Files
ECC/scripts/hooks/block-no-verify.js
T
b3a2d3586b fix(block-no-verify): bound the flag scan to the enclosing quote/heredoc line
The scanner locked onto a `git commit` literal that sat inside a quoted
string of an OUTER command (a python heredoc's string, a VAR="..."
assignment, a printf JSON payload), then hasNoVerifyFlag() re-tokenized from
that inner offset with a fresh quote state. When quote parity flipped, the
"segment" ran past the enclosing string and picked up an unrelated later
`bash -n` / `sed -n` / `grep -n` as `commit -n`. Two legitimate commands were
blocked this way in one working session.

The first attempt at this PR (d5c428c) fixed the false positive by SKIPPING
`git` tokens judged to be in "data" context. That was the wrong lever: data
becomes executable the moment it is piped to a shell (`echo '...' | bash`,
`bash <<< '...'`, `cat <<EOF | bash`), and no regex list of shell invocations
is complete (`bash --noprofile -c` slipped). Three independent reviewers
(codex, Greptile, CodeRabbit) demonstrated executing bypasses; that commit is
squashed away here and none of its behaviour survives.

This version keeps every `git` candidate visible and keeps main's blocking
surface intact. A single O(n) preprocessing pass (buildScanBoundaries)
records, for each enclosed character, the closing quote or the current
heredoc-body line end. Subcommand discovery and flag tokenization are capped
at that boundary, so tokens after the enclosing data can never leak into a
candidate's argument list. Also: comment detection is a single mask pass
instead of a repeated prefix scan; heredoc parsing accepts quoted hyphenated
delimiters and CRLF terminators and preserves the `<<` vs `<<-` tab
distinction; quote-assembled words (`g''it`) are recognized.

Verified (all payloads run through the hook as JSON on stdin):
- red-list, 24 executing forms incl. every reviewer-reported bypass -> exit 2
  on main AND here (CRLF heredoc trailer: 0 on main, 2 here);
- green-list, 16 leak-class false positives -> exit 2 on main, 0 here;
- tests/hooks/block-no-verify.test.js 84/84 (main's 25 retained verbatim,
  d5c428c's 8 removed, 59 table-driven red/green cases added);
  tests/hooks/cursor-block-no-verify.test.js 14/14;
- 204,807-byte command with 8,905 non-command `git` literals: 8.5 ms.

Co-Authored-By: Codex (GPT) <noreply@openai.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EyuZY1LZNuShHiewExekLT
2026-09-04 22:35:09 -04:00

892 lines
21 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* PreToolUse Hook: Block --no-verify flag
*
* Blocks git hook-bypass flags (--no-verify, -c core.hooksPath=) to protect
* pre-commit, commit-msg, and pre-push hooks from being skipped by AI agents.
*
* Replaces the previous npx-based invocation that failed in pnpm-only projects
* (EBADDEVENGINES) and could not be disabled via ECC_DISABLED_HOOKS.
*
* Exit codes:
* 0 = allow (not a git command or no bypass flags)
* 2 = block (bypass flag detected)
*/
'use strict';
const MAX_STDIN = 1024 * 1024;
let raw = '';
/**
* Git commands that support the --no-verify flag.
*/
const GIT_COMMANDS_WITH_NO_VERIFY = [
'commit',
'push',
'merge',
'cherry-pick',
'rebase',
'am',
];
/**
* Characters that can appear immediately before 'git' in a command string.
*/
const VALID_BEFORE_GIT = ' \t\n\r;&|$`(<{!"\']/.~\\';
// Git config section and variable names are case-insensitive
// (subsection names are case-sensitive but core.hooksPath has none),
// so we normalize the candidate token to lowercase before matching.
// See https://git-scm.com/docs/git-config — "The variable names are
// case-insensitive."
const GIT_CONFIG_KEY_PREFIX = 'core.hookspath=';
const COMMIT_OPTIONS_WITH_VALUE = new Set([
'-m',
'--message',
'-F',
'--file',
'-C',
'--reuse-message',
'-c',
'--reedit-message',
'--author',
'--date',
'--template',
'--fixup',
'--squash',
'--pathspec-from-file',
]);
const COMMIT_OPTIONS_WITH_INLINE_VALUE = [
'--message=',
'--file=',
'--reuse-message=',
'--reedit-message=',
'--author=',
'--date=',
'--template=',
'--fixup=',
'--squash=',
'--pathspec-from-file=',
];
// Short options that take a value. When seen as part of a combined
// short-option token (e.g. -tn), git's parser treats the rest of the
// token as the option's value (template path 'n' here), so the scanner
// must stop at this character — anything after it is the inline value,
// not another flag.
