✨(mobile) custom logout view to terminates the IdP session

ProConnect ignores prompt=login, so preserving the IdP session locked
mobile users into the same identity forever. The logout endpoint now
accepts a mobile_scheme and ends the RP-initiated round-trip on a new
logout-callback view that deep-links back to the app, so the system
browser — which holds both the Django session handed over at login and
the IdP SSO cookie — terminates both sessions.
Then, Proconnect login page's Content Security Policy blocks
the direct redirect: Chrome enforces its form-action on the whole
redirect chain of the credential form submission, and "*" only matches
network schemes — so our network mobile scheme violates it and the user
stays stuck on the identity provider during logout workflow.
The callback now serves a page that ends the form chain on a
network mobile scheme, then hands off to the app from our own page,
outside the IdP policy: automatically via script (iOS
interception, unchanged) with a button as the always-working fallback.

docs/mobile.md

@@ -102,15 +102,28 @@ Step by step:
    system browser.
 2. **Backend flags the session.** `OIDCAuthenticationRequestView` checks the
    scheme against `MOBILE_AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEMES` (rejects unknown schemes) and
-   stashes `{scheme, code_challenge, created_at}` in the Django session. A flag
+   stashes `{scheme, code_challenge, state, created_at}` in the Django session.
-   older than 10 min is later ignored, so an abandoned mobile attempt can't
+   The `state` is the one generated for this OIDC round-trip: the callback only
-   hijack a subsequent web login in the same browser.
+   consumes the flag when its own state matches, and a flag older than 10 min
+   is ignored, so an abandoned or overlapping mobile attempt can't hijack a web
+   flow running in the same browser (same binding for the mobile logout).
 3. **IdP authenticates** — interactively the first time, silently afterwards
    (see *Cross-app SSO conditions* below).
 4. **Callback mints a one-time token.** `OIDCAuthenticationCallbackView` caches
    `{session_key, code_challenge}` under `mobile-auth-token:<token>` with a
-   `MOBILE_AUTH_TOKEN_TTL` (60 s) timeout and deep-links back to
+   `MOBILE_AUTH_TOKEN_TTL` (60 s) timeout and hands the browser back to
-   `stmessages://auth?token=…`.
+   `stmessages://auth?token=…` — through a small **hand-off page**
+   (auto-redirect + "open the app" button), not a plain 302 to the scheme.
+   The direct redirect gets blocked by the **CSP of the IdP login page**:
+   Chrome enforces its `form-action` on the whole redirect chain of the
+   credential form submission, and `*` only matches network schemes, so the
+   final custom-scheme hop violates it and the sheet stays stuck on the IdP.
+   ProConnect sends such a CSP; the dev Keycloak does not, which hides the
+   bug in dev. Ending the chain on a 200 page satisfies the policy, and the
+   deep link then leaves from our own page. iOS is indifferent —
+   `ASWebAuthenticationSession` intercepts the scheme navigation either way —
+   and the logout keeps its direct scheme redirects: its round-trip involves
+   no form submission, so no `form-action` ever applies.
 5. **App exchanges the token.** `MobileSessionExchangeView` (anonymous, single
    use) deletes the cache key *before* verifying it (a failed attempt can't be
    retried), checks `S256(code_verifier) == code_challenge` with
@@ -146,13 +159,19 @@ are independent of `MOBILE_APP_ID`.
 > simply because the Django session cookie is still valid — that never hits
 > `/authorize` and does **not** prove IdP SSO. Always exercise the mobile flow.
 
-### Logout keeps the IdP session alive
+### Logout ends the session everywhere (Django **and** IdP)
 
-`nativeLogout()` does **not** call `/logout/`, which would trigger RP-initiated
+`nativeLogout()` runs the RP-initiated logout (`/api/v1.0/logout/` with
-IdP logout and tear down the cross-app SSO session. It POSTs to
+`mobile_scheme`) in the system browser, which holds both the Django session
-`/api/v1.0/mobile/auth/logout/` instead, which flushes only the server-side
+cookie handed over at login and the IdP SSO cookie: the round-trip terminates
-Django session, then clears the native cookies and the cached CSRF token.
+both and ends on a `scheme://logout` deep link that closes the sheet. Keeping
-IdP-level logout is a follow-up.
+the IdP session alive is not an option — it silently signs the same identity
+back in on the next login and ProConnect ignores `prompt=login`, so tearing it
+down is the only way to let the user switch accounts. The app then POSTs to
+`/api/v1.0/mobile/auth/logout/` as a safety net (the browser round-trip only
+ends the app-side session when the browser still holds the same session
+cookie), clears the native cookies and the cached CSRF token. By design this
+also ends the SSO session shared with other La Suite apps.
 
