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a548afffa2e43ccc0bc7bbe7c2bb09dd424711b2
10
Commits
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682a177e9b |
feat(bounty-hub): HackerOne reports and earnings with program cross-links
- sync the account's reports, bounties and standing from the HackerOne hacker API into bounty_reports, bounty_awards and bounty_accounts; money comes from /payments/earnings, totals stay per currency - /bounty-hub/<platform> as a Bounty Hub child in the sidebar, in the /scans idiom: stat strip, severity toggles, monthly chart with drag range, stage tabs with filtered counts, URL filters, expandable rows, keyboard navigation and a by-program view - program names open the Bounty Hub program sheet, which links back to the reports on that program and fetches unfetched scope on open - hourly report sync gated on bug bounty mode and the sync interval Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0b853e04b6 |
chore: production-readiness review across the tree
A full static review of the 3.0 tree, run as two fan-out passes with every
finding verified against the running stack rather than taken on inspection.
Correctness and security
- instance settings encrypted the mask over the stored AI key: `!= MASK` never
matched `••••••••abcd`, so saving settings destroyed the key and `test_ai`
posted the mask as a bearer token
- the MFA token was replayable for its full five-minute life; the gate now
checks revocation and consumes the token after a successful exchange
- logout revoked nothing for a bearer client while answering "Logged out"
- `POST /api-keys/{id}/test` returned the plaintext key inside httpx's error
string, which embeds the whole URL
- an interest rule could be edited or deleted through another project's id
- redis ran the celery broker under `allkeys-lru`, free to evict a queued task
or a chord counter; now `noeviction`
- nuclei's stored command carried the OAST token and every auth header
- a finalize step could poison the session and leave a scan RUNNING for ever
- `is:issue` raised TypeError on every search
- offset paging repeated and skipped rows in four dimensions
- a cancelled run kept a stale `scans.*_found` rollup
- every PDF report raised `KeyError: 'software'`
- `version_key` truncated a wide numeric run and inverted release ordering
- psycopg raises a NUL as a bare ValueError, above StatementError, so every
savepoint guard was blind to the case it was written for
Performance
- endpoints.host had no trigram index: 35.9ms seq scan -> 0.389ms
- free text compiled to one OR, not the prescribed UNION ALL: 132ms -> 41ms
- `/http-assets/summary` and `/ips/summary` materialised whole tables
- the cross-link `ip` kind ran an estate query per page and drew nothing
Frontend
- `$effect` loaders that read the state they write, an unbounded request loop
on a failing endpoint
- error states that rendered as empty states
- 2FA backup codes were unusable while the copy said they worked
- a "Scan history" dialog that always reported none
- ~400 duplicated lines across five filter bars, now one component
Build and tooling
- every scanner installed at @latest; all 13 pinned to the measured versions
- CI built `web/`, gone since 2.x, with tags that cannot be valid
- the prettier pre-commit hook discarded its filenames and always passed
- the test suite destroyed itself when run twice
Also: subdomains from public code, via a pinned github-subdomains source and a
GitHub API key that subfinder receives too; sublist3r and oneforall removed
after measuring one unique host in 89 across four targets.
Verified: 853 tests, ruff clean over eleven packages, svelte-check 0 errors,
the count-is-a-promise gate at 131 checks and 0 mismatches, and 143 GET routes
with no 5xx. Four migrations, each with an exercised downgrade.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DVkdx5ynZ6aof5kLFczmhX
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dcdba5cfd4 |
feat(bounty-hub): read Intigriti through its researcher API
A platform with a researcher API is now a provider: one module under shared/services/bounty_providers implementing programs() and scopes(), returning rows the sync engine stores. bounty_programs.py became the platform-agnostic engine, so adding a platform is one module, one APIProvider value, one PlatformSpec.api_provider and a key tester. Intigriti is the second connected platform, on a personal access token the hunter creates. On this instance: 220 programs, 54 of them private, 155 with scope and 65 the platform refuses, which accounts for all 220. Measured against the live API, against the docs: - Tier ids are unordered and undocumented. Id 4 is Tier 1, not No Bounty, so the first mapping stored the best-paying assets as paying nothing. Eligibility reads the label; out of scope is matched on id and label. - A 403 carrying FORBID001 is a refusal, not the documented rate-limit overage, and it covers public programs the account has not joined. Retrying it cost 11s a program; AccessDeniedError ends it in one request and records scope_access, keeping the failure budget for real breakage. - Membership is proved by the platform letting the token read a private program's scope. confidentialityLevel never reports "invite only", so joined was always false and its filter was dead. Bounty Hub follows what the data actually says: - source becomes sources, a JSONB array. A program is routinely in both a platform API and the public feed; the feed adds itself without taking an API row back, and facet counts overlap accordingly. - The row hint read "Bookmarked on HackerOne" while rendering Intigriti's follow flag. It now reads PlatformSpec.follow_label. - Refresh queued the sync and returned, so nothing changed on screen. It waits for the sweep, reloads, and says so. - The dashed connect card per platform is one dismissible Alert. - Connecting a platform no longer diffs API scope against feed scope, which would report every asset removed and re-added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SiHx8Sm34hS1nanrsPdBaD |