const COMMIT_SHORT_OPTIONS_WITH_VALUE = new Set(['m', 'F', 'C', 'c', 't']);
function tokenizeShellWords(input, start = 0, end = input.length) {
const tokens = [];
let value = '';
let tokenStart = null;
let quote = null;
let escaped = false;
function beginToken(index) {
if (tokenStart === null) {
tokenStart = index;
}
}
function pushToken(index) {
if (tokenStart === null) {
return;
}
tokens.push({
value,
start: tokenStart,
end: index,
});
value = '';
tokenStart = null;
}
for (let i = start; i < end; i++) {
const char = input.charAt(i);
if (escaped) {
beginToken(i - 1);
value += char;
escaped = false;
continue;
}
if (quote) {
if (char === quote) {
quote = null;
continue;
}
if (quote === '"' && char === '\\') {
beginToken(i);
escaped = true;
continue;
}
beginToken(i);
value += char;
continue;
}
if (char === '"' || char === "'") {
beginToken(i);
quote = char;
continue;
}
if (char === '\\') {
beginToken(i);
escaped = true;
continue;
}
if (/\s/.test(char)) {
pushToken(i);
continue;
}
beginToken(i);
value += char;
}
if (escaped) {
value += '\\';
}
pushToken(end);
return tokens;
}
/**
* Find the end of a shell command segment without scanning beyond `limit`.
*/
function findCommandSegmentEnd(input, start, limit = input.length) {
let quote = null;
let escaped = false;
for (let i = start; i < limit; i++) {
const char = input.charAt(i);
if (escaped) {
escaped = false;
continue;
}
if (quote) {
if (quote === '"' && char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
continue;
}
if (char === quote) {
quote = null;
}
continue;
}
if (char === '"' || char === "'") {
quote = char;
continue;
}
if (char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
continue;
}
if (char === ';' || char === '|' || char === '&' || char === '\n') {
return i;
}
}
return limit;
}
function commitOptionConsumesNextValue(value) {
if (isCommitNoVerifyShortFlag(value)) {
return false;
}
if (COMMIT_OPTIONS_WITH_VALUE.has(value)) {
return true;
}
const shortValueOption = getCommitShortValueOption(value);
return Boolean(shortValueOption && shortValueOption.consumesNextValue);
}
function commitOptionContainsInlineValue(value) {
if (isCommitNoVerifyShortFlag(value)) {
return false;
}
if (COMMIT_OPTIONS_WITH_INLINE_VALUE.some(prefix => value.startsWith(prefix))) {
return true;
}
const shortValueOption = getCommitShortValueOption(value);
return Boolean(shortValueOption && shortValueOption.containsInlineValue);
}
function getCommitShortValueOption(value) {
if (!value.startsWith('-') || value.startsWith('--') || value === '-') {
return null;
}
const options = value.slice(1);
for (let i = 0; i < options.length; i++) {
if (COMMIT_SHORT_OPTIONS_WITH_VALUE.has(options.charAt(i))) {
return {
consumesNextValue: i === options.length - 1,
containsInlineValue: i < options.length - 1,
};
}
}
return null;
}
function isCommitNoVerifyShortFlag(value) {
return value === '-n' || /^-n[a-zA-Z]/.test(value);
}
/**
* Precompute the positions that follow a comment marker on their current line.
* This preserves the hook's existing comment heuristic without rescanning a
* potentially long line for every `git` candidate.
*/
function buildCommentMask(input) {
const comments = new Uint8Array(input.length);
let afterCommentMarker = false;
let quote = null;
let escaped = false;
for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++) {
const char = input.charAt(i);
if (char === '\n') {
afterCommentMarker = false;
escaped = false;
continue;
}
comments[i] = afterCommentMarker ? 1 : 0;
if (afterCommentMarker) continue;
if (escaped) {
escaped = false;
continue;
}
if (quote) {
if (quote === '"' && char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
} else if (char === quote) {
quote = null;
}
continue;
}
if (char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
continue;
}
if (char === '"' || char === "'") {
quote = char;
continue;
}
if (char === '#' && (i === 0 || /[\s;&|()]/.test(input.charAt(i - 1)))) {
const previous = i > 0 ? input.charAt(i - 1) : '';
if (previous !== '$' && previous !== '\\') afterCommentMarker = true;
}
}
return comments;
}
/**
* Compute the maximum scan endpoint for characters inside outer quotes and
* heredoc body lines. The hook deliberately keeps every `git` candidate: quoted
* data may later be executed by a shell. Bounds only prevent a candidate's flag
* scan from leaking into unrelated text after its enclosing quote or body line.