 ## Networking & session
 
@@ -637,8 +656,10 @@ or the Capacitor version.
    manifest is refused (downgrade guard).
 5. **Native file paths** — download/share an attachment and a raw `.eml`
    (native HTTP session), upload an attachment (CSRF token path).
-6. **Logout → re-login** — logout ends the Django session only; the
+6. **Logout → re-login** — logout ends both the Django session and the IdP
-   following login must complete silently (IdP session preserved).
+   session (RP-initiated logout in the system browser); the following login
+   must stop on the IdP login form, allowing an account switch. A silent
+   re-login means the IdP session survived: that is a regression.
 7. **No dev server baked in** — in dev, `MOBILE_DEV_SERVER_URL` bakes the Vite
    dev server URL into `capacitor.config.json` (hot reload, see *Build & run
    workflow*). Before archiving, set it empty in `frontend.local` and rerun

src/backend/core/api/serializers.py

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ from core.mda.dispatch_webhooks import (
     VALID_FORMATS,
 )
 from core.mda.inline_images import extract_inline_images_html
-from core.services.attachments import get_attachment_display_name
 from core.mda.utils import message_snippet
+from core.services.attachments import get_attachment_display_name
 from core.services.blob_gc import schedule_for_gc
 from core.services.identity import keycloak as keycloak_service
 from core.services.importer.channel import merged_state

src/backend/core/api/viewsets/mobile_auth.py

@@ -114,11 +114,11 @@ class MobileSessionExchangeView(APIView):
 class MobileLogoutView(APIView):
     """Invalidate the Django session without the RP-initiated IdP logout.
 
-    The web logout (`/logout/`) redirects to the identity provider with an
+    Fallback for the mobile logout: the nominal path runs the full IdP logout
-    `id_token_hint`, which terminates the IdP session and therefore cross-app
+    (`/logout/?mobile_scheme=...`) in the system browser, but when that flow
-    SSO. Mobile logout must only flush the server-side Django session: the app
+    fails or is cancelled the app still needs to end its own session — this
-    clears its local cookie jar, and the IdP session stays alive for the other
+    endpoint only flushes the server-side Django session bound to the request
-    apps of the suite.
+    cookie.
 
     Anonymous requests are a no-op (204): the app calls this best-effort, and
     logging out an already expired session must not fail.

src/backend/core/authentication/urls.py

@@ -2,12 +2,17 @@
 
 from django.urls import include, path
 
-from .views import OIDCLogoutView
+from .views import OIDCLogoutCallbackView, OIDCLogoutView
 
 urlpatterns = [
     # lasuite's logout views are not swappable through settings (unlike the
     # authenticate/callback views): override their paths by URL ordering, the
     # same way lasuite overrides mozilla-django-oidc's.
     path("logout/", OIDCLogoutView.as_view(), name="oidc_logout_custom"),
+    path(
+        "logout-callback/",
+        OIDCLogoutCallbackView.as_view(),
+        name="oidc_logout_callback",
+    ),
     path("", include("lasuite.oidc_login.urls")),
 ]

src/backend/core/authentication/views.py

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ anonymous — see `OIDCLogoutView`.
 import logging
 import secrets
 import time
-from urllib.parse import urlencode
+from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlencode, urlparse
 
 from django.conf import settings
 from django.contrib import auth
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from django.core.cache import cache
 from django.core.exceptions import SuspiciousOperation
 from django.core.handlers.wsgi import WSGIRequest
 from django.http import HttpResponse, HttpResponseBadRequest, HttpResponseRedirect
+from django.shortcuts import render
 
 from lasuite.oidc_login.views import (
     OIDCAuthenticationCallbackView as LaSuiteOIDCAuthenticationCallbackView,
@@ -29,15 +30,19 @@ from lasuite.oidc_login.views import (
 from lasuite.oidc_login.views import (
     OIDCAuthenticationRequestView as LaSuiteOIDCAuthenticationRequestView,
 )
+from lasuite.oidc_login.views import (
+    OIDCLogoutCallbackView as LaSuiteOIDCLogoutCallbackView,
+)
 from lasuite.oidc_login.views import OIDCLogoutView as LaSuiteOIDCLogoutView
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY = "mobile_auth"
+MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY = "mobile_logout"
 MOBILE_AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_PREFIX = "mobile-auth-token"  # noqa: S105 (cache key prefix, not a secret)
-# A pending mobile login older than this is ignored by the callback, so an
+# A pending mobile login/logout older than this is ignored by the callbacks,
-# abandoned mobile attempt cannot turn a later web login performed in the same
+# so an abandoned mobile attempt cannot turn a later web flow performed in the
-# browser session into a deep-link redirect.
+# same browser session into a deep-link redirect.
 MOBILE_AUTH_FLAG_MAX_AGE = 60 * 10
 
 
@@ -50,51 +55,117 @@ class AppSchemeRedirect(HttpResponseRedirect):
         super().__init__(redirect_to, *args, **kwargs)
 