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db030d733c |
feat(bounty-hub): watch a program
Scope-true continuous discovery for a bounty program, bug bounty mode only (capability `program_watches`). Watching a program imports its in-scope targets under the program's organization, writes out-of-scope entries as exclusions and the rate ceiling on a `Watch · <program>` scan context, schedules an optional baseline, and streams certificate transparency for the watched apexes. A new in-scope host is resolved, written into the covering scan with source `ct_log`, probed by a focused run with a screenshot, evaluated against the watch's alert query and alerted once per fingerprint through the chosen channels. - ct-stream compose service: certspotter 0.24.2 under a supervisor that regenerates the watchlist from active watches, spools events through a hook script that emits only certspotter fields, and reports over Redis - worker tasks: certificate, settle, recheck, reconcile; finalize dispatches settle for any probe run; reconcile after every program or feed sync - notifier: named channels bypass per-channel preferences; attachments; new `watch` notification type - API under /bounty-programs/watches with preview, ledger, events, marks - Bounty Hub: Watching tab, Watch dialog, watch sheet, program badge, certificate stream card in Settings - schedules carry an intensity; scan_schedules.intensity Two review rounds folded in: compare-and-set probe claim, resolver-down handling, spool kept on failed dispatch, schedule cap, mute keeps prior state, ledger-derived totals, event filters, mode lockout of worker and stream in corporate mode. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ba2f7gwu2GXiETCKqRztyB |
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2cb8d73280 |
style: strip explanatory comments across the codebase
The comment rule in CLAUDE.md is one line maximum, never narration: no multi-line blocks, no module-header explainers, no sentences that explain or justify the code to the reader. The tree had drifted a long way from it, and most of the drift is mine. Removed: 232 lines of multi-line comment blocks 203 single-line comments that argued instead of stating 154 comments joined by so/because/otherwise/rather-than 143 narrating comments in the frontend 112 test docstrings (the test name already says what it asserts) 25 test module docstrings and 25 decorative section dividers Collapsed: 324 multi-line docstrings to one factual line 271 one-line docstrings that had a justifying clause bolted on Kept: functional directives, section dividers, short field labels, alembic revision headers, and the eight FastAPI route docstrings that render in /docs. Where a fact was load-bearing it is in CLAUDE.md, which is where it belongs. 284 python tests and 34 frontend tests pass, ruff and ruff-format clean across ten packages, svelte-check 0 errors, prettier and eslint clean, app.main imports. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013dKUV96WkQQETZBMoAG98C |
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163df52ad5 |
perf(db): a primary key is already an index, so the second one on id was write cost for nothing
SQLModel emitted index=True beside primary_key=True on every id field, so 41 tables carried ix_<table>_id alongside <table>_pkey: the same single-column btree twice. 12 MB of duplicate index, and every insert maintaining both — on the hot path of a scan writing 345,152 endpoints. The planner had been using them (72,160 scans across the set) simply because they were there and equivalent; with them gone it uses the primary key, verified on subdomains: Index Scan using subdomains_pkey. The migration finds them rather than naming them, because which tables exist depends on how far an install has migrated and a name already gone must not fail an upgrade. It drops only a non-unique, single-column btree on id belonging to a table that has a primary key — no other index can match that shape. There is no downgrade: the primary key serves every lookup they served. The 33 models are corrected too, so the next hand-written migration is not comparing against a schema that would want them back. Counted honestly: 41, not the 102 an earlier pass reported — that number included the 61 primary keys themselves. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013dKUV96WkQQETZBMoAG98C |
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fe5bc8094c |
feat(bounty-hub): Bugcrowd, Intigriti and YesWeHack from the public feed
Bounty Hub was empty until someone pasted a HackerOne token. It now ships with 464 public programs and 6,889 scope assets from arkadiyt/bounty-targets-data (MIT, republished every 30 minutes), so a fresh install is useful with no credentials at all and the token becomes an upgrade rather than a prerequisite. HackerOne is deliberately not read from the feed. The API gives us private programs and richer scope, so the feed would be a downgrade — and a new `source` column keeps that from happening by accident: an API row is authoritative and the feed never overwrites one. The three platforms do not agree on anything, so each gets its own entry in shared/definitions/bounty_feed.py: the asset field is `target` on two of them and `endpoint` on Intigriti; the type vocabularies are `website`/`network` versus `url`/`wildcard`/`iprange` versus `web-application`/`mobile-application-ios`; and only Intigriti and YesWeHack ship a handle, so Bugcrowd's is derived from its engagement URL. All of it lands on the 17 asset types reNgine already has, and target_for_scope needed no change to resolve 5,072 of them. What the platforms do not report is not invented. Bugcrowd publishes no submission state, so it stores `unknown` and the row shows no badge rather than guessing "open". What they report and HackerOne does not — the actual payout range — becomes a first-class field, a badge and a sort. Provenance is visible rather than implied: every row names its platform, the detail sheet says which source it came from and what that source can and cannot contain, and Platform and Source are faceted filters. The feed has its own schedule because it costs four small files rather than 640 requests: off, every 6 hours, daily or weekly, beside the HackerOne interval in Settings. The change-detection layer needed nothing — it was already platform-agnostic, so scope alerts work on all four platforms, and a first feed load of 464 programs correctly announced none of them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SZEi41ZDRWtwYDPFwoCVnu |
