mirror of
https://github.com/laramies/theHarvester.git
synced 2026-08-17 19:35:40 +02:00
* Model active evidence in result persistence * Expose active action diagnostics * Persist truthful DNS action evidence * Persist direct action evidence * feat: add authenticated durable run API v1 * Make API file interchange JSONL-only * Harden API evidence boundaries * Remove API rate limiter * Unify API runs with result persistence * Support target action runs * Keep DNS resolver selection action-neutral * Add action-neutral CLI resolver selection * Preserve API evidence across JSONL round trips * Complete HarvestView API run parity * Harden HarvestView run API contracts * Remove obsolete bundled network snapshots Delete the unused bundled AWS IP-range and resolver snapshots while preserving operator-supplied resolver file input. * refactor: canonicalize URL results * docs: define a bounded test budget * Standardize hostname and IP result names * fix(api): avoid duplicate evidence conflicts
381 lines
15 KiB
Python
381 lines
15 KiB
Python
import os
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import re
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import tempfile
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
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import pytest
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from theHarvester.__main__ import sanitize_filename, sanitize_for_xml
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class TestCORSConfiguration:
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"""Test CORS security configuration."""
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def test_api_does_not_enable_cross_origin_requests(self):
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from theHarvester.lib.api.api import app
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assert all('CORSMiddleware' not in str(middleware.cls) for middleware in app.user_middleware)
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class TestXMLInjectionPrevention:
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"""Test XML injection prevention."""
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def test_sanitize_for_xml_escapes_special_characters(self):
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"""
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Security Test: Verify XML special characters are properly escaped.
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Prevents XML injection attacks.
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"""
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# Test all XML special characters
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test_cases = [
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('&', '&'),
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('<', '<'),
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('>', '>'),
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('"', '"'),
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("'", '''),
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('<script>alert("XSS")</script>', '<script>alert("XSS")</script>'),
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('user@example.com & <test>', 'user@example.com & <test>'),
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('Normal text', 'Normal text'),
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]
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for input_text, expected_output in test_cases:
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result = sanitize_for_xml(input_text)
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assert result == expected_output, f'Failed to properly escape: {input_text}'
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def test_sanitize_for_xml_prevents_xml_entity_injection(self):
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"""
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Security Test: Prevent XML entity injection attempts.
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"""
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malicious_inputs = [
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'<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>',
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'<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///dev/random">',
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'<![CDATA[malicious]]>',
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'<script>',
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]
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for malicious_input in malicious_inputs:
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result = sanitize_for_xml(malicious_input)
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# Ensure dangerous characters are escaped
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assert '<' in result or '&' in result, f'Failed to sanitize: {malicious_input}'
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assert '<' not in result or result == malicious_input.replace('<', '<'), f'XML tags not escaped: {malicious_input}'
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def test_command_line_args_are_sanitized_in_xml_output(self):
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"""
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Security Test: Command line arguments must be sanitized before XML output.
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This test is a conceptual check - in real usage, ensure the XML writing
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code uses sanitize_for_xml() on all user-controlled data.
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"""
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# Simulate dangerous command line arguments
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dangerous_args = [
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'--domain=test.com',
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"--source='<script>alert(1)</script>'",
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'--output="; rm -rf /',
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'--domain=example.com¶m=<injection>',
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]
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for arg in dangerous_args:
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sanitized = sanitize_for_xml(arg)
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# Verify no unescaped XML special characters remain
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assert '<script>' not in sanitized, f'Script tag not escaped in: {arg}'
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assert '¶m=' not in sanitized or '&' in sanitized, f'Ampersand not escaped in: {arg}'
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class TestInformationDisclosure:
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"""Test information disclosure prevention."""
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@pytest.fixture
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def client(self):
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"""Create a test client for API testing."""
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from theHarvester.lib.api.api import app
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return TestClient(app)
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def test_api_does_not_expose_traceback_in_error_responses(self, client):
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"""
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Security Test: API should never expose stack traces to clients.
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Stack traces can reveal sensitive information about the system.
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"""
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response = client.get('/api/v1/sources')
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# Even if there's an error, traceback should not be in response
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if response.status_code >= 400:
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response_data = response.json()
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assert 'traceback' not in response_data, 'Traceback exposed in error response'
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assert 'Traceback' not in str(response_data), 'Traceback text found in response'
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assert 'File "' not in str(response_data), 'File paths exposed in response'
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def test_error_responses_do_not_leak_internal_paths(self, client, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""
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Security Test: Error messages should not reveal internal file paths.