 
+def mobile_login_handoff(request: WSGIRequest, app_url: str) -> HttpResponse:
+    """Serve the page handing a finished mobile login back to the app deep link.
+
+    A plain 302 to the custom scheme gets blocked by the Content Security
+    Policy of the IdP login page: Chrome enforces its ``form-action`` on the
+    whole redirect chain of the credential form submission, and ``*`` only
+    matches network schemes — the final custom-scheme hop violates it and the
+    sheet stays stuck on the IdP ("Sending form data … violates form-action").
+    ProConnect sends such a CSP; the dev Keycloak does not, which hides the
+    bug in dev, and the logout chain involves no form submission, so its
+    direct scheme redirects are fine. Serving a 200 page ends the form chain
+    on a network scheme; the deep link then leaves from *this* page, outside
+    the IdP policy: automatically via script (iOS ASWebAuthenticationSession
+    intercepts it; Android may still gate an external-protocol launch on user
+    activation) with a tap target as the fallback that always works.
+    """
+    response = render(request, "core/mobile_handoff.html", {"app_url": app_url})
+    # The page embeds a one-time bearer token: it must never outlive the
+    # navigation that carried it.
+    response["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+    return response
+
+
+def get_requested_mobile_scheme(request: WSGIRequest) -> str:
+    """Return the validated `mobile_scheme` query parameter ("" when absent).
+
+    The scheme is the deep-link destination of the whole flow: only
+    allowlisted schemes may terminate it.
+    """
+    mobile_scheme = request.GET.get("mobile_scheme", "")
+    if mobile_scheme and mobile_scheme not in settings.MOBILE_AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEMES:
+        raise SuspiciousOperation("Unknown mobile callback scheme.")
+    return mobile_scheme
+
+
+def pop_mobile_flag(session, key: str, state: str | None) -> dict | None:
+    """Pop the pending mobile flow flag, if it belongs to `state` and is fresh.
+
+    `state` identifies the OIDC round-trip the callback belongs to. A session
+    can carry several valid states at once (overlapping or abandoned flows), so
+    a flag consumed by the wrong callback would send that flow to the app deep
+    link — a web login or logout landing on a custom scheme — and leave the
+    mobile one without it.
+    """
+    mobile_flag = session.get(key)
+    if mobile_flag is None:
+        return None
+    if not state or mobile_flag.get("state") != state:
+        return None
+    del session[key]
+    session.save()
+    if time.time() - mobile_flag["created_at"] > MOBILE_AUTH_FLAG_MAX_AGE:
+        logger.warning("Ignoring stale %s flag.", key)
+        return None
+    return mobile_flag
+
+
 class OIDCAuthenticationRequestView(LaSuiteOIDCAuthenticationRequestView):
     """Authentication request view supporting a mobile session handoff.
 
     Mobile apps add `mobile_scheme` (an allowlisted deep-link scheme) and
     `code_challenge` (PKCE S256) to the authenticate URL. The pair is stored in
-    the session so the callback view knows where to hand the session over.
+    the session — bound to the state of this OIDC round-trip — so the callback
+    view knows where to hand the session over.
     """
 
     def get(self, request: WSGIRequest) -> HttpResponse:
         """Flag the session when the login is initiated by a mobile app."""
-        mobile_scheme = request.GET.get("mobile_scheme", "")
+        mobile_scheme = get_requested_mobile_scheme(request)
-        if mobile_scheme:
+        if not mobile_scheme:
-            if mobile_scheme not in settings.MOBILE_AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEMES:
+            return super().get(request)
-                raise SuspiciousOperation("Unknown mobile callback scheme.")
+
         code_challenge = request.GET.get("code_challenge", "")
         if not code_challenge:
             return HttpResponseBadRequest("Missing code_challenge.")
+
+        response = super().get(request)
+        # Flagged after super(): the state the parent view just generated ties
+        # the flag to this round-trip only. Its own session save happened
+        # before, hence the explicit one below.
         request.session[MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY] = {
             "scheme": mobile_scheme,
             "code_challenge": code_challenge,
+            "state": parse_qs(urlparse(response["Location"]).query)["state"][0],
             "created_at": time.time(),
         }
-            # The parent view forces a session save before redirecting to the
+        request.session.save()
-            # identity provider, so the flag survives the OIDC round-trip.
+        return response
-        return super().get(request)
 
 
 class OIDCAuthenticationCallbackView(LaSuiteOIDCAuthenticationCallbackView):
     """Callback view handing the session over to the mobile app via deep link."""
 
-    def _pop_mobile_auth(self) -> dict | None:
+    def pop_mobile_auth(self) -> dict | None:
-        """Pop and return the pending mobile login data, if any and still fresh."""
+        """Return the mobile flag of the login this callback closes, if any.
-        mobile_auth = self.request.session.pop(MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY, None)
+
-        if mobile_auth is None:
+        The parent view consumed the state from `oidc_states` before handing
-            return None
+        over, but the query parameter still identifies the round-trip: a
-        self.request.session.save()
+        callback carrying no state at all (a malformed one, never a real IdP
-        if time.time() - mobile_auth["created_at"] > MOBILE_AUTH_FLAG_MAX_AGE:
+        answer) belongs to no known flow and must leave the flag alone.
-            logger.warning("Ignoring stale mobile login flag.")
+        """
-            return None
+        return pop_mobile_flag(
-        return mobile_auth
+            self.request.session,
+            MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY,
+            self.request.GET.get("state"),
+        )
 
     def login_success(self) -> HttpResponse:
-        """Redirect to the mobile app with a one-time token after a mobile login."""
+        """Hand a one-time session token to the mobile app after a mobile login."""
         response = super().login_success()
-        mobile_auth = self._pop_mobile_auth()
+        mobile_auth = self.pop_mobile_auth()
         if mobile_auth is None:
             return response
 