*/
function buildScanBoundaries(input) {
const boundaries = new Int32Array(input.length);
boundaries.fill(-1);
const pendingHeredocs = [];
let quote = null;
let quoteStart = -1;
let escaped = false;
let comment = false;
for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++) {
if ((i === 0 || input.charAt(i - 1) === '\n') && pendingHeredocs.length > 0) {
const lineEnd = input.indexOf('\n', i);
const physicalEnd = lineEnd === -1 ? input.length : lineEnd;
const contentEnd = input.charAt(physicalEnd - 1) === '\r' ? physicalEnd - 1 : physicalEnd;
const heredoc = pendingHeredocs[0];
const line = input.slice(i, contentEnd);
const comparableLine = heredoc.stripTabs ? line.replace(/^\t+/, '') : line;
if (comparableLine === heredoc.delimiter) {
pendingHeredocs.shift();
} else {
boundaries.fill(contentEnd, i, contentEnd);
}
i = physicalEnd;
continue;
}
const char = input.charAt(i);
if (comment) {
if (char === '\n') comment = false;
continue;
}
if (escaped) {
escaped = false;
continue;
}
if (quote) {
if (quote === '"' && char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
continue;
}
if (char === quote) {
boundaries.fill(i, quoteStart + 1, i);
quote = null;
quoteStart = -1;
}
continue;
}
if (char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
continue;
}
if (char === '"' || char === "'") {
quote = char;
quoteStart = i;
continue;
}
if (char === '#' && (i === 0 || /[\s;&|()]/.test(input.charAt(i - 1)))) {
comment = true;
continue;
}
if (char === '<' && input.charAt(i + 1) === '<' && input.charAt(i + 2) !== '<') {
const heredocMatch = /^<<(-?)[ \t]*(?:'([^']+)'|"([^"]+)"|([^ \t\r\n;|&()<>]+))/.exec(input.slice(i));
if (heredocMatch) {
pendingHeredocs.push({
delimiter: heredocMatch[2] || heredocMatch[3] || heredocMatch[4],
stripTabs: heredocMatch[1] === '-',
});
i += heredocMatch[0].length - 1;
}
}
}
if (quote) boundaries.fill(input.length, quoteStart + 1);
return boundaries;
}
/**
* Return the enclosing quote or heredoc-line endpoint for a candidate.
*/
function getScanBoundary(boundaries, idx, fallback) {
const boundary = boundaries[idx];
return boundary >= 0 ? boundary : fallback;
}
/**
* Parse the first non-global-option word after a `git` executable token.
* Git chooses that word as its subcommand, so later words cannot change it.
*/
function findGitSubcommand(input, start, end) {
let value = '';
let tokenStart = -1;
let quote = null;
let escaped = false;
let expectOptionValue = false;
/**
* Classify a completed word, returning a protected Git subcommand if found.
*/
function classifyWord() {
if (tokenStart === -1) return null;
const completed = { value, start: tokenStart };
value = '';
tokenStart = -1;
if (expectOptionValue) {
expectOptionValue = false;
return null;
}
if (completed.value.startsWith('-')) {
if (completed.value === '-c' || completed.value === '-C' ||
completed.value === '--work-tree' || completed.value === '--git-dir' ||
completed.value === '--namespace' || completed.value === '--super-prefix') {
expectOptionValue = true;
}
return null;
}
return {
terminal: true,
command: GIT_COMMANDS_WITH_NO_VERIFY.includes(completed.value) ? completed.value : null,
start: completed.start,
};
}
for (let i = start; i < end; i++) {
const char = input.charAt(i);
if (escaped) {
if (tokenStart === -1) tokenStart = i - 1;
value += char;
escaped = false;
continue;
}
if (quote) {
if (char === quote) {
quote = null;
} else if (quote === '"' && char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
} else {
if (tokenStart === -1) tokenStart = i;
value += char;
}
continue;
}
if (char === '"' || char === "'") {
if (tokenStart === -1) tokenStart = i;
quote = char;
continue;
}
if (char === '\\') {
if (tokenStart === -1) tokenStart = i;
escaped = true;
continue;
}
if (/\s/.test(char) || char === ';' || char === '|' || char === '&') {
const completed = classifyWord();
if (completed?.terminal) return completed;
if (char === ';' || char === '|' || char === '&' || char === '\n') return null;
continue;
}
if (tokenStart === -1) tokenStart = i;
value += char;
}
return classifyWord();
}
/**
* Find the next contiguous raw `git` token starting from a position.
