Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Yogesh OjhaandClaude Opus 5 1e2d16eed2 feat(ops): a backup that has been restored, and pools that cannot silently outgrow the server
There was no backup path at all, and the connection arithmetic did not add up.

scripts/backup.sh dumps the four things an instance actually is: the database, the
scan media on disk, the docker volumes holding uploaded wordlists, nuclei templates,
report themes and fonts, and the settings a restore needs. SECRET_KEY travels with
it deliberately — API keys, proxy credentials and notification secrets are Fernet
encrypted with a key derived from it, so an archive without it restores a database
full of unreadable secrets. The header says so, and backups/ and *.tar are
gitignored, because an archive is a credential.

Restore is the half that is usually never tried, so it was: a 305 MB archive of this
instance was restored over it and came back at 9 scans, 59,858 subdomains, 535,000
endpoints, 29 findings and 7 targets — identical — with the migration head intact,
the API answering and an encrypted API key still decrypting. It stops the api and
both workers first so nothing writes underneath it, and asks for the database name
before it destroys anything.

The pools could ask for more connections than the server would give. The api takes
10 + 20, each celery prefork child takes 2 + 3, and beat takes another pool: at the
concurrency of 8 this box runs that is 75 against a max_connections of 100, and at
the 12 the compose file now defaults to it is 95 — five short of the ceiling, which
fails as a checkout timeout under load and reads like a slow query.

max_connections is now set from compose with the arithmetic beside it, and the api
checks it at startup: pool_demand() against max_connections less the superuser
reserve, warned once rather than discovered during an incident. The inputs moved to
shared settings because the sum spans both processes and neither could see the
other's numbers.

Worth recording: .env on this box pins CELERY_SCAN_CONCURRENCY=8, so raising the
compose default to 12 changes new installs and not this one. It also still carries
CELERY_DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY, which nothing has read since it was renamed.

Three tests: the demand counts every pool, the shipped defaults fit the shipped
server, and an oversized pool warns rather than failing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013dKUV96WkQQETZBMoAG98C
2026-09-10 23:16:46 +05:30
Yogesh OjhaandClaude Opus 5 9cdd132a20 fix(api): an event stream must not pin a pooled connection for its lifetime
The SSE route authenticated through CurrentUser, whose session dependency is
only released when the response ends — so every open stream left one connection
idle in transaction for as long as the tab stayed open. The engine was created
with no pool arguments at all, so the ceiling was SQLAlchemy's default 5+10:
fifteen tabs and every DB endpoint blocked for pool_timeout and then 500'd.
Reproduced exactly, and both pinned backends' last query was get_current_user's
SELECT users.

StreamUser opens and closes its own short session, so a stream holds nothing
pooled — 200 concurrent streams now report checked_out 1.

The pool is configured rather than defaulted (10+20, pre-ping, 30m recycle,
fail-fast timeout) and carries an application_name, because a blank one is why
this needed a live reproduction to diagnose. idle_in_transaction_session_timeout
is the backstop: any future leak from any path is reclaimed by Postgres instead
of accumulating, and pre-ping makes the next checkout succeed on a fresh socket.

A stream also no longer outlives its token. It re-checks expiry and revocation
on each heartbeat — JWT plus Redis, no DB — and emits `event: unauthorized`, so
logout actually ends the feed and the client refreshes at once instead of
burning three failed reconnects.

Worker pools are sized per prefork child (8 x 15 was over max_connections) and
the inherited engine is disposed on fork so a child never shares a parent socket.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015biqVXTng75nnfKXMqm61H
2026-09-06 10:47:03 +05:30
Yogesh Ojha a5e6c0ac0d feat: add target enrichment, vhost discovery, and WAF detection stages
- Implemented TargetEnrichmentStage for enriching targets with DNS, WHOIS, and BGP context.
- Added VhostStage for virtual host discovery using host-header fuzzing.
- Introduced WafDetectStage for fingerprinting web application firewalls.
- Created configuration files for each new stage with relevant parameters.
- Updated Dockerfile to copy stages instead of engines.
- Enhanced existing tools and services for better integration with new stages.
- Refactored task management in Celery to accommodate new stages and improve error handling.
2026-09-02 10:18:03 +05:30
Yogesh Ojha cb282930a8 fix model dir changes 2026-02-04 20:36:33 +05:30
Yogesh Ojha 25df5b62f5 change project structure 2026-02-04 20:05:28 +05:30