@@ -109,15 +180,19 @@ class OIDCAuthenticationCallbackView(LaSuiteOIDCAuthenticationCallbackView):
             timeout=settings.MOBILE_AUTH_TOKEN_TTL,
         )
         query = urlencode({"token": token})
-        return AppSchemeRedirect(f"{mobile_auth['scheme']}://auth?{query}")
+        return mobile_login_handoff(
+            self.request, f"{mobile_auth['scheme']}://auth?{query}"
+        )
 
     def login_failure(self) -> HttpResponse:
-        """Redirect to the mobile app with an error after a failed mobile login."""
+        """Hand the login error back to the mobile app after a failed mobile login."""
         response = super().login_failure()
-        mobile_auth = self._pop_mobile_auth()
+        mobile_auth = self.pop_mobile_auth()
         if mobile_auth is None:
             return response
-        return AppSchemeRedirect(f"{mobile_auth['scheme']}://auth?error=login_failed")
+        return mobile_login_handoff(
+            self.request, f"{mobile_auth['scheme']}://auth?error=login_failed"
+        )
 
 
 class OIDCLogoutView(LaSuiteOIDCLogoutView):
@@ -135,10 +210,17 @@ class OIDCLogoutView(LaSuiteOIDCLogoutView):
     rest of the parent flow is untouched (post_logout_redirect_uri is the
     /logout-callback/ route — it must be registered at the IdP — and the
     session is kept alive until the callback validates the returned state).
+
+    Mobile apps run this same flow in the system browser (which holds both the
+    Django session cookie handed over at login and the IdP SSO cookie) and add
+    `mobile_scheme` so the round-trip ends on a deep link closing the sheet —
+    see `OIDCLogoutCallbackView`.
     """
 
     def post(self, request: WSGIRequest) -> HttpResponse:
         """Log the user out of the IdP session, then out of Django."""
+        mobile_scheme = get_requested_mobile_scheme(request)
+
         logout_url = self.redirect_url
 
         if request.user.is_authenticated or request.session.get("oidc_id_token"):
@@ -147,10 +229,52 @@ class OIDCLogoutView(LaSuiteOIDCLogoutView):
         if logout_url == self.redirect_url:
             # No IdP round-trip possible: end the local session right away.
             auth.logout(request)
+            if mobile_scheme:
+                return AppSchemeRedirect(f"{mobile_scheme}://logout")
         else:
+            if mobile_scheme:
+                request.session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY] = {
+                    "scheme": mobile_scheme,
+                    # The state generated by construct_oidc_logout_url() ties
+                    # the flag to this round-trip only.
+                    "state": parse_qs(urlparse(logout_url).query)["state"][0],
+                    "created_at": time.time(),
+                }
             # Persist the state generated in construct_oidc_logout_url()
-            # before the browser leaves for the IdP.
+            # (and the mobile flag) before the browser leaves for the IdP.
             request.session.modified = True
             request.session.save()
 
         return HttpResponseRedirect(logout_url)
+
+
+class OIDCLogoutCallbackView(LaSuiteOIDCLogoutCallbackView):
+    """Logout callback view handing control back to the mobile app.
+
+    A logout initiated by a mobile app must end on a deep link so the
+    system-browser sheet closes and the app can clear its local state; the
+    parent view otherwise lands on LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URL, leaving the sheet
+    open on the web homepage.
+    """
+
+    def get(self, request: WSGIRequest) -> HttpResponse:
+        """Redirect to the app once the parent view has ended the session."""
+        # The one-shot flag is only consumed on the final IdP callback of the
+        # very logout that set it — a state known to this session *and* the one
+        # stored alongside the flag: the parent redirects without ending the
+        # session on the state-less "preflight" some providers send before the
+        # actual callback, and raises on an unknown state, while an overlapping
+        # web logout carries another valid state. Popping on any of those would
+        # close the sheet while the browser session is still authenticated,
+        # then leave the real callback without its flag.
+        # Popped before super(): auth.logout() flushes the session.
+        mobile_logout = None
+        state = request.GET.get("state")
+        if state and state in request.session.get("oidc_states", {}):
+            mobile_logout = pop_mobile_flag(
+                request.session, MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY, state=state
+            )
+        response = super().get(request)
+        if mobile_logout is None:
+            return response
+        return AppSchemeRedirect(f"{mobile_logout['scheme']}://logout")

src/backend/core/mda/utils.py

@@ -26,7 +26,12 @@ from email.utils import make_msgid
 
 from django.utils import timezone
 
-from jmap_email import ComposeOptions, body_part_text, decode_rfc2047_header, preview_text
+from jmap_email import (
+    ComposeOptions,
+    body_part_text,
+    decode_rfc2047_header,
+    preview_text,
+)
 from jmap_email.types import JmapEmail
 
 # Compose policy shared by every path that builds MIME for us.

src/backend/core/templates/core/mobile_handoff.html

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+<!doctype html>
+{% comment %}
+Hand-off page ending a mobile login on the app deep link — served instead of
+a plain 302 to the custom scheme, which the IdP login page's CSP form-action
+blocks at the end of the credential form's redirect chain (see
+mobile_login_handoff in core/authentication/views.py for the full rationale).
+The script keeps the silent path (iOS interception); the link is the Android
+fallback — a user-activated navigation from this page, outside the IdP CSP.
+{% endcomment %}
+<html lang="fr">
+  <head>
+    <meta charset="utf-8" />
+    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
+    <title>Messages</title>
+    <style>
+      body {
+        font-family: system-ui, sans-serif;
+        display: flex;
+        flex-direction: column;
+        align-items: center;
+        justify-content: center;
+        gap: 1.5rem;
+        min-height: 100dvh;
+        margin: 0;
+        padding: 1rem;
+        text-align: center;
+        color: #161616;
+        background: #fff;
+      }
+      a {
+        display: inline-block;
+        padding: 0.75rem 1.5rem;
+        border-radius: 0.5rem;
+        background: #000091;
+        color: #fff;
+        text-decoration: none;
+        font-weight: 600;
+      }
+    </style>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <p>Retour vers l&rsquo;application&hellip;<br /><span lang="en">Returning to the app&hellip;</span></p>
+    <a id="open" href="{{ app_url }}">Ouvrir l&rsquo;application / <span lang="en">Open the app</span></a>
+    <script>
+      location.replace(document.getElementById("open").href);
+    </script>
+  </body>
+</html>

