[eric] agents: convention fixes on merge surface (public cross-file helpers, pydantic approval memory, resolve_ask @typechecked)

backend/apps/agents/manager/permissions/build_effective_tool_lists.py

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ def build_effective_tool_lists(
                 effective_disallowed.append(wt_name)
     # Claude's internal Cron* scheduler is denied in favour of the visible native
     # one; withhold it from the SDK so the model doesn't even reach for it.
-    for bt in path_gate.p_CLAUDE_INTERNAL_SCHEDULER_TOOLS:
+    for bt in path_gate.CLAUDE_INTERNAL_SCHEDULER_TOOLS:
         if bt not in effective_disallowed:
             effective_disallowed.append(bt)
     return effective_allowed, effective_disallowed

backend/apps/agents/manager/permissions/gate_hooks.py

@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ from backend.apps.agents.manager.prompt.prompt_context import (
 )
 from backend.apps.agents.manager.streaming.HookContext import HookContext
 from backend.apps.agents.manager.permissions.workflow_approval import (
-    p_is_claude_schedule_skill,
-    p_note_tool_used,
-    p_resolve_ask,
+    is_claude_schedule_skill,
+    note_tool_used,
+    resolve_ask,
 )
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 async def can_use_tool(
     ctx: HookContext, tool_name: str, input_data: object, context: object
 ) -> Union[PermissionResultAllow, PermissionResultDeny]:
-    if p_is_claude_schedule_skill(tool_name, input_data):
-        p_note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
+    if is_claude_schedule_skill(tool_name, input_data):
+        note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
         return PermissionResultDeny(
             message="Use the openswarm-schedule MCP tools instead of Claude's internal schedule skill."
         )
@@ -46,13 +46,13 @@ async def can_use_tool(
             effective_policy(tool_name, ctx.builtin_perms, ctx.policy_defaults), tool_name, input_data
         )
         if policy == "always_allow":
-            p_note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, True)
+            note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, True)
             return PermissionResultAllow(updated_input=input_data)
         if policy == "deny":
-            p_note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
+            note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
             return PermissionResultDeny(message="Tool denied by permission policy")
 
-    decision = await p_resolve_ask(ctx, tool_name, input_data, sensitive_pattern)
+    decision = await resolve_ask(ctx, tool_name, input_data, sensitive_pattern)
     if decision.behavior == "allow":
         return PermissionResultAllow(
             updated_input=decision.updated_input if decision.updated_input is not None else input_data
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ async def pre_tool_hook(ctx: HookContext, input_data: dict, tool_use_id: Optiona
 
     if tool_name and tool_name != "AskUserQuestion":
         tool_input = input_data.get("tool_input", {})
-        if p_is_claude_schedule_skill(tool_name, tool_input):
-            p_note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
+        if is_claude_schedule_skill(tool_name, tool_input):
+            note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
             return {
                 "hookSpecificOutput": {
                     "hookEventName": hook_event,
@@ -150,10 +150,10 @@ async def pre_tool_hook(ctx: HookContext, input_data: dict, tool_use_id: Optiona
         )
 
         if policy == "always_allow":
-            p_note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, True)
+            note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, True)
 
         if policy == "deny":
-            p_note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
+            note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
             return {
                 "hookSpecificOutput": {
                     "hookEventName": hook_event,
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ async def pre_tool_hook(ctx: HookContext, input_data: dict, tool_use_id: Optiona
             }
 
         if policy == "ask":
-            decision = await p_resolve_ask(ctx, tool_name, tool_input, sensitive_pattern)
+            decision = await resolve_ask(ctx, tool_name, tool_input, sensitive_pattern)
 
             if decision.behavior == "allow":
                 if tool_use_id:

backend/apps/agents/manager/permissions/path_gate.py

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ p_SCHEDULE_GATED = {
     "mcp__openswarm-schedule__DeleteScheduledWorkflow",
     "mcp__openswarm-schedule__PauseAllWorkflows",
 }
-p_CLAUDE_INTERNAL_SCHEDULER_TOOLS = ("CronCreate", "CronList", "CronDelete")
+CLAUDE_INTERNAL_SCHEDULER_TOOLS = ("CronCreate", "CronList", "CronDelete")
 
 
 @typechecked
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ def maybe_override_policy(policy: str, tool_name: str, tool_input: object) -> Tu
     future writes to it pass through silently."""
     if tool_name == "Bash" and looks_like_os_scheduling(tool_input):
         return "ask", None
-    if tool_name in p_CLAUDE_INTERNAL_SCHEDULER_TOOLS:
+    if tool_name in CLAUDE_INTERNAL_SCHEDULER_TOOLS:
         return "deny", None
     # Committing or mutating a native recurring schedule is the in-app twin of the
     # crontab gate above: real, user-visible, hard-to-undo, so it goes through

backend/apps/agents/manager/permissions/workflow_approval.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ agent_manager re-exports the setters for the executor's convenience.
 import logging
 from typing import Callable, Dict, Optional
 
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict
 from typeguard import typechecked
 
 from backend.apps.agents.manager.permissions.ApprovalDecision import ApprovalDecision
@@ -19,23 +20,18 @@ from backend.apps.agents.manager.streaming.HookContext import HookContext
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
-class WorkflowApprovalMemory:
+class WorkflowApprovalMemory(BaseModel):
     """A workflow run's approval context, pushed in by the executor."""
 