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992770478a |
feat(bounty-hub): a Settings tab for the sync schedule and change alerts
The interval belonged in Settings, not as a dropdown in a page header. There is now a Bounty Hub tab under Settings, gated on CAP_BOUNTY_PROGRAMS the same way the nav item is, holding two cards. Sync says how often reNgine asks HackerOne what changed — manual only, daily or weekly — and states the cost so the choice is informed: a full sync is about 640 requests against a 600-per-minute limit. Manual only says plainly that nothing leaves the instance on a timer. Notifications is a master switch plus one toggle per change kind, each with the sentence describing what it means. Turning a kind off does not stop the change being recorded: it still appears in the Updates tab, only the alert is suppressed, and the card says so. Preferences live in instance_settings .bounty_settings, following the mcp_settings precedent. The worker reads those preferences before it publishes, so the toggles change behaviour rather than only the UI. Verified end to end: with program_added switched off, a newly appearing program is recorded as an event and no notification is sent. An unknown change kind or interval is refused with the offending value named, and an empty kind list means no alerts rather than all of them — the same fail-closed rule the vulnerability selection axes use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SZEi41ZDRWtwYDPFwoCVnu |
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d506f8be66 |
feat(bounty-hub): record what changed in a program and alert on it
The first person to see new scope wins, so Bounty Hub now watches for change rather than only listing what is there today. Every sync diffs against what was already stored and writes bounty_events: a program appearing, scope added or removed, an asset flipping in or out of scope, submissions reopening, a VDP starting to pay. An Updates tab reads that feed and the alerting kinds publish through the existing notification layer, so in-app and webhook channels both fire with no new delivery path. The rule that makes it trustworthy is the one used everywhere else: a first observation is not a change. A program read for the first time records a baseline and emits nothing, and a library synced for the first time does not announce 630 new programs. Verified against the live API — a re-sync with nothing changed upstream produces zero events. Sync is scheduled and the interval belongs to the user: off, daily or weekly, chosen in the header. Beat ticks hourly and the task decides whether the interval is due; Refresh from HackerOne passes force and always runs, the same rule the threat-intel feeds follow. Off means nothing leaves the box on a timer, and says so. Also fixes the same paginate() trap twice hit in this feature: a derived field on a …Read model has to carry a default, because paginate coerces the ORM row before the service fills it in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SZEi41ZDRWtwYDPFwoCVnu |
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09368a76ed |
feat(bounty-hub): browse HackerOne programs and import their scope as targets
A new bug-bounty-mode surface at /bounty-hub, gated on CAP_BOUNTY_PROGRAMS — the capability that already existed and gated nothing. Programs and their structured scope are stored, not cached, so in-scope and out-of-scope are real server-side filters rather than a modal accordion. 2.x deliberately discarded out-of-scope entries with a TODO; this lands it. The vocabulary is one definition (shared/definitions/bounty_programs.py): all 17 asset types across network/mobile/code/other, with the five reNgine can reach mapped to a TargetType. 2.x carried two divergent allow-lists and silently dropped CIDR assets the modal had shown. Normalisation delegates rather than duplicates: an identifier is cleaned and then handed to reNgine's own validate_target. The asset type decides whether to try; validate_target decides whether it works. So *.example.com and https://*.uber.com become domains, 10.0.0.0/8 stays a range, AS64500 is recognised out of the free-text OTHER field, and *.example.* resolves to nothing rather than a broken target. Import is end to end: selected assets become targets grouped under an organization named for the program and tagged with the platform's own tag, both confirmed in a dialog where the name and tags can be edited. Out-of-scope assets are never selectable without an explicit opt-in. Measured against the live API (630 programs, 46,109 scope assets): - state is public_mode or soft_launched; there is no private_mode. Matching the literal mislabelled every invite-only program as public. - last_invitation_accepted_at_for_user separates programs you have joined from public ones you have not, so both are filters. - profile_picture is a presigned URL up to 2,107 chars, so it is Text; the varchar(1000) it replaced failed one row and lost all 630. - a program may publish no structured scope at all (200 with an empty array), which is a different fact from "not fetched yet" and reads as such. Also fixes the API-key Test button, which could never have worked for a provider needing a username: testers only ever received key_value, so they now receive key_meta too, and HackerOne verifies through the same client the sync uses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SZEi41ZDRWtwYDPFwoCVnu |