefer the internal service url: the routes the backend calls are not meant to be reachable from the outside. Route /collaboration/ws/ to the service publicly — that is the one the browsers open — plus /collaboration/ydoc/ for the http fallback, /collaboration/activity/ and /collaboration/changeset/ for the editing history, and /collaboration/jwks/, which carries public keys and nothing else. Keep everything else in-cluster: rollback, prune, reset-connections, migrate, restore-ydoc, reset-ydoc and create-ydoc are refused to a browser by the permission tables anyway, and an endpoint that cannot be reached cannot be probed.

Both directions are authenticated with short-lived RS256 JWTs rather than a shared secret, and each side verifies the other against the JWKS it publishes — so both need a signing key of their own, and neither needs a copy of the other's:

# Django
JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE: /path/to/backend-private.pem
# yhub
YHUB_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE: /path/to/yhub-private.pem

They are ordinary PKCS#8 RSA keys (openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048), and rolling one needs no change on the other side. Without them the documents still open and edit, but the backend cannot create, delete or restore a document's content, and yhub cannot tell it that a document changed — its updated_at stops following the edits.

Generating them on the cluster

The helm chart generates both for you, so that no key has to be created by hand, put in a values file or in a secret:

jwtKeys:
  enabled: true

A job then creates the two keys, once, in a secret every service mounts read-only, and points the backend and yhub at them. It generates them with openssl in a pod-local volume and hands them to kubectl create secret, so they never touch a disk, a manifest or a values file. The secret is left alone when it is already there, so the job is safe to re-run — it runs on every sync — and rolling the keys is deleting the secret and letting the next run create it again. Both sides follow: they pick the verification key by its kid and fetch the set again when they meet one they do not know.

The job is the only thing allowed near that secret: the chart gives it a service account whose role can create a secret and read whether that one exists, nothing more. The services never call the kubernetes API — they read a mounted file. The secret is not part of the release either, so uninstalling keeps the same identities; delete the secret to start over.

Deployments already holding their keys in a secret of their own point the chart at it instead, and the job and its rights are not created at all:

jwtKeys:
  enabled: true
  existingSecret: my-jwt-keys   # holding private.pem and yhub-private.pem

Setting JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE or YHUB_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE yourself keeps priority over what the job provides, so a deployment holding its keys in a secret of its own can leave jwtKeys disabled and mount them where it wants.

Several replicas can serve the same document: they exchange updates through Redis, so no sticky routing is needed on the websocket ingress.

What happens when connection to the websocket is not allowed?

Some networks refuse a websocket upgrade — corporate proxies, captive portals — and a browser is told nothing more than "the connection closed". For those clients the editor falls back to polling the collaboration server over plain http, on the same room, with the same session cookie and the same authorization. Nothing has to be configured: the fallback is installed next to the websocket and only ever sends a request while the socket is down.

That means /collaboration/ydoc/ has to be routed publicly, not only in-cluster — the browsers of those users call it directly. And the origins a browser may reach the server from are the ones in COLLABORATION_SERVER_ORIGIN, which now gate the http routes as well as the websocket:

COLLABORATION_SERVER_ORIGIN: https://{yourdocsdomain.tld}

A comma-separated list is allowed, and each entry is a bare origin — https://host[:port], no path and no trailing slash. A deployment serving the frontend from another origin than the collaboration server has to list it here or the fallback is refused, the same way the websocket already is.

What the fallback does not do is hide the difference. It publishes local changes about a second after the last keystroke, and it retrieves the document every ten seconds, so someone else's edits arrive with up to that much delay and remote cursors move at poll resolution. Each round transfers the whole document, so a large document polled by many clients is real egress. It is a way to keep editing, not a replacement for the socket — and the socket keeps being retried underneath, so a client that fell back during an outage returns to it on its own.

A reader on the fallback sees no cursors at all. Read-only clients may not publish presence (see below), the provider has no receive-only setting for it, and a reader that tried to publish would be refused and stop polling altogether — so it is built without awareness and only ever reads the document. On the websocket a reader still sees everyone else's cursors.

Documents are never in conflict either way: both transports publish from the same Yjs document, and Yjs merges. Before the fallback existed, users who could not open a websocket edited a document that was saved wholesale and erased each other's modifications; that is what this removes.

Who may share a cursor

Presence — the coloured cursors and selections of the other people in a document — is a permission of its own, separate from the right to edit. A reader receives presence but never publishes it: they see who else is in the document and where, and nobody sees them.

The collaboration server enforces this itself rather than trusting the editor to be quiet. It drops a read-only connection's presence message on the websocket, and refuses the awareness field of a fallback request, so a modified or stale client changes nothing. See the access-control section of src/yhub-server/README.md for the permission tables this comes from.

Note this is deliberately stricter than the collaboration server's own default, which lets read-only connections broadcast cursors.

How much history a user may see

The editing history is bounded per user: you see the document's history from the moment you were given access to it, and no further back. Joining a document that has been written for a year does not hand you the year — it hands you what happened since you arrived.

This is not a new rule. It is the one the version endpoints have always applied ("only those created after the user got access to the document"); it now also bounds the collaboration server's activity and changeset routes, which are what a history view is built on.

The date is the earliest access you hold on the document or on one of its ancestors — share a folder with someone and they get its whole subtree from that moment, including documents created in it later. The backend computes it (user_access_since on the document endpoint) and the collaboration server turns it into the start of the history it will serve. The bound is applied server-side and silently: a client asks for whatever range it likes and receives only its own share, so there is no bound for it to get wrong and none it can widen.

A reader who reaches a document through its link alone — a public or authenticated-reach document they hold no access on — gets no history at all, not a bounded one. There is no access record and therefore no date to bound it with, which is the same reason the version endpoints have always refused them.