- Fix for DNS Rebinding Bypass via SVCB/HTTPS Records in Unbound.

Thanks to Kunta Chu, School of Software, Tsinghua University,
  Taofei Guo, Peking University, and Jianjun Chen, Institute for
  Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University for the
  report. The private-address option is fixed to also elide
  SVCB and HTTPS records that match the filter.
This commit is contained in:
W.C.A. Wijngaards
2026-03-05 09:47:13 +01:00
parent c4f8e60c85
commit 8f96ae7acf
5 changed files with 467 additions and 3 deletions
+8
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
5 March 2026: Wouter
- Fix for DNS Rebinding Bypass via SVCB/HTTPS Records in Unbound.
Thanks to Kunta Chu, School of Software, Tsinghua University,
Taofei Guo, Peking University, and Jianjun Chen, Institute for
Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University for the
report. The private-address option is fixed to also elide
SVCB and HTTPS records that match the filter.
4 March 2026: Yorgos
- For #1411: Introduce a failing case in the rpl test so that it only
passes with the fix in place.
+5
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@@ -2015,6 +2015,11 @@ These options are part of the ``server:`` section.
turned into a network proxy, allowing remote access through the browser to
other parts of your private network.
The option removes resource records of types A, AAAA, SVCB and HTTPS
that match the filter.
Inside the SVCB and HTTPS records, the svcparams of type ipv4hint
and ipv6hint are checked for matches.
Some names can be allowed to contain your private addresses, by default all
the :ref:`local-data<unbound.conf.local-data>` that you configured is
allowed to, and you can specify additional names using
+167 -1
View File
@@ -207,6 +207,168 @@ size_t priv_get_mem(struct iter_priv* priv)
return sizeof(*priv) + regional_get_mem(priv->region);
}
/**
* Check if svcparam ipv4hint contains a private address.
* @param priv: private address lookup struct.
* @param d: the data bytes.
* @param data_len: number of data bytes in the svcparam.
* @param addr: address to return the private address to log in to.
* It has space for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
* @param addrlen: length of the addr. Returns the correct size for the addr.
* @return true if the rdata contains a private address.
*/
static int svcb_ipv4hint_contains_priv_addr(struct iter_priv* priv,
uint8_t* d, uint16_t data_len, struct sockaddr_storage* addr,
socklen_t* addrlen)
{
struct sockaddr_in sa;
*addrlen = (socklen_t)sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa.sin_port = (in_port_t)htons(UNBOUND_DNS_PORT);
while(data_len >= LDNS_IP4ADDRLEN) {
memmove(&sa.sin_addr, d, LDNS_IP4ADDRLEN);
memmove(addr, &sa, *addrlen);
if(priv_lookup_addr(priv, addr, *addrlen))
return 1;
d += LDNS_IP4ADDRLEN;
data_len -= LDNS_IP4ADDRLEN;
}
/* if data_len != 0 here, then the svcparam is malformed. */
return 0;
}
/**
* Check if svcparam ipv6hint contains a private address.
* @param priv: private address lookup struct.
* @param d: the data bytes.
* @param data_len: number of data bytes in the svcparam.
* @param addr: address to return the private address to log in to.
* It has space for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
* @param addrlen: length of the addr. Returns the correct size for the addr.
* @return true if the rdata contains a private address.
*/
static int svcb_ipv6hint_contains_priv_addr(struct iter_priv* priv,
uint8_t* d, uint16_t data_len, struct sockaddr_storage* addr,
socklen_t* addrlen)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 sa;
*addrlen = (socklen_t)sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
sa.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sa.sin6_port = (in_port_t)htons(UNBOUND_DNS_PORT);
while(data_len >= LDNS_IP6ADDRLEN) {
memmove(&sa.sin6_addr, d, LDNS_IP6ADDRLEN);
memmove(addr, &sa, *addrlen);
if(priv_lookup_addr(priv, addr, *addrlen))
return 1;
d += LDNS_IP6ADDRLEN;
data_len -= LDNS_IP6ADDRLEN;
}
/* if data_len != 0 here, then the svcparam is malformed. */
return 0;
}
/**
* Check if type SVCB and HTTPS rdata contains a private address.