*/
function findRawGit(input, start) {
let pos = start;
while (pos < input.length) {
const idx = input.indexOf('git', pos);
if (idx === -1) return null;
const isExe = input.slice(idx + 3, idx + 7).toLowerCase() === '.exe';
const len = isExe ? 7 : 3;
const after = input[idx + len] || ' ';
if (!/[\s"']/.test(after)) {
pos = idx + 1;
continue;
}
const before = idx > 0 ? input[idx - 1] : ' ';
if (VALID_BEFORE_GIT.includes(before)) return { idx, len, end: idx + len };
pos = idx + 1;
}
return null;
}
/**
* Find a shell word assembled through quoting or escapes that evaluates to
* `git` or `git.exe`. Only words before `end` need inspection because a raw
* candidate at that position is already known to be earlier.
*/
function findAssembledGit(input, start, end) {
let value = '';
let tokenStart = -1;
let quote = null;
let escaped = false;
/**
* Complete the current word and return it when it evaluates to Git.
*/
function completeWord(wordEnd) {
if (tokenStart === -1) return null;
const normalized = value.toLowerCase();
const candidate = normalized === 'git' || normalized === 'git.exe'
? { idx: tokenStart, len: wordEnd - tokenStart, end: wordEnd }
: null;
value = '';
tokenStart = -1;
return candidate;
}
for (let i = start; i < end; i++) {
const char = input.charAt(i);
if (escaped) {
value += char;
escaped = false;
continue;
}
if (quote) {
if (char === quote) {
quote = null;
} else if (quote === '"' && char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
} else {
value += char;
}
continue;
}
if (char === '"' || char === "'") {
if (tokenStart === -1) tokenStart = i;
quote = char;
continue;
}
if (char === '\\') {
if (tokenStart === -1) tokenStart = i;
escaped = true;
continue;
}
if (/\s/.test(char) || char === ';' || char === '|' || char === '&') {
const candidate = completeWord(i);
if (candidate) return candidate;
continue;
}
if (tokenStart === -1) tokenStart = i;
value += char;
}
return completeWord(end);
}
/**
* Find the next raw or shell-assembled Git executable token.
*/
function findGit(input, start) {
const rawCandidate = findRawGit(input, start);
const assembledCandidate = findAssembledGit(
input,
start,
rawCandidate ? rawCandidate.idx : input.length
);
return assembledCandidate || rawCandidate;
}
/**
* Normalize the shell word containing `idx`, including adjacent quoted and
* escaped fragments, and return its raw endpoint.
*/
function assembleShellWordContaining(input, idx) {
let wordStart = idx;
while (wordStart > 0 && !/[\s;&|]/.test(input.charAt(wordStart - 1))) {
wordStart--;
}
let value = '';
let quote = null;
let escaped = false;
let wordEnd = input.length;
for (let i = wordStart; i < input.length; i++) {
const char = input.charAt(i);
if (escaped) {
value += char;
escaped = false;
continue;
}
if (quote) {
if (char === quote) {
quote = null;
} else if (quote === '"' && char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
} else {
value += char;
}
continue;
}
if (char === '"' || char === "'") {
quote = char;
continue;
}
if (char === '\\') {
escaped = true;
continue;
}
if (/\s/.test(char) || char === ';' || char === '|' || char === '&') {
wordEnd = i;
break;
}
value += char;
}
return { value: value.toLowerCase(), end: wordEnd };
}
/**
* Detect which git subcommand (commit, push, etc.) is being invoked.
* Returns { command, offset } where offset is the position right after the
* subcommand keyword, so callers can scope flag checks to only that portion.
*/
function detectGitCommand(input, boundaries, comments, start = 0) {
while (start < input.length) {
const git = findGit(input, start);
if (!git) return null;
if (comments[git.idx]) {
start = git.end;
continue;
}
const rawGitEnd = git.end;
const enclosingEnd = getScanBoundary(boundaries, git.idx, input.length);
const quotedExecutable = enclosingEnd === rawGitEnd;
const assembledWord = quotedExecutable
? assembleShellWordContaining(input, git.idx)
: null;
const assembledExecutable = assembledWord &&
(assembledWord.value === 'git' || assembledWord.value === 'git.exe');
if (quotedExecutable && !assembledExecutable) {
start = git.end;
continue;
}
const gitEnd = assembledExecutable ? assembledWord.end : rawGitEnd;
const scanEnd = quotedExecutable ? input.length : enclosingEnd;
const subcommand = findGitSubcommand(input, gitEnd, scanEnd);
if (subcommand?.command) {
return {
command: subcommand.command,
offset: subcommand.start + subcommand.command.length,
gitStart: git.idx,
gitEnd,
commandStart: subcommand.start,
scanEnd,
};
}
start = git.end;
}
return null;
}
/**
* Check if the input contains a --no-verify flag for a specific git command.