src/backend/core/tests/authentication/test_logout.py

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 """Tests for the logout flow, IdP-terminating even for anonymous sessions."""
 
+import time
 from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
 
 from django.test.utils import override_settings
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ from rest_framework import status
 from rest_framework.test import APIClient
 
 from core import factories
+from core.authentication.views import MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY
 
 pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
 
@@ -18,6 +20,11 @@ LOGOUT_SETTINGS = {
     "LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URL": "https://app.test/",
 }
 
+MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS = {
+    **LOGOUT_SETTINGS,
+    "MOBILE_AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEMES": ["stmessagesa"],
+}
+
 
 class TestLogoutView:
     """Tests for the logout view."""
@@ -100,3 +107,197 @@ class TestLogoutCallbackView:
         assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
         assert response["Location"] == "https://app.test/"
         assert "_auth_user_id" not in client.session
+
+
+class TestMobileLogoutHandoff:
+    """Tests for the mobile handoff of the IdP-terminating logout.
+
+    A logout initiated by a mobile app runs in the system browser and must end
+    on a deep link so the sheet closes and the app can clear its local state.
+    """
+
+    def _login_with_id_token(self, client):
+        """Authenticate the client with an id_token stored in the session."""
+        client.force_login(factories.UserFactory())
+        session = client.session
+        session["oidc_id_token"] = "fake-id-token"
+        session.save()
+
+    @override_settings(**MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS)
+    def test_mobile_logout_goes_through_idp_and_flags_the_session(self):
+        """A mobile logout must run the IdP round-trip and flag the session."""
+        client = APIClient()
+        self._login_with_id_token(client)
+
+        response = client.get(
+            reverse("oidc_logout_custom"), {"mobile_scheme": "stmessagesa"}
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        assert response["Location"].startswith("https://oidc.test/logout?")
+        query = parse_qs(urlparse(response["Location"]).query)
+        mobile_logout = client.session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY]
+        assert mobile_logout["scheme"] == "stmessagesa"
+        assert mobile_logout["state"] == query["state"][0]
+
+    @override_settings(**MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS)
+    def test_mobile_logout_unknown_scheme_is_rejected(self):
+        """A scheme not in the allowlist must be rejected as suspicious."""
+        response = APIClient().get(
+            reverse("oidc_logout_custom"), {"mobile_scheme": "evilapp"}
+        )
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST
+
+    @override_settings(**MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS)
+    def test_mobile_logout_without_id_token_deep_links_immediately(self):
+        """With no IdP round-trip possible, the deep link must close the flow."""
+        client = APIClient()
+        client.force_login(factories.UserFactory())
+
+        response = client.get(
+            reverse("oidc_logout_custom"), {"mobile_scheme": "stmessagesa"}
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        assert response["Location"] == "stmessagesa://logout"
+        assert "_auth_user_id" not in client.session
+
+    @override_settings(**MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS)
+    def test_mobile_callback_deep_links_to_the_app(self):
+        """The callback must end the session then hand control to the app."""
+        client = APIClient()
+        client.force_login(factories.UserFactory())
+        session = client.session
+        session["oidc_states"] = {"logout-state": {}}
+        session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY] = {
+            "scheme": "stmessagesa",
+            "state": "logout-state",
+            "created_at": time.time(),
+        }
+        session.save()
+
+        response = client.get(
+            reverse("oidc_logout_callback"), {"state": "logout-state"}
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        assert response["Location"] == "stmessagesa://logout"
+        assert "_auth_user_id" not in client.session
+
+    @override_settings(**MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS)
+    def test_stateless_preflight_does_not_consume_the_mobile_flag(self):
+        """Some IdPs send a state-less preflight before the actual callback:
+        it must leave the flag and the session untouched so the real
+        callback still ends on the deep link."""
+        client = APIClient()
+        client.force_login(factories.UserFactory())
+        session = client.session
+        session["oidc_states"] = {"logout-state": {}}
+        session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY] = {
+            "scheme": "stmessagesa",
+            "state": "logout-state",
+            "created_at": time.time(),
+        }
+        session.save()
+
+        response = client.get(reverse("oidc_logout_callback"))
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        assert response["Location"] == "https://app.test/"
+        assert client.session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY]["scheme"] == "stmessagesa"
+        assert "_auth_user_id" in client.session
+
+        response = client.get(
+            reverse("oidc_logout_callback"), {"state": "logout-state"}
+        )
+
+        assert response["Location"] == "stmessagesa://logout"
+        assert "_auth_user_id" not in client.session
+
+    @override_settings(**MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS)
+    def test_unknown_state_does_not_consume_the_mobile_flag(self):
+        """A callback with a state unknown to the session is rejected by the
+        parent view: the flag must survive for the legitimate callback."""
+        client = APIClient()
+        client.force_login(factories.UserFactory())
+        session = client.session
+        session["oidc_states"] = {"logout-state": {}}
+        session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY] = {
+            "scheme": "stmessagesa",
+            "state": "logout-state",
+            "created_at": time.time(),
+        }
+        session.save()
+
+        response = client.get(
+            reverse("oidc_logout_callback"), {"state": "forged-state"}
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST
+        assert client.session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY]["scheme"] == "stmessagesa"
+
+    @override_settings(**MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS)
+    def test_another_valid_state_keeps_the_web_redirect(self):
+        """A second flow started from the same browser session leaves another
+        valid state behind: a still-fresh mobile flag must not turn that
+        callback into a deep-link redirect on a web page."""
+        client = APIClient()
+        client.force_login(factories.UserFactory())
+        session = client.session
+        session["oidc_states"] = {"web-state": {}, "mobile-state": {}}
+        session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY] = {
+            "scheme": "stmessagesa",
+            "state": "mobile-state",
+            "created_at": time.time(),
+        }
+        session.save()
+
+        response = client.get(reverse("oidc_logout_callback"), {"state": "web-state"})
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        assert response["Location"] == "https://app.test/"
+        assert "_auth_user_id" not in client.session
+
+    @override_settings(**MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS)
+    def test_anonymous_mobile_callback_still_deep_links(self):
+        """A failed sign-in leaves the session anonymous while the IdP logout
+        round-trip runs: the callback must still close the sheet via the
+        deep link even though the parent view returns early."""
+        client = APIClient()
+        session = client.session
+        session["oidc_states"] = {"logout-state": {}}
+        session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY] = {
+            "scheme": "stmessagesa",
+            "state": "logout-state",
+            "created_at": time.time(),
+        }
+        session.save()
+
+        response = client.get(
+            reverse("oidc_logout_callback"), {"state": "logout-state"}
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        assert response["Location"] == "stmessagesa://logout"
+
+    @override_settings(**MOBILE_LOGOUT_SETTINGS)
+    def test_stale_mobile_flag_keeps_the_web_redirect(self):
+        """An abandoned mobile logout must not hijack a later web logout."""
+        client = APIClient()
+        client.force_login(factories.UserFactory())
+        session = client.session
+        session["oidc_states"] = {"logout-state": {}}
+        session[MOBILE_LOGOUT_SESSION_KEY] = {
+            "scheme": "stmessagesa",
+            "state": "logout-state",
+            "created_at": time.time() - 3600,
+        }
+        session.save()
+
+        response = client.get(
+            reverse("oidc_logout_callback"), {"state": "logout-state"}
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        assert response["Location"] == "https://app.test/"
+        assert "_auth_user_id" not in client.session