* @param priv: private address lookup struct.
* @param pkt: the packet.
* @param rr: the rr with rdata to check.
* @param addr: address to return the private address to log in to.
* @param addrlen: length of the addr. Initially the total size, on
* return the correct size for the addr.
* @return true if the rdata contains a private address.
*/
static int svcb_rr_contains_priv_addr(struct iter_priv* priv,
sldns_buffer* pkt, struct rr_parse* rr, struct sockaddr_storage* addr,
socklen_t* addrlen)
{
uint8_t* d = rr->ttl_data;
uint16_t svcparamkey, data_len, rdatalen;
size_t oldpos, dname_len, dname_start, dname_compr_len;
d += 4; /* skip TTL */
rdatalen = sldns_read_uint16(d); /* read rdata length */
d += 2;
if(rdatalen < 2 /* priority */ + 1 /* 1 length target */)
return 0; /* malformed, too short */
d += 2; /* skip priority */
rdatalen -= 2;
oldpos = sldns_buffer_position(pkt);
sldns_buffer_set_position(pkt, (size_t)(d - sldns_buffer_begin(pkt)));
dname_start = sldns_buffer_position(pkt);
dname_len = pkt_dname_len(pkt);
dname_compr_len = sldns_buffer_position(pkt) - dname_start;
sldns_buffer_set_position(pkt, oldpos);
if(dname_len == 0)
return 0; /* dname malformed */
if(dname_compr_len > rdatalen)
return 0; /* malformed */
d += dname_compr_len; /* skip target */
rdatalen -= dname_compr_len;
while(rdatalen >= 4) {
svcparamkey = sldns_read_uint16(d);
data_len = sldns_read_uint16(d+2);
d += 4;
rdatalen -= 4;
/* verify that we have data_len data */
if(data_len > rdatalen) {
/* It is malformed, but if there are addresses
* in there it can be rejected. */
data_len = rdatalen;
}
if(!data_len)
continue; /* no data for the svcparamkey */
if(svcparamkey == SVCB_KEY_IPV4HINT) {
if(svcb_ipv4hint_contains_priv_addr(priv, d, data_len,
addr, addrlen))
return 1;
} else if(svcparamkey == SVCB_KEY_IPV6HINT) {
if(svcb_ipv6hint_contains_priv_addr(priv, d, data_len,
addr, addrlen))
return 1;
}
d += data_len;
rdatalen -= data_len;
}
/* If rdatalen != 0 here, then the svcb rdata is malformed. */
return 0;
}
/**
* Check if the SVCB and HTTPS rrset is bad.
* @param priv: private address lookup struct.
* @param pkt: the packet.
* @param rrset: the rrset to check.
* @return 1 if the entire rrset has to be removed. 0 if not.
* It removes RRs if they have private addresses, and log that.
*/
static int priv_svcb_rrset_bad(struct iter_priv* priv, sldns_buffer* pkt,
struct rrset_parse* rrset)
{
struct rr_parse* rr, *prev = NULL;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen = (socklen_t)sizeof(addr);
for(rr = rrset->rr_first; rr; rr = rr->next) {
if(svcb_rr_contains_priv_addr(priv, pkt, rr, &addr,
&addrlen)) {
if(msgparse_rrset_remove_rr("sanitize: removing public name with private address", pkt, rrset, prev, rr, &addr, addrlen))
return 1;
continue;
}
prev = rr;
}
return 0;
}
int priv_rrset_bad(struct iter_priv* priv, sldns_buffer* pkt,
struct rrset_parse* rrset)
{
@@ -268,7 +430,11 @@ int priv_rrset_bad(struct iter_priv* priv, sldns_buffer* pkt,
}
prev = rr;
}
}
} else if(rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SVCB ||
rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_HTTPS) {
if(priv_svcb_rrset_bad(priv, pkt, rrset))
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
+4 -2
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@@ -972,8 +972,10 @@ scrub_sanitize(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
}
/* remove private addresses */
if( (rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_A ||
rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_AAAA)) {
if(rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_A ||
rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_AAAA ||
rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SVCB ||
rrset->type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_HTTPS) {
/* do not set servfail since this leads to too
* many drops of other people using rfc1918 space */
+283
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@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
; config options
server:
target-fetch-policy: "0 0 0 0 0"
qname-minimisation: no
minimal-responses: yes
iter-scrub-promiscuous: yes
private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
private-address: fd00::/8
private-address: fe80::/10
private-domain: "example.net"
stub-zone:
name: "."
stub-addr: 193.0.14.129 # K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
CONFIG_END
SCENARIO_BEGIN Test iterator scrubber with private addresses in SVCB.
