Keep npm and Yarn resolution policy aligned so both lockfile paths stay on the patched release.\n\nCo-authored-by: Svector-anu <svector-anu@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(ito-compute): document ito accept and ito_accept MCP workflow
Updates the canonical ECC skill to cover the new quote acceptance path:
- CLI: ecc ito accept <ticket-id>
- MCP: ito_accept tool
- Explicit buyer-authority guard before accepting
- Clear statement that accept routes to desk, does not purchase
* test(ito-compute): assert the four-tool MCP boundary including ito_accept
The exact-boundary test pinned the three-tool description. Runtime
ito-compute-cli now exposes ito_accept (Ito-Markets/ito-cloud-runtime#1453),
so the template boundary assertion moves to four tools.
* docs(ito-compute): drop the firm-quote gate from the accept workflow
Desk quotes are indicative_paper in production (a firm quote requires the
separate human-held signing path and cannot reach the client), so gating
accept on 'a firm quote is ready' described an unfireable condition. Align
with the runtime contract: accept routes the current desk quote to human
review and the result carries quote_class (ito-cloud-runtime#1453).
The uninstall cases run two full CLI passes (install, then uninstall)
over several hundred files under a flat 30s timeout, which is tight
enough on Windows CI to fail intermittently with spawnSync ETIMEDOUT.
install-apply.test.js already scales its timeout by platform for the
same reason; match that precedent rather than re-running past the flake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The guided installer asks how ECC hooks should run, but that consent
lived only in the wizard path. Running install-apply directly with a
profile that includes hooks-runtime still materialized the hook runtime
with no disclosure and no decision.
Gate the apply layer instead, so every entry point is covered:
- disclose the six hook capability groups when a plan would materialize
the hook runtime, and refuse to apply until the caller decides
- --enable-hooks confirms the hook runtime; --no-hooks installs the rest
of the selection without it and records the reduced module closure in
install-state
- surface the pending decision as a dry-run warning
- show the same capability disclosure in the guided installer's plan
preview, so the wizard's hook question states what it is asking about
Plans that never materialize hooks (Kimi, --profile minimal,
--without baseline:hooks) are unaffected and need no flag. Repair and
uninstall operate on already-recorded state and stay unchanged.
The capability taxonomy and the held-materialization behavior come from
Samarjeet Singh Tomar's PR #2634, reworked to fit the single-decision
consent model that shipped with the guided installer in #2649.
Co-Authored-By: Samarjeet Singh Tomar <samar_tomar@hotmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
_parse_stream_json() persisted raw tool_input/tool_response content into
ObservationEvents that grade() scores and generate_report() writes to
results/<skill>.md -- a report meant to be shared and reviewed.
--add-dir restricts the agent's additional accessible directory to the
sandbox (SANDBOX_BASE = /tmp/skill-comply-sandbox), but that doesn't stop
the agent's own tool calls (a Bash command using ~ expansion, a scenario
setup_commands entry referencing a dotfile) from emitting the operator's
home directory into tool_input/tool_response -- which then lands
verbatim, truncated but not sanitized, in the written report.
Adds _redact_home_path(), pure stdlib (Path.home()), applied to both
input_str and output_str before they're stored on the ObservationEvent.
Scoped deliberately to the home directory only -- grade() needs real
tool-call semantics for LLM-based compliance classification, so
truncating/stripping content the way a pure logging hook could isn't an
option here; only the operator-identifying path component needs to go.
New TestParseStreamJsonRedactsHomePath class in
skills/skill-comply/tests/test_runner.py (3 tests) -- full file now
10/10 passing, up from 7/7. Confirmed tests/test_invariant_runner.py (the
sandbox-execution security tests from #2149) still passes clean, 4/4.
Fixes#2730
The find -> sort -> read chain in both scripts used newline-delimited
records (plain read -r), so a skill directory name containing a
literal newline would be split across two records. Verified with a
directory literally named "evil\nskill": the old reader produced a
truncated "evil" fragment plus an orphan "skill/SKILL.md" fragment,
inflating the skill count and throwing awk/date errors on the garbage
paths.
Switch to -print0 / sort -z / read -r -d '' in both scripts so a path
is always read as a single record, regardless of its contents. Paths
under scan are untrusted input.
Addresses further CodeRabbit review feedback on PR #2640.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FhDjpSfrbPpnpqT3CZBEX1
wellkilo