Preserve the contributor pin and current main. Keep both default connector declarations at the exact official 1.10.1 release and retain user-managed configuration behavior.
Source-PR: https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC/pull/3233
Source-Head: 62bf2b2910
Integration-Main: d3b8a3e908
* fix(install): make install.sh robust to sh/dash invocation
Two related portability fixes so `sh install.sh` behaves correctly
even though the script is written for bash:
- The cygpath detection used the bash-only `&>/dev/null` redirection.
dash misparses `&>`, so `command -v cygpath &>/dev/null` always took
the true branch and tried to run the nonexistent `cygpath` binary,
failing with "cygpath: not found". Switched to the POSIX-portable
`>/dev/null 2>&1` form.
- Some dash builds don't support `set -o pipefail`, so `sh install.sh`
can fail immediately at that line before even reaching the cygpath
check (or the `[[ ... ]]` symlink-resolution logic further down).
Added a guard that re-execs the script under bash when the current
shell lacks bash capabilities, so the rest of the bash-only syntax
always runs under a real bash regardless of the invoking shell. The
guard probes for the `[[` compound command directly (via
`eval '[[ 1 == 1 ]]'`) rather than trusting the $BASH_VERSION
environment variable, since that variable could be inherited or
spoofed under a non-bash shell and cause the guard to be skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019XBaBRjaZgwhrZtYoqcQfp
* test(install): cover the sh install.sh re-exec path
Greptile flagged that the bash re-exec guard added in install.sh has
no automated coverage, since the existing test helper only invoked
the wrapper via `bash`. Adds two regression tests:
- "delegates to the Node installer when invoked via a POSIX sh
wrapper" — runs the script via `sh` and asserts the args/cwd still
reach the Node installer correctly.
- "re-execs into bash under sh even when BASH_VERSION is spoofed in
the environment" — exercises the eval '[[ 1 == 1 ]]' capability
probe directly, guarding against a regression back to trusting the
(spoofable) $BASH_VERSION variable.
CodeRabbit then pointed out that the second test used generic `sh`,
which could trivially pass without exercising the re-exec branch at
all if `sh` ever resolves to bash on some system. Added a
findPosixOnlyShell() helper that prefers `dash` (falling back to
checking `sh`, and skipping with an explicit message if neither
genuinely lacks bash's `[[`), so the test reliably exercises the
branch it claims to cover instead of passing vacuously.
CodeRabbit then flagged that the skip path itself was miscounted as
a pass (the callback returned normally, so `test()` reported success
and `passed` was incremented even though nothing executed). Moved
the findPosixOnlyShell() check outside the test() registration, so
the test is only registered — and only counted — when a genuinely
POSIX-only shell is actually available; otherwise it's excluded from
both the passed and failed counts with an explicit skip line.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019XBaBRjaZgwhrZtYoqcQfp
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The default chrome-devtools connector is launched with `npx -y` and
`@latest`, so every session start can silently install whatever version
was most recently published to npm. Pinning makes the default connector
reproducible and removes the unpinned-npx finding that /security-scan
(AgentShield) reports against ECC's own .mcp.json.
The same spec is pinned in the Codex merge script so both harnesses
stay in sync, and the Codex merge test is updated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kimi.com/code serves mainland China (WeChat / +86 sign-in, Alipay and WeChat Pay), so ECC's international readers cannot sign up or pay there.
Point the Kimi Code link in the install-target tables at kimi.ai/code (Google sign-in, card payment) instead, keeping the same aff value.
* fix(gateguard): sanitize dangerous invisible unicode in denial paths
sanitizePath only stripped control characters and bidi overrides, so
the 394 codepoints that the repo-wide unicode safety policy classifies
as dangerous-invisible (zero-width U+200B-200D, U+2060, U+2061-2064,
variation selectors U+FE00-FE0F, tag block U+E0000-E007F, Hangul
fillers, U+FEFF, U+180E, U+3164) plus the U+2028/U+2029 line and
paragraph separators passed verbatim into Edit/Write denial messages.
Invisible characters in a quoted file path let a malicious path look
clean to a human reviewer.
Align sanitizePath with the CI policy list and cover it with a
hook-output regression test that asserts no dangerous invisible
character survives into the denial reason while visible path text
stays intact.
* refactor(gateguard): name the sanitizePath unicode policy constants
Address review feedback: move the code points and ranges out of
sanitizePath into descriptive constants mirroring
scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js, so the policy is auditable in one
place. Also seed the regression test input with U+2029 so the
paragraph-separator assertion is exercised rather than vacuous.
* fix(gateguard): sanitize C1 control characters in denial paths
Follow-up on the sanitizePath policy alignment: the Unicode C1 control
block (U+0080..U+009F) is invisible in every renderer like the ASCII
controls below 0x20, but the strip only covered the ASCII range. Add
C1_CONTROLS to the policy constants and seed U+0091 into the
regression test input.
* fix(skill-comply): stop a failed step supplying evidence downstream
`_check_temporal_order` fell back to the raw classifier output whenever
the referenced step was absent from `resolved`. A step only enters
`resolved` once it passes, so "failed" and "not graded yet" were the
same thing to that lookup, and a dependant could pass on an event
belonging to a prerequisite that had failed its own ordering check.
With three steps C, A (before C) and B (after A) and events C@T0,
A@T1, B@T2, A fails and B passed on A's classified event: 2/3 instead
of 1/3. It compounds down a chain, so one failed prerequisite could
leave a five-step workflow reading 4/5.