; K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
ADDRESS 193.0.14.129
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
. IN NS
SECTION ANSWER
. IN NS K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. IN A 193.0.14.129
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode subdomain
ADJUST copy_id copy_query
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
com. IN A
SECTION AUTHORITY
com. IN NS a.gtld-servers.net.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
a.gtld-servers.net. IN A 192.5.6.30
ENTRY_END
; root server authoritative for example.net too.
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR AA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
mail.example.net. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
mail.example.net. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.net. ipv4hint=10.20.30.40
ENTRY_END
RANGE_END
; a.gtld-servers.net.
RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
ADDRESS 192.5.6.30
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
com. IN NS
SECTION ANSWER
com. IN NS a.gtld-servers.net.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
a.gtld-servers.net. IN A 192.5.6.30
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode subdomain
ADJUST copy_id copy_query
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
example.com. IN A
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_END
RANGE_END
; ns.example.com.
RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
ADDRESS 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
example.com. IN NS
SECTION ANSWER
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
ns.example.com. IN A
SECTION ANSWER
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
ns.example.com. IN AAAA
SECTION ANSWER
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN SOA ns.example.com. root.example.com. 4 14400 3600 604800 3600
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR AA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
www.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv4hint=192.20.30.40
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR AA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
mail.example.com. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
mail.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv6hint=fe80::15
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR AA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
foo.example.com. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
foo.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv4hint=10.20.30.40
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qtype qname
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR AA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
toss.example.com. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
toss.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv4hint=10.20.30.40
toss.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv4hint=10.20.30.40
toss.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv4hint=1.2.3.4
toss.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv6hint=fe80::15
toss.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv4hint=10.20.30.41
toss.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv4hint=192.0.2.1,10.20.30.42,192.0.2.2
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_END
RANGE_END
; public address is not scrubbed
STEP 1 QUERY
ENTRY_BEGIN
REPLY RD
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN SVCB
ENTRY_END
; recursion happens here.
STEP 2 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH all
REPLY QR RD RA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
www.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv4hint=192.20.30.40
ENTRY_END
; IPv4 address is scrubbed
STEP 3 QUERY
ENTRY_BEGIN
REPLY RD
SECTION QUESTION
foo.example.com. IN SVCB
ENTRY_END
; recursion happens here.
STEP 10 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH all
REPLY QR RD RA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
foo.example.com. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
; scrubbed away
ENTRY_END
; IPv6 address is scrubbed
STEP 20 QUERY
ENTRY_BEGIN
REPLY RD
SECTION QUESTION
mail.example.com. IN SVCB
ENTRY_END
STEP 30 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH all
REPLY QR RD RA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
mail.example.com. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
ENTRY_END
; allowed domain is not scrubbed.
STEP 40 QUERY
ENTRY_BEGIN
REPLY RD
SECTION QUESTION
mail.example.net. IN SVCB
ENTRY_END
STEP 50 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH all
REPLY QR RD RA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
mail.example.net. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
mail.example.net. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.net. ipv4hint=10.20.30.40
ENTRY_END
; rest of RRset intact, only 10/8 tossed away.
STEP 60 QUERY
ENTRY_BEGIN
REPLY RD
SECTION QUESTION
toss.example.com. IN SVCB
ENTRY_END
STEP 70 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH all
REPLY QR RD RA NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
toss.example.com. IN SVCB
SECTION ANSWER
toss.example.com. IN SVCB 1 foo.example.com. ipv4hint=1.2.3.4
ENTRY_END
SCENARIO_END