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"""
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fetch_all = AsyncMock(side_effect=AssertionError('API security test attempted a provider request'))
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monkeypatch.setenv('THEHARVESTER_API_KEY', 'operator-secret')
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monkeypatch.setenv('THEHARVESTER_RUN_DB', str(tmp_path / 'runs.sqlite'))
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monkeypatch.setattr('theHarvester.lib.core.AsyncFetcher.fetch_all', fetch_all)
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endpoints = ['/api/v1/sources', '/api/v1/runs/not-found']
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for endpoint in endpoints:
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response = client.get(endpoint, headers={'X-API-Key': 'operator-secret'})
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response_text = str(response.json() if response.status_code != 200 else {})
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# Check for common path leakage patterns
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path_patterns = [
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r'/home/\w+/',
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r'/usr/local/',
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r'C:\\Users\\',
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r'/var/www/',
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r'site-packages/',
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r'\.py:\d+', # filename.py:123
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]
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for pattern in path_patterns:
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matches = re.findall(pattern, response_text)
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assert not matches, f'Internal path leaked in {endpoint}: {matches}'
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fetch_all.assert_not_awaited()
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def test_debug_mode_does_not_expose_sensitive_info(self, client, monkeypatch):
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"""
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Security Test: Even with DEBUG=1, sensitive info should not be exposed to clients.
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"""
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# Set DEBUG environment variable
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monkeypatch.setenv('DEBUG', '1')
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# Make request that might trigger an error
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response = client.get('/api/v1/runs/not-found')
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if response.status_code >= 400:
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response_data = response.json()
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# Even with DEBUG=1, traceback should NOT be sent to client
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assert 'traceback' not in response_data, 'DEBUG mode exposes tracebacks to clients'
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class TestAPIAuthentication:
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"""Test authentication and error handling for the versioned API."""
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@pytest.fixture
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def client(self):
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"""Create a test client for API testing."""
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from theHarvester.lib.api.api import app
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return TestClient(app)
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def test_api_fails_closed_without_configured_api_key(self, client, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.delenv('THEHARVESTER_API_KEY', raising=False)
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monkeypatch.delenv('THEHARVESTER_API_KEY_FILE', raising=False)
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response = client.get('/api/v1/sources')
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assert response.status_code == 503
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def test_api_key_can_be_read_from_a_docker_secret_file(self, client, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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secret = tmp_path / 'operator-api-key'
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secret.write_text('test-secret\n', encoding='utf-8')
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monkeypatch.delenv('THEHARVESTER_API_KEY', raising=False)
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monkeypatch.setenv('THEHARVESTER_API_KEY_FILE', str(secret))
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response = client.get('/api/v1/sources', headers={'X-API-Key': 'test-secret'})
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assert response.status_code == 200
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def test_api_rejects_missing_or_invalid_api_key(self, client, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv('THEHARVESTER_API_KEY', 'test-secret')
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missing_response = client.get('/api/v1/sources')
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invalid_response = client.get('/api/v1/sources', headers={'X-API-Key': 'wrong'})
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assert missing_response.status_code == 401
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assert invalid_response.status_code == 401
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def test_api_does_not_expose_internal_errors(self, monkeypatch):
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from theHarvester.lib.api import api
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from theHarvester.lib.api.run_store import RunStore
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async def fail(_self):
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raise RuntimeError('/home/user/project/secret.py:123 internal failure')
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monkeypatch.setenv('THEHARVESTER_API_KEY', 'test-secret')
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monkeypatch.setattr(RunStore, 'list_runs', fail)
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client = TestClient(api.app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
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response = client.get('/api/v1/runs', headers={'X-API-Key': 'test-secret'})
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assert response.status_code == 500
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response_text = response.text
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assert 'internal failure' not in response_text
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assert '/home/user/project' not in response_text
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class TestPathTraversalPrevention:
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"""Test path traversal prevention."""
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def test_sanitize_filename_removes_path_components(self):
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"""
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Security Test: Filenames should not contain path traversal sequences.
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"""
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dangerous_filenames = [
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'../../../etc/passwd',
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'..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\config\\sam',
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'/etc/passwd',
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'C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\sam',
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'../../sensitive_file.txt',
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'./../hidden_file',
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'subdir/../../../etc/passwd',
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]
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for dangerous_filename in dangerous_filenames:
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result = sanitize_filename(dangerous_filename)
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# Should not contain any path separators
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assert '/' not in result, f'Path separator found in sanitized filename: {result}'
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assert '\\' not in result, f'Windows path separator found: {result}'
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# Should not start with .. (parent directory reference at the beginning is most dangerous)
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assert not result.startswith('..'), f'Parent directory reference at start: {result}'
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# Should only be the basename
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assert os.path.dirname(result) == '', f'Path component remains: {result}'
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def test_sanitize_filename_removes_dangerous_characters(self):
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"""
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Security Test: Filenames should only contain safe characters.