src/backend/core/tests/authentication/test_mobile_auth.py

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 """Tests for the mobile (Capacitor) OIDC session handoff."""
 
+import re
 import time
 from importlib import import_module
 from unittest.mock import patch
@@ -92,6 +93,9 @@ class TestMobileAuthenticationRequest:
         mobile_auth = client.session[MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY]
         assert mobile_auth["scheme"] == "stmessagesa"
         assert mobile_auth["code_challenge"] == "challenge"
+        query = parse_qs(urlparse(response["Location"]).query)
+        assert mobile_auth["state"] == query["state"][0]
+        assert mobile_auth["state"] in client.session["oidc_states"]
 
     @override_settings(**AUTHENTICATE_SETTINGS)
     def test_web_login_does_not_flag_the_session(self):
@@ -114,9 +118,10 @@ CALLBACK_SETTINGS = {
 class TestMobileAuthenticationCallback:
     """Tests for the mobile handoff performed by the callback view."""
 
-    def _build_view(self, session_data=None):
+    def _build_view(self, session_data=None, state="login-state"):
         """Return a callback view bound to a request with a real session."""
-        request = RequestFactory().get("/api/v1.0/callback/")
+        query = {"state": state} if state else {}
+        request = RequestFactory().get("/api/v1.0/callback/", query)
         SessionMiddleware(lambda _request: None).process_request(request)
         for key, value in (session_data or {}).items():
             request.session[key] = value
@@ -130,6 +135,21 @@ class TestMobileAuthenticationCallback:
         view.user = user
         return view
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def _handoff_url(response):
+        """Extract the app deep link from the hand-off page of a mobile login.
+
+        The login ends on a page (not a 302 to the scheme, which the IdP login
+        page's CSP form-action blocks at the end of the credential form's
+        redirect chain) whose auto redirect and tap fallback both point at the
+        deep link.
+        """
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        assert response["Cache-Control"] == "no-store"
+        match = re.search(rb'href="([^"]+)"', response.content)
+        assert match is not None
+        return match[1].decode()
+
     @override_settings(**CALLBACK_SETTINGS)
     def test_mobile_login_success_redirects_to_the_app(self):
         """A mobile login ends with a deep link carrying a one-time token."""
@@ -138,14 +158,14 @@ class TestMobileAuthenticationCallback:
                 MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY: {
                     "scheme": "stmessagesa",
                     "code_challenge": "challenge",
+                    "state": "login-state",
                     "created_at": time.time(),
                 }
             }
         )
         response = view.login_success()
 
