fix: tool node injection bug (#7391)

ensuring that injected args can only be injected by LC code, not LLMs :)

this does not appear to be an actual security concern because it falls
outside of documented usage, the tool node doesn't inject arbitrary args
This commit is contained in:
Sydney Runkle
2026-04-02 11:19:24 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent ee0566d31d
commit 57b314c5d7
2 changed files with 113 additions and 2 deletions
+17 -1
View File
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ from langchain_core.tools.base import (
TOOL_MESSAGE_BLOCK_TYPES,
ToolException,
_DirectlyInjectedToolArg,
_is_injected_arg_type,
get_all_basemodel_annotations,
)
from langgraph._internal._runnable import RunnableCallable
@@ -611,6 +612,7 @@ class _InjectedArgs:
state: dict[str, str | None]
store: str | None
runtime: str | None
all_injected_keys: set[str]
class ToolNode(RunnableCallable):
@@ -1377,7 +1379,15 @@ class ToolNode(RunnableCallable):
if injected.runtime:
injected_args[injected.runtime] = tool_runtime
tool_call_copy["args"] = {**tool_call_copy["args"], **injected_args}
# Strip any caller-supplied values for injected args, then add
# back only trusted values. This prevents an LLM from forging
# hidden InjectedToolArg fields via ToolCall.args.
stripped_args = {
k: v
for k, v in tool_call_copy["args"].items()
if k not in injected.all_injected_keys
}
tool_call_copy["args"] = {**stripped_args, **injected_args}
return tool_call_copy
def _validate_tool_command(
@@ -1841,8 +1851,13 @@ def _get_all_injected_args(tool: BaseTool) -> _InjectedArgs:
state_args: dict[str, str | None] = {}
store_arg: str | None = None
runtime_arg: str | None = None
all_injected_keys: set[str] = set()
for name, type_ in all_annotations.items():
# Track all InjectedToolArg-annotated params (including custom subclasses)
if _is_injected_arg_type(type_):
all_injected_keys.add(name)
# Check for runtime (special case: parameter named "runtime")
if name == "runtime":
runtime_arg = name
@@ -1866,4 +1881,5 @@ def _get_all_injected_args(tool: BaseTool) -> _InjectedArgs:
state=state_args,
store=store_arg,
runtime=runtime_arg,
all_injected_keys=all_injected_keys,
)
+96 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ from langchain_core.messages import (
ToolMessage,
)
from langchain_core.runnables.config import RunnableConfig
from langchain_core.tools import BaseTool, ToolException
from langchain_core.tools import BaseTool, InjectedToolArg, ToolException
from langchain_core.tools import tool as dec_tool
from langgraph.config import get_stream_writer
from langgraph.errors import GraphBubbleUp, GraphInterrupt
@@ -2008,3 +2008,98 @@ async def test_tool_node_inject_runtime_dynamic_tool_via_wrap_tool_call_async()
tool_message = result["messages"][-1]
assert tool_message.content == "dynamic: x=42, tool_call_id=call_dynamic_2"
assert tool_message.tool_call_id == "call_dynamic_2"
# --- InjectedToolArg security tests ---
def test_tool_node_strips_plain_injected_tool_arg() -> None:
"""Plain InjectedToolArg values supplied by the LLM should be stripped."""
@dec_tool
def read_secret(
query: str,
auth: Annotated[dict, InjectedToolArg()],
) -> str:
"""Return secret data based on auth role."""
if auth.get("role") == "admin":
return "ADMIN_SECRET"
return "PUBLIC_DATA"
node = ToolNode([read_secret], handle_tool_errors=True)
# LLM tries to supply the hidden 'auth' field
tool_call = {
"name": "read_secret",
"args": {"query": "hello", "auth": {"role": "admin"}},
"id": "call-1",
"type": "tool_call",
}
msg = AIMessage("", tool_calls=[tool_call])
result = node.invoke({"messages": [msg]}, config=_create_config_with_runtime())
tool_message = result["messages"][-1]
# auth should have been stripped, so tool should fail (missing required arg)
assert "ADMIN_SECRET" not in tool_message.content
def test_tool_node_strips_custom_injected_tool_arg_subclass() -> None:
"""Custom InjectedToolArg subclasses should also be stripped."""
class InjectedAuth(InjectedToolArg):
pass
@dec_tool
def read_secret(
query: str,
auth: Annotated[dict, InjectedAuth()],
) -> str:
"""Return secret data based on auth role."""
if auth.get("role") == "admin":
return "ADMIN_SECRET"
return "PUBLIC_DATA"
node = ToolNode([read_secret], handle_tool_errors=True)
tool_call = {
"name": "read_secret",
"args": {"query": "hello", "auth": {"role": "admin"}},
"id": "call-1",
"type": "tool_call",
}
msg = AIMessage("", tool_calls=[tool_call])
result = node.invoke({"messages": [msg]}, config=_create_config_with_runtime())
tool_message = result["messages"][-1]
assert "ADMIN_SECRET" not in tool_message.content
def test_tool_node_injected_state_overwrites_llm_value() -> None:
"""InjectedState should use graph state, not LLM-supplied values."""
@dec_tool
def read_secret(
query: str,
auth: Annotated[dict, InjectedState("auth")],
) -> str:
"""Return secret data based on auth from graph state."""
if auth.get("role") == "admin":
return "ADMIN_SECRET"
return "PUBLIC_DATA"
node = ToolNode([read_secret])
# LLM tries to supply auth as admin
tool_call = {
"name": "read_secret",
"args": {"query": "hello", "auth": {"role": "admin"}},
"id": "call-1",
"type": "tool_call",
}
msg = AIMessage("", tool_calls=[tool_call])
# Graph state has auth as viewer
result = node.invoke(
{"messages": [msg], "auth": {"role": "viewer"}},
config=_create_config_with_runtime(),
)
tool_message = result["messages"][-1]
assert tool_message.content == "PUBLIC_DATA"