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"""
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test_cases = [
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'file; rm -rf /',
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'file`whoami`.txt',
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'file$(malicious).txt',
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'file|cmd.txt',
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'file&background.txt',
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'normal-file_123.txt',
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]
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for input_filename in test_cases:
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result = sanitize_filename(input_filename)
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# Should not be empty
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assert len(result) > 0, f'Sanitized filename is empty for: {input_filename}'
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# Should not contain shell special characters
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dangerous_chars = [';', '|', '&', '$', '`', '(', ')', '{', '}', '[', ']', '<', '>']
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for char in dangerous_chars:
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assert char not in result, f'Dangerous character {char} found in: {result}'
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# Should only contain alphanumeric, dash, underscore, and dot
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assert re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$', result), f'Invalid characters in sanitized filename: {result}'
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def test_sanitize_filename_prevents_hidden_files(self):
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"""
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Security Test: Prevent creation of hidden files.
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"""
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hidden_files = ['.bashrc', '.ssh_config', '.env', '..hidden', '.']
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for hidden_file in hidden_files:
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result = sanitize_filename(hidden_file)
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# Should not start with a dot (except for allowed extensions)
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if result: # If not empty
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assert not result.startswith('.'), f'Hidden file not prevented: {result}'
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def test_filename_sanitization_preserves_safe_filenames(self):
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"""
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Security Test: Safe filenames should remain mostly unchanged.
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"""
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safe_filenames = [
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'report.json',
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'results_2024-01-17.xml',
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'scan-output.txt',
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'data_file_v2.csv',
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]
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for safe_filename in safe_filenames:
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result = sanitize_filename(safe_filename)
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# Safe filenames should be preserved (possibly with minor changes)
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assert len(result) > 0, 'Safe filename was completely removed'
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assert '.' in result if '.' in safe_filename else True, 'File extension removed incorrectly'
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def test_path_traversal_in_file_operations(self):
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"""
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Integration Test: Verify file operations don't allow path traversal.
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"""
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# This tests the actual usage in the code
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from theHarvester.__main__ import sanitize_filename
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# Simulate user input
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user_input = '../../../etc/passwd'
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sanitized = sanitize_filename(user_input)
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# Try to create a file with sanitized name
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
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safe_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, sanitized)
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# Ensure the resolved path is still within tmpdir
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assert os.path.commonpath([tmpdir, safe_path]) == tmpdir, 'Path traversal detected!'
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# Verify we can't escape the directory
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assert tmpdir in os.path.abspath(safe_path), 'File path escaped temporary directory'
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class TestSecurityBestPractices:
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"""Additional security best practices tests."""
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def test_no_hardcoded_secrets_in_code(self):
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"""
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Security Test: Ensure no hardcoded secrets in main code files.
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"""
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# Check main application files for common secret patterns
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files_to_check = [
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'theHarvester/__main__.py',
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'theHarvester/lib/api/api.py',
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'theHarvester/lib/core.py',
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]
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# Patterns that might indicate hardcoded secrets
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secret_patterns = [
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r'password\s*=\s*["\'][^"\']+["\']',
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r'api_key\s*=\s*["\'][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}["\']',
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r'secret\s*=\s*["\'][^"\']+["\']',
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r'token\s*=\s*["\'][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}["\']',
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]
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for file_path in files_to_check:
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if os.path.exists(file_path):
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with open(file_path) as f:
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content = f.read()
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for pattern in secret_patterns:
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matches = re.findall(pattern, content, re.IGNORECASE)
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# Filter out obvious non-secrets (like example values, empty strings, variable names)
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real_matches = [
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m
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for m in matches
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if 'example' not in m.lower() and 'your_' not in m.lower() and '""' not in m and "''" not in m
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]
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assert not real_matches, f'Potential hardcoded secret in {file_path}: {real_matches}'
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def test_sensitive_endpoints_require_validation(self, monkeypatch):
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"""
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Security Test: Ensure sensitive endpoints validate input.
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"""
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from theHarvester.lib.api.api import app
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monkeypatch.setenv('THEHARVESTER_API_KEY', 'test-secret')
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client = TestClient(app)
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headers = {'X-API-Key': 'test-secret'}
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missing_target = client.post('/api/v1/runs', headers=headers, json={'sources': ['crtsh']})
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empty_sources = client.post('/api/v1/runs', headers=headers, json={'target': 'example.test', 'sources': []})
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assert missing_target.status_code == 422
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assert empty_sources.status_code == 422
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if __name__ == '__main__':
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pytest.main([__file__, '-v'])
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