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        decisions: Dict[str, str],
-        step_usage: Dict[str, Dict[str, bool]],
-        remember: Optional[Callable[[str, str], None]],
-        ask_timeout: float,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.decisions = decisions          # workflow-level: tool -> "allow"/"deny"
-        self.step_usage = step_usage        # per-step record: step_id -> {tool: approved}
-        self.remember = remember            # persist a workflow-level decision to disk
-        self.ask_timeout = ask_timeout
-        # The executor bumps this as it advances steps so the gate can record
-        # which tools each step touched. None on test runs that don't thread it.
-        self.current_step_id: Optional[str] = None
+    model_config = ConfigDict(validate_assignment=True)
+
+    decisions: Dict[str, str]                       # workflow-level: tool -> "allow"/"deny"
+    step_usage: Dict[str, Dict[str, bool]]          # per-step record: step_id -> {tool: approved}
+    remember: Optional[Callable[[str, str], None]]  # persist a workflow-level decision to disk
+    ask_timeout: float
+    # The executor bumps this as it advances steps so the gate can record which
+    # tools each step touched. None on test runs that don't thread it.
+    current_step_id: Optional[str] = None
 
 
 p_approval_memory: Dict[str, WorkflowApprovalMemory] = {}
@@ -51,7 +47,7 @@ def set_workflow_approval_memory(
     ask_timeout: float,
 ) -> None:
     p_approval_memory[session_id] = WorkflowApprovalMemory(
-        decisions, step_usage, remember, ask_timeout
+        decisions=decisions, step_usage=step_usage, remember=remember, ask_timeout=ask_timeout
     )
 
 
@@ -74,14 +70,14 @@ def get_workflow_step_usage(session_id: str) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, bool]]:
 
 
 @typechecked
-def p_is_claude_schedule_skill(tool_name: str, tool_input: object) -> bool:
+def is_claude_schedule_skill(tool_name: str, tool_input: object) -> bool:
     if tool_name != "Skill" or not isinstance(tool_input, dict):
         return False
     return str(tool_input.get("skill") or "").strip().lower() == "schedule"
 
 
 @typechecked
-def p_note_tool_used(session_id: str, tool_name: str, approved: bool) -> None:
+def note_tool_used(session_id: str, tool_name: str, approved: bool) -> None:
     # Record which tools each step touched (in-memory; the executor/test path
     # persists step_usage once at run end). Captures every tool the gate sees so
     # a step's tool set is complete, not only the ones that prompted.
@@ -91,7 +87,8 @@ def p_note_tool_used(session_id: str, tool_name: str, approved: bool) -> None:
     mem.step_usage.setdefault(mem.current_step_id, {})[tool_name] = approved
 
 
-async def p_resolve_ask(
+@typechecked
+async def resolve_ask(
     ctx: HookContext, tool_name: str, tool_input: object, sensitive_pattern: Optional[str]
 ) -> ApprovalDecision:
     """Resolve an 'ask' policy. On a workflow run, reuse a remembered decision
@@ -114,10 +111,10 @@ async def p_resolve_ask(
             return ApprovalDecision(behavior="deny", message="Denied by a remembered workflow permission")
         prior = mem.decisions.get(tool_name)
         if prior == "allow":
-            p_note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, True)
+            note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, True)
             return ApprovalDecision(behavior="allow")
         if prior == "deny":
-            p_note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
+            note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, False)
             return ApprovalDecision(behavior="deny", message="Denied by a remembered workflow permission")
     timeout = mem.ask_timeout if mem is not None else 600.0
     decision = await request_user_approval(
@@ -127,7 +124,7 @@ async def p_resolve_ask(
     if rememberable and decision.behavior in ("allow", "deny"):
         behavior = decision.behavior
         mem.decisions[tool_name] = behavior
-        p_note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, behavior == "allow")
+        note_tool_used(ctx.session_id, tool_name, behavior == "allow")
         if mem.remember:
             try:
                 mem.remember(tool_name, behavior)

backend/apps/agents/manager/session/history_compaction.py

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ def wrap_platform_note(body: str) -> str:
     return f"{PLATFORM_NOTE_OPEN}\n{PLATFORM_NOTE_PREAMBLE}\n{body}\n{PLATFORM_NOTE_CLOSE}"
 
 
-_SENTINEL_TAG_RE = re.compile(r"</?openswarm_(?:platform_note|session_recap)\b[^>]*>")
+P_SENTINEL_TAG_RE = re.compile(r"</?openswarm_(?:platform_note|session_recap)\b[^>]*>")
 
 
 def strip_forged_sentinels(text: str) -> str:
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ def strip_forged_sentinels(text: str) -> str:
     user input) so attacker-supplied content can't pose as trusted platform context."""
     if "openswarm_platform_note" not in text and "openswarm_session_recap" not in text:
         return text
-    return _SENTINEL_TAG_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(0).replace("<", "&lt;").replace(">", "&gt;"), text)
+    return P_SENTINEL_TAG_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(0).replace("<", "&lt;").replace(">", "&gt;"), text)
 
 
 def p_recap_tool_call_line(content: object) -> str: