Files
rengine/api/app/core/ratelimit.py
T
Yogesh OjhaandClaude Opus 5 0b853e04b6 chore: production-readiness review across the tree
A full static review of the 3.0 tree, run as two fan-out passes with every
finding verified against the running stack rather than taken on inspection.

Correctness and security
- instance settings encrypted the mask over the stored AI key: `!= MASK` never
  matched `••••••••abcd`, so saving settings destroyed the key and `test_ai`
  posted the mask as a bearer token
- the MFA token was replayable for its full five-minute life; the gate now
  checks revocation and consumes the token after a successful exchange
- logout revoked nothing for a bearer client while answering "Logged out"
- `POST /api-keys/{id}/test` returned the plaintext key inside httpx's error
  string, which embeds the whole URL
- an interest rule could be edited or deleted through another project's id
- redis ran the celery broker under `allkeys-lru`, free to evict a queued task
  or a chord counter; now `noeviction`
- nuclei's stored command carried the OAST token and every auth header
- a finalize step could poison the session and leave a scan RUNNING for ever
- `is:issue` raised TypeError on every search
- offset paging repeated and skipped rows in four dimensions
- a cancelled run kept a stale `scans.*_found` rollup
- every PDF report raised `KeyError: 'software'`
- `version_key` truncated a wide numeric run and inverted release ordering
- psycopg raises a NUL as a bare ValueError, above StatementError, so every
  savepoint guard was blind to the case it was written for

Performance
- endpoints.host had no trigram index: 35.9ms seq scan -> 0.389ms
- free text compiled to one OR, not the prescribed UNION ALL: 132ms -> 41ms
- `/http-assets/summary` and `/ips/summary` materialised whole tables
- the cross-link `ip` kind ran an estate query per page and drew nothing

Frontend
- `$effect` loaders that read the state they write, an unbounded request loop
  on a failing endpoint
- error states that rendered as empty states
- 2FA backup codes were unusable while the copy said they worked
- a "Scan history" dialog that always reported none
- ~400 duplicated lines across five filter bars, now one component

Build and tooling
- every scanner installed at @latest; all 13 pinned to the measured versions
- CI built `web/`, gone since 2.x, with tags that cannot be valid
- the prettier pre-commit hook discarded its filenames and always passed
- the test suite destroyed itself when run twice

Also: subdomains from public code, via a pinned github-subdomains source and a
GitHub API key that subfinder receives too; sublist3r and oneforall removed
after measuring one unique host in 89 across four targets.

Verified: 853 tests, ruff clean over eleven packages, svelte-check 0 errors,
the count-is-a-promise gate at 131 checks and 0 mismatches, and 143 GET routes
with no 5xx. Four migrations, each with an exercised downgrade.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DVkdx5ynZ6aof5kLFczmhX
2026-09-13 18:03:29 +05:30

95 lines
2.8 KiB
Python

import logging
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
from fastapi import HTTPException, status
from app.config import settings
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_redis: aioredis.Redis | None = None
def _client() -> aioredis.Redis:
global _redis # noqa: PLW0603
if _redis is None:
_redis = aioredis.from_url(settings.redis_url, decode_responses=True)
return _redis
async def too_many_attempts(key: str, *, limit: int) -> None:
try:
raw = await _client().get(key)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("rate limiter read unavailable for %s: %s", key, exc)
return
if raw is not None and int(raw) >= limit:
try:
ttl = await _client().ttl(key)
except Exception:
ttl = -1
wait = f" Try again in {ttl} seconds." if ttl and ttl > 0 else ""
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail=f"Too many attempts.{wait}",
)
async def record_failure(key: str, *, window_seconds: int) -> None:
try:
pipe = _client().pipeline(transaction=True)
pipe.incr(key)
pipe.expire(key, window_seconds, nx=True)
await pipe.execute()
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("rate limiter write unavailable for %s: %s", key, exc)
async def clear_failures(key: str) -> None:
try:
await _client().delete(key)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("rate limiter clear unavailable for %s: %s", key, exc)
async def revoke_token(jti: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> None:
if ttl_seconds <= 0:
return
try:
await _client().set(f"revoked:jti:{jti}", "1", ex=ttl_seconds)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("token revoke unavailable for %s: %s", jti, exc)
async def is_token_revoked(jti: str) -> bool:
try:
return await _client().exists(f"revoked:jti:{jti}") == 1
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("token revoke check unavailable for %s: %s", jti, exc)
return False
async def grant_token_grace(jti: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> None:
"""How long a rotated token stays usable."""
if ttl_seconds <= 0:
return
try:
await _client().set(f"grace:jti:{jti}", "1", ex=ttl_seconds)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("token grace unavailable for %s: %s", jti, exc)
async def is_token_in_grace(jti: str) -> bool:
try:
return await _client().exists(f"grace:jti:{jti}") == 1
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("token grace check unavailable for %s: %s", jti, exc)
return False
async def clear_token_grace(jti: str) -> None:
try:
await _client().delete(f"grace:jti:{jti}")
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("token grace clear unavailable for %s: %s", jti, exc)