-        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        location = urlparse(self._handoff_url(response))
-        location = urlparse(response["Location"])
         assert location.scheme == "stmessagesa"
         assert location.netloc == "auth"
 
@@ -173,6 +193,7 @@ class TestMobileAuthenticationCallback:
                 MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY: {
                     "scheme": "stmessagesa",
                     "code_challenge": "challenge",
+                    "state": "login-state",
                     "created_at": time.time() - 3600,
                 }
             }
@@ -181,6 +202,28 @@ class TestMobileAuthenticationCallback:
         assert response["Location"] == "/"
         assert MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY not in view.request.session
 
+    @override_settings(**CALLBACK_SETTINGS)
+    def test_mobile_flag_of_another_login_is_left_alone(self):
+        """A browser session can carry a pending mobile login while another
+        login runs: that callback must keep its web redirect and leave the flag
+        to the callback it belongs to."""
+        view = self._build_view(
+            {
+                MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY: {
+                    "scheme": "stmessagesa",
+                    "code_challenge": "challenge",
+                    "state": "mobile-state",
+                    "created_at": time.time(),
+                }
+            },
+            state="web-state",
+        )
+        response = view.login_success()
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        assert response["Location"] == "/"
+        assert MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY in view.request.session
+
     @override_settings(**CALLBACK_SETTINGS)
     def test_mobile_login_failure_redirects_to_the_app(self):
         """A failed mobile login notifies the app through the deep link."""
@@ -189,13 +232,13 @@ class TestMobileAuthenticationCallback:
                 MOBILE_AUTH_SESSION_KEY: {
                     "scheme": "stmessagesa",
                     "code_challenge": "challenge",
+                    "state": "login-state",
                     "created_at": time.time(),
                 }
             }
         )
         response = view.login_failure()
-        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_302_FOUND
+        assert self._handoff_url(response) == "stmessagesa://auth?error=login_failed"
-        assert response["Location"] == "stmessagesa://auth?error=login_failed"
 
     @override_settings(**CALLBACK_SETTINGS)
     def test_web_login_failure_is_unchanged(self):
@@ -345,10 +388,11 @@ class TestMobileSessionExchange:
 
 
 class TestMobileLogout:
-    """Tests for the mobile logout endpoint.
+    """Tests for the mobile logout fallback endpoint.
 
-    Unlike `/logout/` it must end the Django session without the RP-initiated
+    The nominal mobile logout runs the IdP round-trip through `/logout/`;
-    IdP logout, so the cross-app SSO session survives.
+    this endpoint only flushes the Django session, for when the system
+    browser flow fails or is cancelled.
     """
 
     def _login(self, client, user):

src/frontend/src/features/native/auth.ts

@@ -8,9 +8,18 @@ import { computeCodeChallenge, generateCodeVerifier } from "./pkce";
 
 /**
  * Deep-link scheme ending the mobile OIDC flow. The backend allowlists it
- * through MOBILE_AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEMES.
+ * through MOBILE_AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEMES (a list, so several environments can be
+ * served at once).
+ *
+ * Per-environment (MOBILE_AUTH_SCHEME) so staging and production builds can sit
+ * side by side on one device: two installed apps claiming the same scheme would
+ * make Android ask the user which one should receive the login callback, in the
+ * middle of the auth flow. The same value must reach both native declarations —
+ * the Android manifest through a gradle manifestPlaceholder, the iOS Info.plist
+ * through the AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEME build setting — and the default below must
+ * stay in sync with theirs; sso-invariants.test.ts pins that wiring.
  */
-const AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEME = "stmessages";
+const AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEME = import.meta.env.MOBILE_AUTH_SCHEME || "stmessages";
 
 type ExchangeResponse = {
   csrf_token: string;
@@ -68,18 +77,34 @@ export const nativeLogin = async (): Promise<void> => {
 };
 
 /**
- * End the app session while preserving cross-app SSO.
+ * End the session everywhere: Django AND the identity provider.
  *
- * Calling /api/v1.0/logout/ would trigger the RP-initiated IdP logout
+ * The RP-initiated logout runs in the system browser, which holds both the
- * (id_token_hint) and terminate the cross-app SSO session. The dedicated
+ * Django session cookie (the session handed over at login) and the IdP SSO
- * mobile endpoint flushes only the server-side Django session; the local
+ * cookie: the round-trip terminates both, so the next login always stops on
- * cookies and CSRF token are then dropped. Never rejects: the reload into
+ * the IdP login page and the user can switch accounts — prompt=login alone
+ * cannot guarantee it, ProConnect ignores it. Never rejects: the reload into
  * the logged-out state must happen even when a step fails.
  */
 export const nativeLogout = async (): Promise<void> => {
+  const scheme = AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEME;
   try {
-    // Invalidate the server-side session first: even if clearing the native
+    // Ends on a scheme://logout deep link once the IdP round-trip flushed
-    // cookie jar fails below, the cookie no longer maps to a live session.
+    // the server-side session.
+    await openAuthSession(
+      getRequestUrl("/api/v1.0/logout/", { mobile_scheme: scheme }),
+      scheme,
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    // A cancelled sheet or a failed round-trip must not keep the app
+    // signed in: the local flush below still ends the app session.
+    console.warn("IdP logout did not complete:", error);
+  }
+  try {
+    // Always flush the app-side server session too: the browser round-trip
+    // only ends it when the browser still holds the same session cookie —
+    // if the browser dropped it, the app session would otherwise survive.
+    // Anonymous no-op when the round-trip already ended it.
     const csrfToken = getNativeCsrfToken();
     await fetch(getRequestUrl("/api/v1.0/mobile/auth/logout/"), {
       method: "POST",