The grader now tracks which steps have been graded at all. A referenced
step that was graded and is missing from `resolved` failed, and its
events are refused with a reason that says so. A step not graded yet is
a forward reference to a step declared later, and the fallback stays as
it was: that is what makes an out-of-order declaration work, and the
existing regression for it goes red if the fallback is removed instead.
`before_step` deliberately keeps the old fallback. The two fail in
opposite directions: an `after_step` fallback can only turn a failure
into a pass, a `before_step` one can only turn a pass into a failure,
so dropping it would relax a constraint because some other step failed.
* fix(skill-comply): revoke a pass that rested on a later-failing prerequisite
Review of #3109 found the mirror image of the case that PR fixes. `graded`
only catches a prerequisite that had already failed when its dependant was
graded. A step declared *before* its `after_step` is graded against the
classifier's raw events for a step that has not run yet — the fallback that
makes an out-of-order declaration work — and nothing revisited it once that
step went on to fail its own checks.
Add a pass after grading that demotes any detected step whose `after_step`
ended up failing, repeated to a fixed point: one demotion can invalidate
whatever depended on it, in either declaration order. Demotion only removes
passes, so it terminates. `compliance_rate` is computed from the demoted
results.
Also from review: build `graded` and the chain test's step list as new
objects rather than mutating (AGENTS.md immutability rule), and annotate the
injected mocks in the tests this PR owns.
* fix(gateguard): detect destructive SQL passed quoted to SQL clients
Quoted SQL like psql -c "drop table users" was stripped before the DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD regex ran, making it unreachable. Check dequoted tokens for known SQL clients (psql, mysql, sqlite3, ...) so real invocations are gated while git commit -m / echo mentions stay allowed. Fixesaffaan-m/ECC#3024.
* fix(gateguard): unwrap sudo/env flags and ignore SQL string literals
Address review: sudo -u/env VAR= wrappers now resolve to the real SQL client; SQL single/double/dollar-quoted literals are stripped before the destructive regex so SELECT 'drop table' stays allowed. Adds deny/allow regression tests for quoted SQL, wrappers, literals, and non-SQL clients.
* test(gateguard): cover env PGPASSWORD wrapper variant
* fix(gateguard): close wrapper sh-c, env dir, tagged literal gaps
Review 5189686662: recurse sh -c from unwrapped wrapper index (sudo/doas/env + sh -c now denied); consume env -C/--chdir separate values; strip tagged dollar-quoted literals ($tag$...\baseline). Tests: 200 passed.
The temporary HTTP server that export-pdf.sh spins up to render a deck
joined the decoded request path onto SERVE_DIR without checking the
resolved path, and listened on all interfaces. A request such as
`/..%2f..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd` (raw, or issued by a malicious deck via
fetch() while it renders) returned files outside the deck directory, and
any host on the network could hit the port while an export was running.
- resolve the decoded path against SERVE_ROOT and answer 403 when the
result is not inside it (handles ../, %2e%2e, %2f and query strings)
- answer 400 on malformed percent-encoding instead of throwing
- listen on 127.0.0.1 only; the only client is the local headless browser
Verified with raw HTTP requests against the handler: `/` and
`/index.html` -> 200, `/../x`, `/..%2f..%2fx`, `/%2e%2e/x`,
`/deck/../../x` -> 403, unknown file -> 404, `/%zz` -> 400, and
server.address() reports 127.0.0.1.
Fixes#3101
scripts/plan-canvas.js and scripts/control-pane.js both define their own
openBrowser helpers for launching the user's default browser. The two
implementations have diverged:
- plan-canvas.js dispatches across darwin/win32/linux but its
try/spawn try/catch does not catch async child errors (ENOENT/EACCES
on hosts without the launcher command). Returns a bare true/false.
- control-pane.js is darwin-only and silently returns early on
Windows/Linux, so the two scripts behave inconsistently across
platforms.
When the launcher command is missing (e.g. headless CI without xdg-open)
the JSON output still says 'browser: opened', lying to the agent.
Changes:
- scripts/lib/platform-launch.js: shared openBrowser helper that
dispatches per platform, wires child 'error' so ENOENT/EACCES
propagate, and returns {opened, reason} instead of a bare boolean.
- scripts/plan-canvas.js: drops its local helper, imports the shared
one, and adds browserReason to its JSON output.
- scripts/control-pane.js: replaces its darwin-only branch with the
shared helper and logs the structured reason on failure.
- tests/lib/platform-launch.test.js: 7 node:test cases covering
opener-command selection, invalid-URL guard, structured-result
shape, and a smoke run for the actual spawn.
Verification: node --test tests/lib/platform-launch.test.js → 7/7 pass.
Co-authored-by: auyua9 <auyua9@users.noreply.github.com>
The Claude Code docs page at code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp-overview no
longer exists (404). The current MCP page is
https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp ("Connect Claude Code to tools via
MCP"). Update the link in the English, zh-CN, and tr versions of the
shortform guide.
Co-authored-by: kuishou68 <kuishou68@users.noreply.github.com>
Add focused security regression for sdk-cli allowlisting and document
IOC scan + allowlist probe output under .pr/security-evidence-3171.md.
Signed-off-by: Frank_zhu <58329837+Frank-zhu0404@users.noreply.github.com>
Windows: compare repo identity via normalizeRepoPath/sameRepoIdentity (8.3 short names, case, separators; inode fallback). All nine windows-latest jobs green on 52587005.
affaan-m