* Only inspects the portion of the input starting at `offset` (the position
* right after the detected subcommand keyword) so that flags belonging to
* earlier commands in a chain are not falsely matched.
*/
function hasNoVerifyFlag(input, command, offset, scanEnd) {
const segmentEnd = findCommandSegmentEnd(input, offset, scanEnd);
const tokens = tokenizeShellWords(input, offset, segmentEnd);
let skipNext = false;
for (const token of tokens) {
const value = token.value;
if (skipNext) {
skipNext = false;
continue;
}
if (value === '--') {
break;
}
if (command === 'commit') {
if (commitOptionConsumesNextValue(value)) {
skipNext = true;
continue;
}
if (commitOptionContainsInlineValue(value)) {
continue;
}
}
if (value === '--no-verify') return true;
// For commit, -n is shorthand for --no-verify.
if (command === 'commit' && isCommitNoVerifyShortFlag(value)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Check if the input contains a -c core.hooksPath= override.
*/
function hasHooksPathOverride(input, detected) {
const tokens = tokenizeShellWords(input, detected.gitEnd, detected.commandStart);
for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
const value = tokens[i].value;
// Git config section + variable names are case-insensitive, so a
// bypass attempt like `core.HOOKSPATH=...` or `core.hookspath=...`
// must compare against the lowercased token.
const lowered = value.toLowerCase();
if (value === '-c') {
const next = tokens[i + 1] && tokens[i + 1].value;
if (typeof next === 'string' && next.toLowerCase().startsWith(GIT_CONFIG_KEY_PREFIX)) {
return true;
}
i++;
continue;
}
if (lowered.startsWith(`-c${GIT_CONFIG_KEY_PREFIX}`)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Check a command string for git hook bypass attempts.
*/
function checkCommand(input) {
const boundaries = buildScanBoundaries(input);
const comments = buildCommentMask(input);
let start = 0;
while (start < input.length) {
const detected = detectGitCommand(input, boundaries, comments, start);
if (!detected) return { blocked: false };
const { command: gitCommand, offset } = detected;
if (hasHooksPathOverride(input, detected)) {
return {
blocked: true,
reason: `BLOCKED: Overriding core.hooksPath is not allowed with git ${gitCommand}. Git hooks must not be bypassed.`,
};
}
if (hasNoVerifyFlag(input, gitCommand, offset, detected.scanEnd)) {
return {
blocked: true,
reason: `BLOCKED: --no-verify flag is not allowed with git ${gitCommand}. Git hooks must not be bypassed.`,
};
}
start = findCommandSegmentEnd(input, offset, detected.scanEnd) + 1;
}
return { blocked: false };
}
/**
* Extract the command string from hook input (JSON or plain text).
*/
function extractCommand(rawInput) {
const trimmed = rawInput.trim();
if (!trimmed.startsWith('{')) return trimmed;
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);
if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null) return trimmed;
// Claude Code format: { tool_input: { command: "..." } }
const cmd = parsed.tool_input?.command;
if (typeof cmd === 'string') return cmd;
// Generic JSON formats
for (const key of ['command', 'cmd', 'input', 'shell', 'script']) {
if (typeof parsed[key] === 'string') return parsed[key];
}
return trimmed;
} catch {
return trimmed;
}
}
/**
* Exportable run() for in-process execution via run-with-flags.js.
*/
function run(rawInput) {
const command = extractCommand(rawInput);
const result = checkCommand(command);
if (result.blocked) {
return {
exitCode: 2,
stderr: result.reason,
};
}
return { exitCode: 0 };
}
module.exports = { run };
// Stdin fallback for spawnSync execution — only when invoked directly, not via require()
if (require.main === module) {
process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
process.stdin.on('data', chunk => {
if (raw.length < MAX_STDIN) {
const remaining = MAX_STDIN - raw.length;
raw += chunk.substring(0, remaining);
}
});
process.stdin.on('end', () => {
const command = extractCommand(raw);
const result = checkCommand(command);
if (result.blocked) {
process.stderr.write(result.reason + '\n');
process.exit(2);
}
process.stdout.write(raw);
});
}