src/frontend/src/features/native/sso-invariants.test.ts

@@ -25,14 +25,25 @@ const frontendRoot = resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../../.."
 const read = (relativePath: string): string =>
   readFileSync(resolve(frontendRoot, relativePath), "utf8");
 
-// Source of truth for the deep-link scheme (see auth.ts). Extracted from the
+// Source of truth for the deep-link scheme (see auth.ts). The scheme is
-// source so a scheme rename fails here unless every declaration follows.
+// per-environment (MOBILE_AUTH_SCHEME) so staging and production builds can
+// coexist on a device, so what has to hold is no longer one literal shared by
+// three files: each side must *substitute* the variable, and their fallbacks
+// must agree. Either half failing strands the OIDC callback — silently, since
+// the login opens normally and only the return never lands.
 const authSource = read("src/features/native/auth.ts");
-const scheme = /AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEME = "([a-z0-9]+)"/.exec(authSource)?.[1];
+const schemeDefault =
+  /AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEME =[\s\S]{0,120}?\|\|\s*"([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*)"/.exec(authSource)?.[1];
 
 describe("cross-app SSO invariants", () => {
   it("declares the deep-link scheme in auth.ts", () => {
-    expect(scheme).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(schemeDefault).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it("reads the scheme from the build environment", () => {
+    // Hardcoding it back would silently pin every environment to one scheme,
+    // and two installed builds would fight over the callback.
+    expect(authSource).toContain("import.meta.env.MOBILE_AUTH_SCHEME");
   });
 
   describe("iOS", () => {
@@ -65,18 +76,63 @@ describe("cross-app SSO invariants", () => {
 
     it("registers the callback scheme in Info.plist", () => {
       // With a non-ephemeral session iOS only delivers the callback for an
-      // app-registered scheme (CFBundleURLTypes).
+      // app-registered scheme (CFBundleURLTypes). The value is substituted by
-      expect(read("ios/App/App/Info.plist")).toContain(`<string>${scheme}</string>`);
+      // Xcode from the AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEME build setting, which lives in the
+      // gitignored generated.xcconfig — an unset setting expands to an empty
+      // string rather than failing, so the point of use must carry the inline
+      // default, and it must agree with the auth.ts fallback.
+      expect(read("ios/App/App/Info.plist")).toContain(
+        `<string>$(AUTH_CALLBACK_SCHEME:default=${schemeDefault})</string>`,
+      );
+    });
+
+    it("feeds the generated xcconfig scheme from MOBILE_AUTH_SCHEME", () => {
+      // generated.xcconfig (written at `make mobile-build`) is how the container
+      // env reaches Xcode. A wrong fallback there would quietly diverge from
+      // the scheme auth.ts builds its callback URL with — same invariant as the
+      // gradle manifestPlaceholder on Android.
+      const script = read("scripts/generate-ios-xcconfig.mjs");
+      const fallback =
+        /MOBILE_AUTH_SCHEME \|\| "([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*)"/.exec(script)?.[1];
+
+      expect(fallback).toBe(schemeDefault);
+    });
+
+    it("keeps the bundle identifier driven by MOBILE_APP_ID", () => {
+      // Regenerating the project would hardcode the id back, silently detaching
+      // it from the env (and from the synced capacitor.config.json the release
+      // guard build phase compares against).
+      const pbxproj = read("ios/App/App.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj");
+      const bundleIdConfigs =
+        pbxproj.match(
+          /PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = "\$\(MOBILE_APP_ID:default=[^)]+\)";/g,
+        ) ?? [];
+
+      expect(bundleIdConfigs.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
     });
   });
 
   describe("Android", () => {
     it("registers the callback scheme in the manifest", () => {
       // Routes the Custom Tab's deep-link redirect back to the app
-      // (caught by App.addListener("appUrlOpen")).
+      // (caught by App.addListener("appUrlOpen")). Substituted by gradle from
-      expect(
+      // the manifestPlaceholder below.
-        read("android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml"),
+      expect(read("android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml")).toContain(
-      ).toContain(`android:scheme="${scheme}"`);
+        'android:scheme="${authCallbackScheme}"',
+      );
+    });
+
+    it("feeds the manifest placeholder from MOBILE_AUTH_SCHEME", () => {
+      // A missing placeholder fails the manifest merge loudly, but a wrong
+      // fallback does not: it would quietly diverge from the scheme auth.ts
+      // builds its callback URL with.
+      const buildGradle = read("android/app/build.gradle");
+      const fallback =
+        /authCallbackScheme: System\.getenv\("MOBILE_AUTH_SCHEME"\) \?: "([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*)"/.exec(
+          buildGradle,
+        )?.[1];
+
+      expect(fallback).toBe(schemeDefault);
     });
   });
 });